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Toward a New Philosophical Basis
for Parapsychological Phenomena

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Biographical Note

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TOWARD A NEW PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS
FOR PARAPSYCHOLOGICAL PHENOMENA

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I. EXPERIENTIALISM CONSTITUTES A RADICALLY NEW APPROACH

Various philosophers have been concerned with parapsychology. J. B. Rhine and his associates (1940, p. 6-8)¹ reviewed treatments of ESP in philosophy from ancient times up to the date of their treatise. Since 1940 several outstanding philosophical treatments of psychical research have been published. Among these are *Nature, Mind and Death* (1951) and *The Belief in a Life After Death* (1961), both by C. J. Ducasse; *Religion, Philosophy, and Psychical Research* (1953) and *Lectures on Psychical Research* (1963), both by C. D. Broad; and various writings (1939-1956) by H. H. Price. Several of J. B. Rhine's own publications since 1940 discuss philosophical aspects of parapsychology. But the present paper has been developed because of a conviction that further philosophical explorations and agreements are needed with respect to a major series of psychical-research and parapsychological problems.

THE FOLLOWING PROBLEMS REQUIRE FURTHER PHILOSOPHICAL ILLUMINATION

1. *The nature of "astral matter" needs clarification.* In what sense do collectively perceived apparitions, and their clothing and accessories, involve material or semi-material embodiments? Related problems arise in connection with materialization: In what sense is ectoplasm a form of matter? A third aspect of the same general question is raised by shared dreams. In what sense (if at all) are dream bodies, and the environments of such bodies as perceived in dreams, material?

2. *In what senses, if at all, are various types of apparitions conscious?* How about persons who, during out-of-the-body experiences, are perceived by others as apparitions? How about other apparitions of the living? How about apparitions when the appearers were conscious elsewhere at the moment when the apparition was perceived as acting apparently consciously? How about apparitions of the dead?

¹Bibliographic details, for this and for all subsequent parenthetical references, will be found in the list of "References" at the end of this paper.

3. *How can the phenomena of precognition be fitted into a rational and comprehensive system of philosophy?*

4. *What light can a new philosophical approach throw on the problem of survival?* In what sense (if at all) does personal identity survive bodily death?

5. *What about clairvoyance?* This significant question was raised by Professor Broad (1953, p. 43), when he asked: "Have those who believe that clairvoyance occurs, and deny that it is analogous to any form of sense perception, any positive notion of its psychological nature or its *modus operandi*? If they have, it is most desirable that they should expound it."

6. *How can psi be incorporated into natural science?* Out of a cooperative discussion (Hart and Associates, 1953, p. 72) participated in by C. J. Ducasse, F. L. Kunz, Laurence J. Lafleur, Gardner Murphy, Charles E. Ozanne, Dorothy H. Pope, J. G. Pratt, H. H. Price, J. B. Rhine, J. R. Smythies, Robert H. Thouless, G. N. M. Tyrrell, and others, the following conclusion developed: "From several different angles the fact is beginning to emerge that parapsychological phenomena must be treated as an integral part of reality in general. One common trend which appears in the work of Rhine, Thouless, Wiesner, Carington and others . . . is the recognition that psi phenomena can be understood only if we are able to incorporate them into the basic scheme of thought by means of which we deal with life in general."

7. *How can philosophical thinking about psychic matters become convergent rather than divergent?* One of the major differences between science and other modes of thought is that science reaches results which can be verified by any competent investigator, whereas other modes of thought (unless controlled authoritarily) tend to diverge into controversial disagreements. A major objective of the present paper is to explore possibilities of achieving increasing convergence in philosophical thinking about psi.

WHY NOT BE *REALLY* SKEPTICAL?

Skepticism of psychic phenomena appears to be becoming something of a collective obsession. It hardly needs to be stated that this is true of naïve materialists—including the great bulk of the psychologists and sociologists of the present day. Physicists and chemists can hardly be said to be *naïve* materialists, since matter has dissolved into mathematical formulas in their sciences. But it might be fair to say that a great majority of natural scientists is imprisoned by what Walter Franklin Prince called "The Enchanted Boundary" (1930).

This extreme incredulity about psychic phenomena appears recently to have been spreading among parapsychologists and even among psychical researchers—British, American, and of other nationalities.

The tendency to accept materialistic phenomena with naïve credulity, while grasping at any hypothesis, however extreme, to explain away phenomena pointing toward the reality of a spiritual world and of survival beyond death, appears to have become more or less pandemic in psychical-research and parapsychological publications. One example is the credulity with which the "Super-ESP" hypothesis has been used (see Gauld, 1961).

A suitable rejoinder to such skepticism would seem to be the challenge: "Let us be really, thoroughly, fundamentally, rigorously skeptical!" This is what Experientialism undertakes to do.

EXPERIENTIALISM IS BASED ON COOPERATIVE DISCUSSION AND ON CONSTRUCTIVE SKEPTICISM

Cooperative discussion operates on the postulate that philosophical questions are problems to be solved, not battles to be won. The second postulate of Experientialism is that valid philosophy needs to take as its foundations only such propositions as cannot be denied without reasserting them in the very denial. This skeptical approach is basic; the cooperative rather than combative approach is a matter of methodology. Let us consider first this methodological postulate, and then deal with the skeptical approach.

Philosophy has become largely an arid area of futile combat. It has become an esoteric preserve, in which hair-splitting logicians reciprocally prove each other's theories to be untenable. Judging by current philosophical publications,² any good philosopher can demonstrate that the conclusions of any other philosopher, however eminent, are logically untenable.

Hence philosophical thought is divergent. Science is convergent—the conclusions of competent researchers tend to confirm the conclusions of other competent researchers—the findings draw closer and closer together. But philosophers, like theologians—and like lawyers (except where a Supreme Court imposes authoritarian agreements)—keep splitting into mutually contradictory schools. If such thinking were the last resort of philosophy, then those who seek solutions for the vital problems of psychical research, and of living in general, would have no alternative except to accept blindly the demonstrably unsound conclusions of one or another of the divergent schools of thought.

But cooperative discussion can displace antagonistic controversy. In this approach each participant endeavors to examine open-mindedly and as clearly as possible the positions taken by the other participants,

²As recent examples, take the article on "Dispensing with Existence," by Dial C. Williams, in the November 8, 1962 number of *The Journal of Philosophy*, and the protracted controversy which has been raging on the subject of "Contrary-to-fact Conditionals," e.g., Bernard Mayo's "Conditional Statements," in the *Philosophical Review*, Vol. 60 (July 1957) 291-304.

and endeavors open-mindedly (and more or less humbly) to discover areas of agreement, and to state points at issue with sufficient objectivity and clarity to facilitate approaches toward resolving them. The issues thus clarified through cooperative discussion are formulated with a view to being subjected to factual research. Systematic analysis of factual data, and testing of hypotheses by means of repeatable experiments, are integrated with cooperative discussion at every step.

This type of discussion is one which I, as Professor of Sociology at Bryn Mawr, Duke University, and other educational institutions, have been developing into laboratory exercises which have been devoted to seeking agreement on such issues as admitting Negro students to college classes on a par with whites, seeking areas of agreement between the diverse approaches toward world government, seeking to clarify the controversy between Senator Joseph McCarthy and the State Department, and so on. On each of the above questions I have published articles or brochures setting forth the results of this technique.

Experientialism has been developing through three decades of cooperative discussion and factual research. In retrospect, its initiation may be taken to have occurred in an article on "Visions and Apparitions Collectively and Reciprocally Perceived," by Hornell and Ella B. Hart (1933). Its logical procedures were explored in a preliminary way in Hornell Hart's "Operationism Analyzed Operationally" (1940). Some of these procedures were further validated in "Toward an Operational Definition of the Term 'Operation'" (1953).

Shortly after the Utrecht Conference, discussion through correspondence was initiated under "The International Project on ESP Projection," out of which developed two articles on "The Psychic Fifth Dimension" (1953), and an 86-page article on "Six Theories About Apparitions" (1956).

During the fall semester of 1956, at Duke University, a seminar was conducted, out of which, supplemented by correspondence with Professors C. J. Ducasse, H. H. Price, Gardner Murphy, and others, the initial foundations of the Experiential Philosophy emerged, being embodied in an unpublished mimeographed document entitled: "Can Verifiable Philosophical Foundations Be Laid for Sociopsychological Research?" The present article is a revision of a lecture under the auspices of the Duke University Parapsychological Laboratory on March 7, 1963, which attempted to summarize the Experiential Philosophy and to point out some of its bearings on parapsychology. Criticisms of the present draft by Professor Ducasse have been of inestimable value in clarifying the terminology and improving the formulation of the basic structure.

The second postulate of Experientialism is the constructively skeptical approach. The meaning of *skeptical*, as the term is used here, is defined operationally by the following four rules:

FOUR PROCEDURAL RULES PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR A RIGOROUSLY SKEPTICAL APPROACH

Skepticism is adopted as the base of departure in order to arrive at rigorously verifiable conclusions. Four basic rules of procedure are employed as means to arrive at such conclusions:

1. *Use uncontradictable propositions as basic.* Experientialism seeks to follow the advice of Korzybski³ (1941) to the effect that any sound philosophy must be based upon such propositions as cannot be denied without reasserting them in the denial (cf. Descartes, 1637). Professor Ducasse has pointed out that this is simply an application of the basic principle of contradictions.

2. *Define and measure crucial terms and variables operationally.* Operational definitions and measurements are those which state the operations and observations by means of which the thing defined is identified, or the variable is measured, and states them so clearly and specifically that any competent person will obtain essentially the same classifications and measurements as any other competent person does (cf. Hart and Associates, 1956, pp. 183-86).

3. *Test hypotheses by systematic collections of operationally defined and measured data, and by repeatable experiments.* A repeatable experiment is one for which the essential elements and procedures are stated in such clear operational and observational terms that any competent person, using the instructions, will obtain essentially the same results as any other competent experimenter.

4. *Resolve disagreements by cooperative discussion.* Employing the above three rules will frequently involve differences of opinion. To arrive at working agreements, tested techniques of cooperative discussion are available such as have been demonstrated in the projects referred to on pages 41 to 46 but with still further improvements.

THE FOLLOWING UNCONTRADICTABLE PROPOSITIONS ARE BASIC

Two additional procedural rules constitute the first uncontradictable propositions:

1. *We shall need, at first, to use common sense definitions.* More formally stated, this proposition may be put as follows: Pending the development of operational definitions for pivotal terms, this search for truth can succeed only if use is made of current definitions about which no dispute or ambiguity is evident.

Suppose that that proposition is denied by saying: "Every proposition used in this search for truth must consist entirely of words which have previously been defined in operational terms." That would be a

³For a brief summary of Korzybski's philosophy, see Vincent E. Smith (1950).

proposition used in this search for truth, and if the denial were correct, every word in it would have had to have been operationally defined in advance. But each of these definitions would have to contain words, each of which would have to have been operationally defined, in order to sustain the denial. This would set up an infinite regress.

2. *At least some tentative general principles can be formulated, applicable to further inquiry into experience.* A denial of that proposition would itself constitute a general principle applicable to further inquiry into experience—even though that application consisted in erecting a barrier to all further inquiry.

In the light of the above two procedural propositions, and by means of the four procedural rules for a rigorously skeptical approach, certain fundamentals of consciousness and of experience may be examined:

3. *To my own consciousness, the proposition: "I am conscious," is uncontradictable.* If I think or say to myself, "I am not conscious," the immediate retort which rises in my mind is: "Says who?" The subject of the denying sentence is the pronoun "I." That "I" is a symbol which represents my conscious self. I would have to be conscious in order to think to myself that I am not conscious (cf. Hart and Associates, 1956, pp. 186-87).

4. *I am conscious of recognizable experience-configurations.* An experience-configuration is any unit of direct experience which can be designated by a word or phrase.⁴ Suppose that that proposition is contradicted by asserting: "I am not conscious of any recognizable experience-configurations." But such a sentence includes a series of words which, by definition, designate experience-configurations. If they were not recognizable, the words and the sentence would be meaningless.

5. *There is a time-sequence in my experiences.* In order to deny this proposition I should have to arrange words in a time sequence, and therefore should become involved in self-contradiction.

From paragraphs 4 and 5 above, the following definition emerges: "*My experience-configurations* consist in those configurations of which I am at the moment conscious, plus those which I remember having experienced, plus those which I imagine."

6. *I sometimes feel moved to act.* The denial of that statement would be: "I never feel moved to act." But if one made such a statement it would constitute an act. To utter such a sentence would be the outcome of energy flowing through the nerves and muscles employed in saying or writing it. To construct and utter or write such a sentence

⁴Whately Carington (1946, pp. 164-74) appears to have been referring to experience-configurations when he wrote: "The mind consists of *sensa* and images (*psychons*), and of nothing else whatever. . . ." *Psychons* and *experience-configurations* may be taken to be at least approximate synonyms. For more detailed definitions of inner-world and sensorimotor configurations, see pages 16 and 26 of this article.

would be a conscious act. In other words, in the denial of being moved to act one gives evidence that one *is* moved to act. The reality of *motivation*, and of *desires*, is thus an uncontradictable fact.

7. *I can operate.* The crucial term in this proposition may be defined as follows: *To operate* is to create intentionally a new experience-configuration by recombining old ones. The proposition, "I can operate" may then be put as follows: "I can intentionally create new experience-configurations by recombining old ones." The denial would then be: "I cannot create intentionally any new experience-configurations by recombining old ones." To act intentionally is (a) to have an inner image or conception of a change in one's experience-configurations; (b) to desire such a change; and (c) to act so as to produce it. But before uttering such a denial I must have (a) had a conception of what would constitute it, (b) desired to at least test out whether such a denial could be formulated, and (c) acted so as to produce it. The denial would thus be self-contradictory.

8. *I can observe at least some of my own operations.* To state "I cannot observe any of my own operations" would be to perform an operation which I could not carry to completion unless I were observing it.

9. *I can observe at least some experience-configurations which are not at the moment being created by my own operations.* I could formulate a denial of that proposition only by observing the proposition which was to be denied. That proposition would not, at that moment, be in process of being created by my own operations.

On the basis of propositions 1 to 9, I construct the following definitions: *An observation* is a change experienced by the "I" when a particular experience-configuration comes into consciousness. *Consciousness* consists in the referent of the word "I" when it is used as the subject of the verb "to observe" or "to operate."

10. *I can select.* The crucial term in this proposition may be defined thus: *To select* is to observe, or to operate on, a given experience-configuration more than, or to the exclusion of, other experience-configurations. Denial would then take the form: "I cannot observe or operate on any given experience-configuration more than, or to the exclusion of, other experience-configurations." But to make such a statement would involve observing and operating on the experience-configurations referred to in the denial, to the relative exclusion of those which have been discussed in previous paragraphs.

11. *I can pay attention.* More formally stated, this proposition takes the form: "From among those experience-configurations of which I am actually or potentially aware, I can at least sometimes select one or more configurations for intensive observation, or to be subjected to purposeful operations." To deny that proposition would involve selecting a series of words, observing which ones were appropriate, and then

performing the operation of incorporating them into the denial. Such a denial would therefore be self-contradictory.

From the above propositions the following definition is derived: "To pay attention consists in selecting specific experience-configurations for intensive observation, or to be utilized in operations."

EXPERIENTIAL PHILOSOPHY EXCLUDES FROM CONSIDERATION EVERYTHING EXCEPT EXPERIENCE

"Starting with solipsism." The approach based upon the above propositions may well be characterized by that phrase. It does not take for granted the existence of matter, or of other personalities than oneself, or of any concepts or procedures except such as emerge out of the rigorously skeptical application of the above rules and propositions. But Experientialism does not cling to solipsism as a dogma; it merely uses it as an extremely skeptical point of departure.

The independent existence of matter is not an uncontradictable proposition, in the sense defined above. If I say, "This table, which I see and touch, is composed of matter which would exist even if neither I nor anyone else were observing it," that statement can be contradicted without inherent self-contradiction. This can be shown in three ways:

1. My experience of the table might be merely a part of a dream or of an hypnotic delusion.

2. Locke, Berkeley and Hume demonstrated that one's experience of any physical object consists merely in primary and secondary qualities, which are not identical with any unobserved realities.

3. Modern physics has reduced matter to what Eddington has called a very thin soup of electrons, protons, and other 'trons. These 'trons, in turn, cannot be conceived accurately as physical objects, but only in terms of mathematical formulas and equations. But mathematics is a strictly mental discipline.

Experientialism is concerned with concepts, hypotheses, principles, memories, expectations, potentialities, and so on, but only as experiences. A mathematical formula is real—when anyone is looking at it or thinking about it. The ways in which various people's experiences with such a formula agree or disagree with each other, and the ways in which such experiences prove useful in relation to such other experiences as building bridges or writing textbooks, are highly significant aspects of the reality of the formula. If it is convenient to say that the formula exists even when no one is thinking about it, that statement is acceptable in Experientialism—but only to the extent that it is understood as a shorthand summary of the various types of actual and potential experiences correlated with the formula.

II THE SENSORIMOTOR AND THE INNER WORLDS MAY BE DISCRIMINATED OPERATIONALLY AS TWO DIFFERENT CATEGORIES OF EXPERIENCE

THIS STEP HINGES ON A REPEATABLE EXPERIMENT

The experiment may be described ideally as follows: Let it be supposed that I go into a subterranean chamber which is completely soundproofed, free from perceptible vibrations, artificially lighted, and ideally and noiselessly air-conditioned. Let it be supposed further that I am seated in a perfectly comfortable easy chair, in which I relax profoundly, eliminating every muscular tension, and ceasing to pay any attention to my breathing, heart beats, itchings, and all other intrasomatic sensations. The lights are then to be extinguished.

Under such conditions certain categories of my experience would, for the time being, be eliminated. These would include sensations of sight, hearing, touch, temperature, muscular effort, and so on. The *sensorimotor world* may then be defined as consisting of all types of experience which would necessarily be shut out if the above experiment were carried out to an ideally perfect degree.

But obviously various other types of experience could still persist, no matter how thoroughly the above experiment was carried out. These, taken together, constitute the *inner world*.

INNER-WORLD EXPERIENCE-CONFIGURATIONS MAY BE CLASSIFIED INTO (1) INNER IMAGES; (2) ABSTRACTIONS; AND (3) WORDLESS, IMAGELESS THOUGHT:

1. *Inner-image configurations consist in remembered, imagined, planned, or dreamed images.* They consist of correlated experience-configurations—observational, operational, or mixed—similar to those of the sensorimotor world, but which may still be experienced when sensory channels are blocked off and voluntary muscles relaxed. The correlations between inner-image configurations always involve spatial relationships, and almost always temporal ones. They may also involve causal, similarity, habitual and other types of association.

2. *Abstractions are of various degrees.* Every noun other than a proper noun represents a category of inner images or ideas. Adjectives

refer to generalized qualities or characteristics. Usually consciousness of such a category carries with it some sort of generalized image or images—as when I think: “cathedrals,” “babies,” or “tennis games.” Abstractions of a next higher degree include categories of categories—as, for example, “buildings,” “animals,” or “games.” A still higher degree of abstraction includes general principles or laws, such as: “The square on the hypotenuse of a right triangle is equal in area to the sum of the squares on the two legs.” Here again, inner imagery may accompany the consciousness of the generalization.

3. *Imageless thought may be demonstrated experimentally.* The following informal experiment has been carried out repeatedly, with fairly uniform results: Members of an audience are asked: “How many of you, after struggling with a problem for a long time—and perhaps having temporarily stopped trying to solve it—have had a solution flash so suddenly into your mind that you have said (or thought): ‘Oh, now I’ve got it—just wait until I can put it into words!’?” Typically, a fairly large proportion of the audience raises its hands. Experiences such as those indicated by these raised hands are wordless and imageless thought.

The *inner world* may then be defined as consisting of all types of experience which may continue when the sensorimotor world is excluded. It includes inner images, abstractions, and wordless, imageless thought.

THE FOUR-DIMENSIONAL STRUCTURES OF THE INNER WORLD MAY BE REGARDED AS EXISTING IN FIVE-DIMENSIONAL SPACE⁵

A sequence of five widely reported experiences provides a basis for such an analysis. Inner-world images have three dimensions, similar to those of sensorimotor space. Inner-world images are frequently organized into three-dimensional scenes, with a four-dimensional time-sequence. The following series of types of such scenes and sequences may prove illuminating: (1) ordinary dreams; (2) clear dreams; (3) shared dreams; (4) out-of-the-body excursions into the sensorimotor world; and (5) similar excursions into the inner world.

1. *Ordinary dreams are four-dimensional, but lack clarity.* They typically involve inner-world experiences in which the dreamer finds himself in a three-dimensional setting (a room, an outdoor scene, etc.) in which he progresses in a fourth dimension—time. But in ordinary dreams the observer is not aware that he is dreaming, and the sequences are apt to be more or less chaotic from the standpoint of waking logic.

2. *A clear dream may be defined as one in which the dreamer becomes aware of the fact that he is dreaming, but continues within*

⁵An exploration of this theory, by the method of cooperative discussion through correspondence, was carried out in 1952 (Hart, 1953).

the dream. This type is significant because of its contrast with the usual dream in which the dreamer assumes that his experience is taking place in the sensorimotor world. In a clear dream, the dreamer finds himself in a four-dimensional structure (three of space and one of time). He is an observer and operator at a specified point, or sequence of points, within this space-time structure. Fairly often, in such a dream the dreamer feels that he is possessed of greater insight than he had in his waking life, and also he is likely to feel more or less ecstatic. Such dreams may involve a sense of wide-ranging clairvoyance, and even of transcending time and space.

3. *A shared dream may be defined as one in which two or more dreamers dream of each other in a common space-time situation, and independently remember more or less of their surroundings, their conversation and their other interactions within the dream.* Numerous examples have been reported (Hart, 1933; 1953; 1959). Granted the reality of telepathy, the occurrence of shared dreams is to be expected.

4. *Out-of-the-body excursions into the sensorimotor world may be taken as a fourth stage in the series.* Hundreds of individuals are on record as having had the experience of being projected outside of their physical bodies. Sylvan Muldoon's books on the subject (1921, 1951) present fairly voluminous records of such experiences. Caroline Larsen's book *My Travels in the Spirit World* (1927) contains vivid accounts of such excursions. Dr. Robert Crookall (1960, 1964, 1964) has brought together and analyzed, comparatively, hundreds of reported out-of-the-body experiences.

Another intensive report and analysis of an author's own experiences in this field, reprinted in 1962, is Oliver Fox's *Astral Projection: A Record of Out-of-the-body Experiences*. A significant point is that the author had clear dreams as an adolescent: he discovered that he could recognize that he was dreaming while actually in a dream, with the result that he could consciously control the course of the dream and obtain out-of-the-body experiences.

An analysis of reported cases (Hart, 1954) showed that the following purported features are more or less characteristic: The excursionist finds himself floating in the air above his physical body, or standing beside the bed, looking at it. At the same time he finds himself occupying a body which, to him, is tangible, visible, and capable of muscular movement. He is able to observe his physical surroundings, including any physically embodied persons who may be present. He moves up into the air, independent of gravitation, and travels swiftly—even instantly—to locations to which he directs his attention, or in response to invisible propulsive currents. He passes through physical matter (closed doors, walls, ceilings) with little or no resistance, and he usually finds that he cannot move physical matter (cannot turn a

doorknob, lift a physical object,⁶ make himself heard). He sometimes encounters and communicates with others who are not physically embodied but who seem to have bodies like his own projected body.

The veridicality of such cases has been attested by three types of evidence: (1) The excursionist may observe physical objects and events of which he had no normal knowledge, may record these observations, and may later verify their correctness. (2) He may be seen as an apparition at the location to which he had found himself projected, and the testimony of those who observed him there may be found to correspond significantly with his own record of his experiences. (3) The characteristics of certain specified types of excursion cases may be found to be significantly similar to each other, and yet to differ significantly from the characteristics of other specified types. Dr. Crookall has made a *prima facie* case for this third type of evidence (see Hart, 1963, p. 94).

5. *Many out-of-the-body excursionists report having visited regions which are not located in the sensorimotor world.* These regions are reported to be inhabited by personalities who have survived bodily death. In 1950 S. Rowland Morgan published *An Index to Psychic Science*. From this and other sources, I have compiled a list of 63 books,




Figure 1. THE GEOMETRY OF THE FIRST FOUR DIMENSIONS

⁶A purported exception to this negation appears in "An Unusual Out-of-the-Body Experience," by Lucian Landau (*J. Amer. Soc. Psych. Res.*, 42, Sept. 1963, pp. 125-28). He reports having seen the projected apparition of his fiancée at the same time that he saw the head of her physical body, asleep in bed, and he found near his own bed a rubber toy dog, which belonged to her, and which she testified that she, in her projected body, had lifted and taken across the hall into her fiancé's bedroom. No statement is made in the account of any written record having been made of the experience between September, 1955, when it happened, and the time when the account was submitted to the JSPR, some eight years later.

each of which deals with psychic communications about the nature of these regions, and of life therein.

Evidence for the evidentiality of such reports is almost always slight or nonexistent. Crookall, in his *The Supreme Adventure: Analyses of Psychic Communication* (1961), offers what he believes is scientific evidence that some such reports have objective validity.

Setting aside, for the time being, the question of possible validation, the significant point at the present juncture is that the "inner" worlds described in these reports are consistent with the hypothesis that the life beyond death (if there is one) is similar, in basic respects, to clear dreams collectively shared with one's associates.⁷

The nature of the fifth dimension may be clarified by geometric logic. Consider, for a moment, Figure I A. This is a necessarily crude representation of an ideal zero-dimensional point, having no length, no width and no thickness, but only location. Figure 1 B is, similarly, a crude representation of an ideal one-dimensional line, having no width and no thickness, but only length. Within the line an unlimited ("infinite") number of points could be located without touching each other. Figure 1 C represents an ideal two-dimensional plane, within which an unlimited number of parallel lines could be placed, no one of which would need to touch any of the others. Figure 1 D represents a three-dimensional solid, within which an unlimited number of parallel planes could be placed, without any one of them touching any of the others. Figure 1 E is a crude representation of a strip of motion-picture film of a revolving cube. By speeding up the frequency of the exposures, and photographing the cube when it had revolved through smaller and smaller angles, an unlimited number of these three-dimensional objects could be fitted into the four-dimensional (space-time) continuum represented by the strip of film.

The psychic fifth dimension is the logical next step. This can be made clear by an imaginary illustration:

Suppose that twenty soldiers are sleeping in a single barrack room. Suppose further that each soldier is dreaming a separate dream: One is dreaming that he is piloting a fighter plane, and has just seen an enemy plane approaching from "11 o'clock." Another is dreaming that he is flirting with a girl in Paris. Another, in his dream, is running a harvester machine on a Kansas wheat field. Another is dreaming that he is being reunited with his sweetheart in New York. Another, in his dream, is leading a jazz orchestra.

Each of these dreams—and those being dreamed by the other soldiers—is a four-dimensional experience, having the three ordinary

⁷For comments by Professor Ducasse, on this general conception of a future life, see Hart's review of Ducasse's *Nature, Mind and Death*, in *J. Am. Soc. Psych. Res.*, 1952, 46, 73-77. Comments by Professor H. H. Price are to be found in his review of the same book, *J. of Parapsychol.*, 1952, 16, 143.

space dimensions, plus the time duration of the dream. All of these four-dimensional dreams can be "fitted in" without interference or overlapping: hence, logically, they may be regarded as being in the fifth dimension.

But suppose that the sweetheart of the boy in the fourth dream is actually sharing his dream: at the very moment when the boy is dreaming of her, she also is dreaming, with the same identical details, of that same reunion with him. In such a case we have an overlapping of two four-dimensional objects within the five-dimensional continuum.

Another soldier is having an out-of-the-body experience in which he seems to be back home, talking to his mother who is seriously ill, and about whom he has been worrying. At this same moment, the mother, lying awake in her sickbed, sees the apparition of her son standing by the bedside, looking at her with deep concern. In such a case we have an overlapping of a four-dimensional object from the psychic world, into the four-dimensional scene of the mother's sick-room.

THE AXIOMS WHICH MATERIALISTIC SCIENTISTS TAKE FOR GRANTED AS APPLIED TO THE SENSORIMOTOR WORLD ARE CONTRADICTED BY PSYCHICAL AND PARAPSYCHOLOGICAL PHENOMENA

Professor Broad lists nine such axioms. That psychical phenomena contradict nine "basic limiting principles" which are generally taken for granted as the frame of reference for natural science, in its dealings with the sensorimotor world, has been pointed out (1953, pp. 7-12) by Dr. C. D. Broad.⁸ Three of these principles relate to causation:

1. An effect cannot precede its cause.
2. An event cannot cause another event which occurs at a *temporal* distance from it, except by initiating some intervening chain of events or some persistent modification of a substance.
3. An event cannot cause another event which occurs at a *spatial* distance from it, except by initiating some intervening chain of events.

The other six "basic limiting principles" may be stated briefly as follows:

4. It is impossible for an event in a person's mind to produce directly any change in the material world except certain changes in his own brain.

5. A necessary, even if not a sufficient, immediate condition of any mental event is an event in the brain of a living body.

6. and 7. Knowledge can be acquired only through sensory experience.

8. It is impossible to forecast that an event of such and such a kind will happen at such and such a place and time, except by chance, by inference from data, or by expectations formed from past experience.

⁸Cf. Mundle, 1961, p. 9.

9. It is impossible for a person to know or have reason to believe that an event of such and such a kind happened at such and such a place and time in the past except from present memory, or testimony based on present memory or on records, or by inference from data.

Anyone familiar with psychical research can readily cite data which appear to contradict the above principles. A group of outstanding examples is implied in the very term "extrasensory perception."

Telepathy and clairvoyance negate propositions 3, 6, and 7; precognition negates propositions 1, 2, 3, and 8; and psychokinesis negates proposition 4.

When phenomena are inconsistent with philosophy, philosophy requires reconstruction. The present paper is based upon the postulate that systems of concepts are to be regarded as tools for the interpretation, prediction, and control of human experiences. To that end, the basic contradictions between the axioms of natural science and the facts of psychical phenomena require a fundamental reconstruction of philosophy.

THE BASIC AXIOMS OF THE INNER WORLD ARE RADICALLY DIFFERENT FROM THOSE OF THE SENSORIMOTOR WORLD

The following illustrate some of the contrasts:

1. *An observer in the inner world can move either backward or forward in time, and can move from one point to another in either time or space, without necessarily traversing intermediate points.* The student of history may focus his attention on 1775, and then move instantaneously to 1964, without traversing the intervening years. The "flashbacks" in fiction illustrate this free movement in inner-world time. The scientist may also jump from the Cave Man of 50,000 B.C. to the Neolithic farmer of 4,000 B.C. without traversing the intervening ages. He can move instantly (in thought) from the planet Jupiter to his own astronomical observatory—or he can be in both places at once.

2. *An "I"-thinker (when properly trained) can mold inner-world matter more or less at will.* Aladdin's castles can be created at a wave of the genie's hand. The bride dreams up the home she plans to build, and then moves the fireplace around, adds another bathroom, and cuts down the size of the kitchen—all by quick strokes of the mind (aided by a pencil and paper).

3. *The laws of gravitation, momentum, and the like, do not necessarily control the observer-operator in the inner world.* Approximately one-fourth of the members of numerous audiences questioned on the subject admit that they have had dreams of flying—not with wings, nor by airplane, but simply by will power.

4. Whereas objects and events in the sensorimotor world are arranged in accordance with geographical space and sidereal time, *objects and events in the inner world are arranged on the basis of emotional, ideational and habitual linkages.*

The laws of the inner world tend to be consistent with psychical phenomena. The above examples serve merely as illustrations. Under the Experiential approach it is recognized that the inner world is not subject to the nine "basic limiting factors" which Professor Broad has pointed out as applying to the sensorimotor world. The distinctive characteristics of inner-world experiences will be found to be significant in relation to clairvoyance, to the characteristics of apparitions, to precognition, and to various other parapsychological phenomena.

Professor Broad's challenge as to clairvoyance (referred to in paragraphs on page 8) may help to focus the above discussion. He reported that he found clairvoyance baffling (1953, page 43). After a detailed conceptual analysis of the phenomenon, he concluded that only by making a series of "fantastic suppositions" can one rationally suppose that clairvoyance is *analogous* to any form of normal sense-perception. He continued: "Have those who believe that clairvoyance occurs, and deny that it is analogous to any form of sense-perception, any positive notion of its psychological nature or its *modus operandi*? If they have, it is most desirable that they should expound it."

Clairvoyance can be understood to some extent as being analogous to other forms of inner-world vision. In the inner world, objects and people may be perceived in a number of different ways: (1) as remembered images; (2) as imagined images; (3) as non-veridical dream experiences; (4) as hypnotically-induced images; or (5) as hallucinations of the delirious or psychopathic. All of the above forms have come to be recognized by orthodox psychology. Psychical research adds (6) veridical dream imagery, and (7) out-of-the-body perceptions.

The above list opens the way to a definition which provides a start toward the type of analysis called for by Professor Broad: A "*clairvoyant*" perception may be defined as any veridical inner-world visual perception.

Somewhat similar analyses might be made of various other types of perception recognized by orthodox psychology and/or by parapsychology—perceptions of auditory, tactual, temperature, taste, smell, pain, erotic, or other types.

III. THE ABOVE ANALYSIS PROVIDES A BASIS FOR RESOLVING MAJOR PARAPSYCHOLOGICAL DIFFICULTIES

A. BOTH IN THE SENSORIMOTOR AND THE INNER WORLDS, "MATTER" IS KNOWN ONLY IN TERMS OF CONFIGURATIONS OF CORRELATED ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL EXPERIENCES

What IS a material object? Professor Broad (1953, p. 35) speaks of common sense beliefs in such objects as being based on "auditory, visual, and tactual perceptions and their correlations." What does this mean? The question may be explored by means of a minor experiment.

If I take from my pocket a bunch of keys, and toss them into the air, I feel the touch-sensation of the keys on my fingers and the muscular sensation of tossing them. Coordinated with these is the visual sensation of seeing the keys rise and revolve in the air, and the auditory sensation of hearing them tinkle as they leave my hand and as I catch them. By inference from past experience I know that I can use these keys to lock or to unlock various doors. Also I know, by inference from past experiences, that if I put the keys on my dresser before I go to sleep, I will usually find them there when I awake.

Furthermore, I know that I may toss my keys to my wife when she wants them, that she may possibly catch them, that she can use the proper key to start the car or to open the front door—and so forth. I know also that I can add or subtract keys by certain types of physical operations.

Vaguely I realize that specific color changes could be made in the keys by applying certain acids, or by heating them red-hot or white-hot, that they could be bent, broken, or smashed by certain kinds of physical pressure, and that physicists and chemists can demonstrate various conclusions as to the molecular and atomic structure of their metals. Theoretically I know that the keys might be used to transmit electricity, that they could be melted into a liquid by raising their temperatures to certain levels, and that an unlimited number of other observations might be derived from them by other specific operations.

For experiential purposes, then, this bunch of keys is a configuration of actual, remembered and inferred potential experiences. More formally: *Any material object* may be defined (so far as Experiential

Philosophy is concerned with it) as consisting in the correlated experience-configurations—actual, remembered, and potential—which are obtainable by observing and operating upon whatever phase of this complex is presented.

When the above definition was submitted to Professor Broad, he called attention to the following treatment of this same idea by Bertrand Russell (1921, pp. 98-99): "Instead of supposing that there is some unknown cause, the 'real' table, behind the different sensations of those who are said to be looking at the table, we may take the whole set of these sensations (together possibly with other particulars) as actually *being* the table. . . . I suggest, as a first approximation, that these particulars, together with such correlated others as are unperceived, jointly *are* the table; and that a similar definition applies to all physical objects."

Indeed, Berkeley, 250 years ago, in the first section of his *Principles of Human Knowledge*, said about an apple: "A certain color, taste, smell, figure and consistency, having been observed to go together, are accounted one distinct thing, signified by the name apple; other collections of ideas constitute a stone, a tree, a book, and the like sensible things."

At this point Professor Ducasse raises an objection. One of the basic advantages of Experientialism is that it obviates the gratuitous controversy which has raged for centuries between materialism and idealism and (derivatively) between interactionism and parallelism. But Professor Ducasse (in a letter dated June 2, 1963) offers the following challenge:

". . . . Take, for instance, the awesome term you now introduce: 'configurations of correlated actual and potential experiences'; which term designates, you say, that in terms of which only, 'matter' is known.

"Well, how about a concrete case—for instance the case of what is called 'paper' and the fact that paper is a species of what in English is called 'matter.' The task . . . is to specify in the case of paper (a) *which experiences* are being referred to; (b) in precisely what *sense* is being used each of the two terms 'actual' and 'potential'; (c) correlated in precisely what *sense* of 'correlated'; and (d) correlated in which specific manner. . . .

"Just what do you mean by 'potential'? Do potentialities actually exist or do they exist only potentially?"

The reply to the above queries is as follows:

"Take the case (which you suggest) of paper. I experience a quadrilateral visual white form. When I perform the motor operation of shifting my viewpoint, the shape of this white form changes. Such changes in shape are correlated with the changes in viewpoint, in the sense that each shift is accompanied by a corresponding change in shape. Taking an extreme case, if my viewpoint shifts to a point

intersecting the plane of the quadrilateral, that shape diminishes to a mere line.

“If I perform the operation of stroking the white quadrilateral, I experience touch sensations. If I perform the operation of moving the experience-configuration called ‘my finger’ along the edge of the white quadrilateral, the distinctive tactual sensation of touching the edge is found to correspond, in detail, with the visual sensation of seeing the ‘finger’-shape move along the edge, and when I see the finger-shape reach and turn the corner of the white quadrilateral, the tactual and visual experiences agree with each other in detail.

“If I perform the operation of grasping one end of the quadrilateral with the experience-configuration called my right hand, and the other end with the configuration called my left hand, and if I then perform the operation of separating the two hands vigorously while still grasping firmly, I shall have the visual sensation of seeing the paper tear, while at the same time I experience the minutely corresponding sound sensation of hearing the tearing process; and thereupon, if I perform the operation of running the experience-configuration called my finger along the torn edge, my tactual sensations will correspond with the contours of the torn edge.

“*But what about ‘actual’ versus ‘potential’ experiences?* By *actual experiences* I mean those which are in the focus of attention at a present moment, including a fringe (or apperceptive mass) of remembered and anticipated experiences. By *potential experiences* I mean those which may be brought into consciousness by further operations and observations related to the actual experiences. The tearing of the paper is an example. The potential tearing-configuration would become actual by coming into consciousness if I actually performed the operations and observations noted above in this connection.

“Potential experiences may, for convenience, be divided into two broad categories: (1) the familiar and reasonably predictable ones which have been experienced before, involving remembered sequences of operation and observation, and which the observer has learned to expect in connection with such sequences; and (2) relatively unpredictable ones (from the observer’s standpoint) such as what chemical reactions would occur if specified acids or other reagents were applied to the white quadrilateral, or what could be discovered about its molecular structure by using the experience-configuration called an electron microscope, or the amazing shapes which a clever paper-manipulator could produce by folding and cutting. But (1) and (2) are polar categories: intermediate degrees of familiarity and predictability could be referred to in a more or less continuous series.

“‘Do potentialities actually exist?’ Are you really serious in asking that question? The *idea* of an experience may, of course, be actual, while the experience itself is merely potential. What is the potential

maximum speed of your automobile? Does that potentiality actually exist? Experientially, a potential experience or experience-configuration is one which may come into consciousness if suitable (properly correlated) operations and observations are performed. Included are potential experience-configurations of which the potential observer is—and may continue to be—completely ignorant or unaware. If you were really serious in your questions at this point, would you not have to dispense with the Theory of Probabilities, deny the feasibility of formulating hypotheses, and in general exclude all rational prediction?"

An experience-configuration is partially but never perfectly predictable. A vital experiential approach to the "independent existence of the material world" is to explore the extent to which observations obtained by operating on a given configuration in specified ways are partially but never completely predictable. This may be illustrated, in the sensorimotor world, by an experiment. I take an apple and a knife into a classroom. I offer a small money prize for the best drawing which any student will put on the blackboard as representing the design which will be revealed by cutting the apple through its equator (regarding the stem as the North Pole). A person who has tried the experiment a few times will know that the core of the truncated apple will be seen as a five-pointed star. But no one, no matter how familiar he is with the experiment, can draw *perfectly* the shape which will appear when the apple is cut.

The same principle of partial but never absolute predictability applies to inner-world phenomena as well as to sensorimotor. An experienced explorer of dream phenomena can predict (imperfectly) the character of dreams of flying. An investigator of a new aspect of higher mathematics can predict, with some degree of correctness, what types of results may be obtained by solving stated new types of problems.

Defining a sensorimotor experience-configuration. The terms *experience-configuration* and *inner-world experience-configuration* have already been defined (on pages 12 and 15 of this article). Now, in the light of the above discussion, it is feasible to define a *sensorimotor configuration* as any bundle of correlated actual and potential sensory observations and/or motor operations. In the case of the bunch of keys the sensory observations include visual observations of color, shape and motion, auditory observations of sound, tactual observations of contact between hand and keys, and kinesthetic sensations and operations of tossing and catching.

Sometimes a sensorimotor configuration may involve centrally merely a very simple experience element—such as seeing a spot of purple color or hearing a musical note. But almost always this simple element is experienced in a background of other correlated elements—such as the shape of the spot, the contrasted colors around it, and the focusing of the eyes on the spot.

Quite often a sensorimotor experience-configuration has correlated with it inner-world elements, such as the percipient's silent awareness of the words "bunch of keys" when he is experiencing the corresponding sensorimotor aspects.

To sum up: *Sensorimotor configurations consist of what the "I"-thinker experiences directly with respect to what are referred to in common-sense terms as physical objects, physical actions, and sensory observations.*

As to the Experiential conception of matter, Ducasse and Hart differ mainly in emphasis. Professor Ducasse participated (some years ago) in a cooperative discussion of the above conception of matter (Hart, 1956, pp. 187-89). At that time he wrote:

"Concerning your preference for speaking in terms of 'bundles of correlated actual and potential observations and operations,' instead of in terms of 'things' and 'substances' (whether psychical or physical). That terminology functions essentially as an admonition to be empirical; but, I take it, is not intended to deny that there really are material things, e.g., books, pens, etc.—that is, it is intended to remind the reader that material things are *inferred* (from sensory clues), but are not directly presented as sensations are; i.e., it is not intended to assert that the inference is *invalid*. If so, I fully agree. (That material things are known by construction is the central contention of Chapter 15 of my *Nature, Mind, and Death*.) But, once it having been stated and understood that this is what a 'thing' or 'substance' is—a bundle of potentialities, only a few of which are actualized (in the sense of affecting experience) at any given moment—why not, from then on, use plain English and speak of 'things,' 'substances,' 'doors,' 'books,' 'bodies of flesh and blood,' etc., instead of, so clumsily, in terms of 'configurations' . . ."

Common sense terminology of the sort recommended here by Professor Ducasse is inadequate to deal with crucial psychical-research problems. It will be found throughout those parts of this paper where the experience-configuration terminology is not needed to bring out crucial points, such as the following:

1. *Inner-world matter.* Since physical matter is merely an inference from sensorimotor experience—highly convenient as a shorthand way of summarizing correlations between experience-configurations—so also in the inner world it is entirely legitimate to infer the reality of psychic, etheric, or "astral" matter as being involved in such phenomena as collectively perceived apparitions, shared dreams, or an after-death environment.

Whether a given inner-world or apparitional experience-configuration is material or immaterial is a question of degree, not merely of yes-or-no (cf. Hart, 1956, pp. 223-24). Such degrees are (roughly) measurable by seeking empirically for the answers to such questions as:

How consistently is the experience-configuration shared, by how many and what types of percipients? With what degrees of consistency does the configuration re-establish itself when attention is redirected to it after being turned elsewhere? In the case of apparitions, to what degree is the configuration transparent? To what degree does it reflect light (as indicated by being photographable or by being registrable by other physical instruments)?

2. *Eliminating dualism.* In discussing relationships between mind and matter, Experientialism is not concerned with any baffling relationship between (a) some mysterious thing-in-itself, supposed to be the unknowable source or cause of sensorimotor experiences and (b) some basically different and also unknowable mental substratum. The problem is simply to explore the various aspects of interrelationships between sensorimotor and inner-world experience-configurations. Once this is recognized, the gratuitous problems of dualism, parallelism, interactionism, and the like, disappear.

B. THE EXISTENCE OF OTHER "I"-THINKERS THAN ONESELF IS ALSO TO BE APPROACHED WITH ROCK-BOTTOM SKEPTICISM

What evidence have I that conscious personalities other than myself exist? If I listen to other people talk for any length of time I am likely to hear them use the pronoun "I." But how can I tell whether this "I" represents a center of consciousness similar to the one which I experience when I say "I"?

Robots are not conscious. For me to state that you are conscious is not an uncontradictable proposition. Suppose that I were to visit a museum, in which I were to confront two apparently human figures, each seated by a checkerboard, and that above the figures a sign read: "Each of these figures can beat you at checkers. One of them is a robot. Can you tell which?" Suppose that then each figure, in turn, were to open its lips and say, clearly, "I am conscious!" That would not prove that either one of them was *thinking* "I am conscious." Either or both of them might be robots—or might be conscious human beings.

Other types of sensorimotor human-like figures may not be conscious. If I were to watch and hear an animated, three-dimensional, full-color cartoon of Snow White saying "I," that would not convince me that that configuration of colored shapes on the screen was the locus of a consciousness similar to my own. Neither would a figure of an actor on a TV screen.

Then how about the ordinary people in one's sensorimotor world? By what kinds of tests does one decide whether they have inner worlds like one's own? *About people in my sensorimotor world I note the following facts:*

1. *They have bodies.* These people have hands more or less like my hands. When I look at my face in a mirror I find that it is similar to the faces of other people—though always recognizably different.

2. *We communicate.* Most of these people speak words which have meaning for me. They usually—or at least often—react as though they understand when I speak to them.

3. *We cooperate and otherwise interact.* I can purchase objects from a clerk in a store; I can get simple directions from a corner policeman; I can make a date to meet my wife at a certain place and can actually find her at that place somewhere near the agreed time (with certain distressing exceptions).

4. *They seem to act as if they had purposes, values, understandings and expectations, somewhat as I have purposes, values, understandings and expectations.* Without some such community, interaction with them would be difficult or impossible to conceive.

The above four types of experiences—and various others—fit in with the broad hypothesis that these other “normal” people, who have sensorimotor bodies, who do or could communicate with me, with whom I interact, and who have more or less understandable values, actually have “inside” them a consciousness which is like the consciousness which thinks “I” in me. I cannot prove it conclusively, but the way my experiences with sensorimotor people fit together makes this assumption a sensible one, and I have come to take it so much for granted that it seems at first a little absurd to question it and to seek verification of it as I have just been doing.

C. THE SURVIVAL QUESTION HINGES CRUCIALLY UPON THE EXISTENCE OF “I”-THINKERS WITHIN HUMAN-LIKE APPARITIONAL AND INNER-WORLD BODIES

A multiplicity of inner-world figures must be considered. First come unconscious figments. Some types of inner-world figures are not ordinarily regarded (even by psychical researchers) as being vehicles of self-consciousness. Included are persons whose images are called up in memory, and figures such as the imagined personalities observed in one’s mind while reading fiction, history or biography.

Second are personalities encountered in dreams. Most of these are ordinarily regarded as figments. But psychical researchers have published many cases which suggest that such figures may sometimes be vehicles of “I”-thinkers.

How are apparitions related to the sensorimotor and the inner worlds? The following discussion is based primarily on a statistical and cooperative-discussional study of 165 apparitional cases (Hart, 1956, pp. 153-239).

The typical apparition is perceived in a sensorimotor setting. Such apparitions make adjustments to their sensorimotor surroundings and

to physically embodied people. But in four respects they appear to have inner-world characteristics:

(a) Their visibility is erratic, in that they are likely to appear or disappear suddenly and inexplicably, to be invisible to some of the people who could see them if they were physically embodied, to fade in and out, and to be self-luminous.

(b) They may pass through solid walls or locked doors.

(c) They may rise into the air without physical support, and may glide instead of walking.

(d) They may communicate ideas without words, gestures or other symbols—i.e., telepathically.

Moreover, typical apparitions, which appear in and adjust to sensorimotor settings, are at one extreme of a series which leads back into completely inner-world appearances. Merging into typical apparitions are visions, in which the percipient is awake in a sensorimotor setting, but the vision is perceived in a private space of its own, as when a woman, looking at a blank wall, saw it seem to dissolve, leaving a "window" through which she saw a significant event occurring to her distant husband. As Tyrrell (1953, p. 53) pointed out, "There is an unbroken transition from appearances in space, through appearances in detached and private spaces, to appearances in crystals, in dreams, or in inward types of vision."

The above facts may be summarized, in a simplified way, by saying that such phenomena as apparitions and visions involve overlapping of the inner and the sensorimotor world.

THE EVIDENCE TO BE EXAMINED PARALLELS THE EVIDENCE BY WHICH THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF SENSORIMOTOR PERSONALITIES IS JUDGED

*In what sense are the bodies of inner-world and apparitional personalities "real"? Types cited above—and also some of the hallucinations of the delirious and the insane—appear in the form of human-like bodies in a sensorimotor-world setting. The term *hallucinations* implies that such bodies are mere figments of the imagination. Psychoanalysts presumably regard the bodies observed in the dreams of their patients as being hallucinatory artifacts.*

At this point (as elsewhere) theory needs to be related closely to reliably observed phenomena. Highly desirable are recent, promptly reported cases, which have been verified by documents, interviews and/or correspondence, and which are supplemented by adequate background histories and psychological analyses of the persons involved. But here we encounter some disturbing facts about the recent history of psychical research.

A basic transformation in the handling of psychical-research cases has taken place in recent decades. Up until the emergence of Drs. J. B.

and Louisa Rhine as world-renowned authorities on parapsychology, such cases tended to be channeled through the societies for psychical research. Before appearing in the publications of those societies, these cases were subjected to rigorous cross-examination by correspondence and often by interviews. A fairly high standard of evidentiality was thus developed and insisted upon. There were, of course, many popular channels through which less cautiously examined cases were published—both in periodicals and in books.

But, as the Rhines rose into world-wide prominence as the outstanding authorities on parapsychology, case reports increasingly have been sent to them instead of to the psychical research societies. According to the latest report, the Rhines now have a collection of over 10,000 such cases.

The Rhines regard this collection not as constituting scientific evidence, but as providing illustrative clues from which programs for further research may be developed. They have made no attempt to cross-examine or verify the authenticity of the cases submitted. Moreover, only a few scattering examples of these cases have been published, and (so far as I know) no one other than the Rhines and their assistants have been allowed access to the original case reports.

The evidentiality of case reports of apparitions, out-of-the-body experiences, shared dreams, and related phenomena has been dealt with fairly rigorously in my article on "Six Theories About Apparitions" published in *Proceedings SPR* 50 (1956), 153-239. A rating scale of evidentiality was developed and applied to the collection of apparitional cases dealt with. The characteristics of the half of the cases having the highest evidentiality ratings were then correlated with the characteristics of those having the lowest evidentiality. The very high correlation indicated that these cases reported objective phenomena, and that the degree of authentication presented had little or no relationship with the validity of the phenomena described.

It would be of the greatest importance if the Rhines would grant permission for other (selected and competent) investigators to examine the cases in their collection, to publish selected examples, and to offer statistical and logical analyses of them. But, pending the achievement of such permission, the rational stand would seem to be to make use of the authenticated cases which have been collected in past decades. The analyses which have been published of cases in the Rhine collection indicate that the same basic types have continued to be reported as have appeared in earlier publications by the Societies for Psychical Research.

Collectively perceived apparitions have major bearings on the question of the sense in which apparitions are to be regarded as objectively real. About such cases, six generalizations appear to be basic (cf. Hart, 1956, pp. 207-215):

1. In so far as apparitions are spontaneously perceived collectively (not duplicated by suggestion from one percipient to another) such perceptions are public experiences, in much the same sense that the perception of a sensorimotor person by members of a group is a public experience.

2. Collectively perceived apparitions are seen in perspective, as though they were physical objects occupying space. As they move about in sensorimotor space, they are still seen in appropriate perspective as though they were physical moving objects.

3. Reports of their characteristics, as observed by the various percipients, at the same time, are usually as consistent as would be reports of the characteristics of ordinarily embodied persons observed unexpectedly by such percipients.

4. These apparitional figures tend to have inner-world characteristics—such as gliding instead of walking, appearing or disappearing suddenly, and passing through solid walls or closed doors.

5. On the other hand, they adapt themselves to their physical surroundings, and they may adapt themselves to living personalities in those surroundings, even interacting with percipients to the extent of brief conversations or bodily contacts.

6. Such apparitions may be roughly classified into two categories: (a) Crisis apparitions, whose appearances are related to emotional tensions in the percipient or in the appearer, or in both; and (b) "haunts," whose appearances seem to be related to the locations in which they are seen, and to emotional experiences by the appearers in those locations in times past.

Of the various theories which have been published, aimed at explaining the above facts in terms of mere telepathy, none (as far as I am aware) comes even remotely near to being a plausible hypothesis. Approaching the matter with rigorous skepticism, the most plausible hypothesis would seem to be to regard such apparitions as having independent self-existence. Since the existence of matter itself, even in the sensorimotor world, is regarded in the Experiential Philosophy as being merely a highly convenient, useful and plausible hypothesis, *the existence of "objectively real" bodies of such apparitions would seem to be an appropriate assumption* (cf. Hart, 1956, pp. 228-21).

BUT ARE THESE APPARITIONAL BODIES VEHICLES OF CONSCIOUS PERSONALITIES?

Self-conscious apparitions of the living provide a basic clue. Fairly voluminous evidence on this subject has been presented in previous psychical-research publications.⁹ In "Six Theories About Apparitions" (Hart, 1956), twenty-five cases are reported in which an apparition of a living person was seen and the appearer later remembered having

⁹Cf. Mundle, 1961, p. 9.

occupied the apparition as a vehicle for observation and action. Purposefulness appears to have been characteristic in these cases. Of such apparitions, 92 per cent appeared to some person with whom the appearer had some strong emotional bond—such as husband, wife, betrothed, parent, child, close friend, or beloved relative. More than half of these apparitions were observed to be showing special concern for these loved ones.

Some apparitions of the living, therefore, CAN be vehicles through which "I"-thinkers observe and operate (cf. Hart, 1956, pp. 197-201). The published evidence on this point has become fairly weighty. I am not aware that any dispassionate and searching endeavor to refute this evidence has been published. On the basis of rock-bottom skepticism, therefore, the Experiential Philosophy must certainly entertain the hypothesis that apparitions of the living can be self-existing vehicles of conscious personalities.

BUT WHAT ABOUT APPARITIONS OF THE DEAD?

Apparitions of the dead are closely similar in character to conscious apparitions of the living. With respect to 45 traits most frequently mentioned in 165 evidential cases, apparitions of the dead and the dying are so closely similar to the 25 conscious apparitions of living persons that the two types must be regarded as belonging to the same basic kind of phenomena. This point has been demonstrated by rigorous statistical methods in the "Six Theories" study (Hart, 1956, pp. 155-81). The similarity thus demonstrated between apparitions of the living and apparitions of the dead would not occur by mere chance once in ten to the 150th power.

Purposefulness is a particularly significant similarity. A stimulating examination of this problem appears in Dr. Louisa Rhine's *Hidden Channels of the Mind* (1961). On page 277 of that book she cites the following case:

"A woman in California who had a couple of pure-bred dogs sometimes sent puppies to a kennel some distance away in the southern part of the state. Although she had corresponded occasionally with the owners of the kennel, she had never met them. Then one night she says she dreamed: 'I was wandering in a crowd of very happy people when a man came up to me and took my hand. He was laughing and seemed so pleased to see me. He said, "I've always wanted to meet you as I do so enjoy your letters." I said, "I don't know you, do I?" He said, "Yes, you do, because of the little dogs. Remember that: Because of the little dogs." I said, "I don't know what you mean about the dogs." He said, "Remember about the little dogs and you must tell her you saw me, as it will comfort her."'

"I awoke and told my dream to several people and my husband. The dream was so vivid I could not shake it and so I told it several

times. After two weeks I got a letter from the wife of the kennel owner telling me that when her husband had gone to pick up my puppies he had died from a heart attack while in the station. Before he left the house he hadn't felt well, but had told her he must go to get the little dogs. I wrote her of my dream describing the man who spoke to me. Both she and her son wrote back telling me that the man in my dream was their husband and father beyond a doubt.

"Beyond a doubt, too, the deceased in that instance would have had a stronger, more immediate motive in getting that message across than the dreamer would have had. The question is, would hers have been just strong enough to have caused her to have this unrealistic dream?"

That the degree and clarity of consciousness embodied in apparitions varies widely is strongly suggested by an examination of the published cases. Also, the degree to which a person, after having undergone an out-of-the-body experience *remembers* the details of that experience varies widely. *But the evidence which is now available, and which has been systematically analyzed, provides a firm threshold for the working hypothesis that human personality does survive bodily death.*⁹ Still it is *only* a threshold: extensive further researches are needed.

D. IN WHAT SENSE DOES PERSONAL IDENTITY SURVIVE BODILY DEATH?

What is a personality? For present purposes, let us use the following working definitions:

An expanded personality consists in any entity who thinks of himself as "I," plus everything which that "I"-thinker regards as "mine."

The persona consists in the objectively perceptible aspects of the expanded personality, whether perceived by the "I"-thinker or by other observers.

Every "I"-thinker has the following significant characteristics:

1. He is that which is changed by the process of observing.
2. He is that which initiates or decides upon operations.
3. In his space-time activities, he always occupies a point of view.

⁹For a list of such papers, see *The Enigma of Survival* (1959) p. 267. A bibliography will be found in Hart (1954). The importance of out-of-the-body experiences has been brought out in the December, 1962, *Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research*, in an article by Margaret Eastman, of the Psychophysical Research Unit, Oxford. This article discusses a number of significant psychological and physiological aspects of such experiences. However, it strikingly fails to deal with what may well be taken to be the most significant philosophical aspect of such phenomena—namely, occasions in which the individual who experienced that out-of-the-body experience was seen, at that same time, as an apparition whose appearance, behavior, and surroundings corresponded to those perceived by the one who was out of his body, as in the Wilmot case.

When he is occupying a sensorimotor body, this viewpoint is located where the lines of vision converge, behind the eyes. When he is occupying a dream or apparitional body, his viewpoint is usually similarly located.

4. The viewpoint may shift from the sensorimotor body to a dream or apparitional body. In some of my own recorded dreams, the "I"-thinker viewpoint has shifted, during the dream, from one dream persona to another. In various recorded cases, the viewpoint has shifted repeatedly from the sensorimotor body to the apparitional body and back again.

5. Normally, every "I"-thinker has a unique chain of memories. In each remembered scene he occupies his own unique viewpoint. These scenes come in a specific chronological order, so that (insofar as his memory is clear) he can tell which scene preceded and which succeeded which.

6. Every "I"-thinker has various potentialities—experiences which he might undergo, personas which he might develop.

Personas have the following characteristics:

1. They consist of a network of attachments and aversions, and of the objects, persons and behavioral patterns to which the 'I' feels or shows attachments or aversions, including the "I"-thinker's friends, possessions, preferences, purposes, and other positive values, but also his enemies, dislikes, pains, regrets, failures, and other negative values.

2. Personas may be actual, fictional, or a composite of both.

3. When an actor takes a part, he shifts into a fictional or historical persona, and temporarily becomes the "I"-thinker of that personality. An impostor undertakes to present convincingly the persona of the person whom he is impersonating.

4. When a person dreams, remembers, or imagines, he shifts temporarily into a dreamed, remembered, or imagined persona.

5. An apparition is a persona which (temporarily) has become psychically visible to one or more percipients.

*Experientially, personal identity consists in a unique chain of memories.*¹⁰ This generalization holds, both in the sensorimotor and in the inner world. Consider first two examples from the sensorimotor world:

a. A princess from the Russian Czar's family was supposed to have died at the time when the rest of the family was assassinated by the Communists. Some years later a young woman presented herself, claiming to be this lost princess. How could her identity be established or disproved?

b. Next, take an imaginary case: Let us suppose that a soldier disappeared during furious fighting, involving flame-throwers. His wife insists that he must be still alive, and as she searches among released

¹⁰Cf. Broad, 1958.

prisoners of war, she finds a man whose hands have been cut off, whose face is completely disfigured, and who has amnesia. His voice has been affected by his military experiences, but she thinks that she recognizes it. How is his identity to be established?

c. Now consider two types of psychic phenomena: First, take the "Watseka Wonder" case, cited in this connection by Professor Ducasse (1962), as involving "possession, for some 14 weeks, of the living body of Lurancy Vennum, aged 14, by a mind having the complex of capacities *distinctive of the mind of Mary Roff*, whose body had died some 12 years before at 18 years of age, at a time when Lurancy was a little over 1 year old."

d. As a similar type of problem, from the inner world, consider the cases of persons who, after bereavement, assert that they have seen, in their dreams or as apparitions, their departed loved ones, and have held conversations with them.

The crux of identity in all such cases is a chain of memories. The physical body of the person may be mutilated beyond recognition (as in the case of the soldier) or may have been discarded permanently, as in the purported survival cases. But any amnesia victim may be said to have "lost his identity" if he cannot recall any part of the chain of memories which, in his normal state, he had called "mine."

The person who is having or has had an out-of-the-body experience can be said to have retained his or her identity if the memories of the experience fit in with the chain of his or her other memories.

Professor Ducasse points out that distinctive skills constitute an important aspect of identity, but these are likely to be more difficult to identify accurately, and they relate to the persona rather than to the essential identity. Another crucial aspect of personal identity consists in the purposes and values held by the personality.

In what sense does the self exist during periods of total unconsciousness, and of partial, or distorted consciousness? During total unconsciousness, the "I"-thinker exists potentially, in the sense that the unique chain of memories called "mine" can be revived and extended—either in connection with the reactivation of the brain, or by disembodied survival. Partial consciousness (as in states of drowsy half-awakeness) and distorted consciousness (as during intoxication, delirium, or ordinary dreams) involve incomplete approximations toward the maximum self. On recovering from such states, one is apt to say: "I was not myself."

Toward the opposite end of the spectrum are the states of super-consciousness, when the mind has a wider and clearer grasp of reality and of its own relation to the rest of reality. Thus, to think "I am conscious" usually involves awareness of only a part or an aspect of the total potential self. At any given moment, only a small part of the full self is actually in a state of awareness at the focus of conscious-

ness: the great bulk of the potential self is in the subconscious or the unconscious.

The retention, beyond death, of the memory chain and of essential purposes and value relationships would constitute valid and adequate survival. When a person wakes up in the morning, even before he opens his eyes, the memory of what he had been doing up to the time he went to sleep, and the awareness of what his general objectives and plans are for the immediate future, may flood into his mind, and constitute the reawakening of his identity. Similarly, if a person who is in the midst of an out-of-the-body experience, and who is recognized as an apparition, is in full possession of his memories and of his ordinary purposes, he has retained his identity. Similarly, after the death of his physical body, the retention of the essential features of the memory-and-purpose chain would constitute the survival of that person's identical self. If (as various alleged communications from the dead intimate) memory of past experiences becomes far more vivid and complete after the death of the physical body, and if hitherto unrealized potentialities become actual, we might speak of "super-survival," in the sense that more of the personality had survived than had been active in ordinary life.

Experientially, the "persona" is merely a vehicle. In the sensorimotor world, the persona would include the physical body, the costumes, habits, mannerisms, social status, organization of relationships (and so on) of the personality.

An apparition, or a personality allegedly communicating through a medium, may involve the persona of the individual without actually involving his personal identity. A good deal of psychic evidence suggests that, just as an actor may shift from one part to another, without losing his personal identity as an actor, so also personal identities may use various psychical personas as vehicles.

E. A RATIONAL APPROACH TO THE PRECOGNITION PROBLEM IS PROVIDED BY EXPERIENTIALISM

This analysis hinges on the psychic fifth dimension:

A motion-picture director operates in the fifth dimension. Any given film, while it is being produced and after it is finished, is a four-dimensional object. Each frame in the picture represents a three-dimensional scene. The succession of frames takes place in the time dimension of the film. But the director of the picture operates *in a time dimension of his own*—corresponding roughly with the production schedule of the film. The director is largely emancipated from the time dimension of the film: he can jump from point to point in the sequence; he can introduce cutbacks as he thinks desirable; he can run portions of the film backwards if he so wishes; he can cut out certain scenes and insert others. This liberation of the director is a fifth-dimensional

phenomenon. The same type of emancipation is characteristic of authors, of editors, of musical composers, of historians, of poets, and so on.

The ordinary individual operates in the fifth dimension when he is remembering the past or planning the future. When calling up scenes from the past, the rememberer can jump from his early childhood to the day before yesterday, from the funeral of his wife to the day of their marriage, from the date when his son matriculates in college to the day when he is to graduate, and so on.

Similarly, when one is planning his future, he operates in the fifth dimension. He is emancipated from the strict confines of the anticipated sensorimotor time sequence. If he is going abroad, he can plan what he will do while in London, then jump back to planning his trip across the Atlantic, then leap forward to planning his return trip and back again to arranging an interview which is to be carried out during a sidetrip to Paris.

Our only contact with the potential future is through the inner world. The potential future becomes the present only as it passes through that exceedingly thin slice of reality which we call the sensorimotor world. Judging from the standard length of exposures of frames in moving pictures, that slice is about one-sixteenth of a second in thickness in the time dimension. So long as events remain in the potential future, our only access to them is through forecasting, planning, and precognition. These all belong essentially to the inner world—however much they may be assisted by sensorimotor accessories and activities. After events have passed through the sensorimotor present, our only contacts with them are through memory, historical research, and retrocognition.

The future of an individual, as it will actually develop, will be determined by three types of factors: (1) The first type consists of the wishes and desires of the individual and of the groups with which he identifies himself. (2) The second consists of factors which are beyond the control of the individual or the group. (3) The third consists in the anticipations, the plans and the actions which the individual or his group develops in the light of factor (1) and of whatever he knows (normally or parapsychologically) about (2).

The anticipated or planned future is likely to correspond only partly and inadequately with the future as it will actually develop. The degree of correspondence varies greatly in accordance with (a) the extent to which the kinds of events involved tend to conform to formulated laws, principles, or trends, (b) the intelligence of the forecaster or planner, (c) his familiarity with the kinds of factors which enter into the production of the future events, and (d) his resources and capacities for shaping events.

In one sense, the future as it will actually develop is deterministic. Take, for example, your own future funeral (assuming that civilization

continues beyond the time of your death, and that your body is available for funeral rites). Let us consider the account of that funeral which will appear in your local newspaper, or in a detailed letter written by a close relative to a friend of yours. In imagination, move your point of observation forward to the time when that account will become available. Every word in the account will be as it will be. Every event represented by (or omitted from) that account will have occurred as it will have occurred. These tautological statements are significant in so far as they point out the fact that the complex combination of causes which will lead up to that funeral and to its various particulars will produce a specific experience-configuration which (when viewed with hindsight) will appear to have been deterministic in the sense that adequate causes will have produced specific results.

On the other hand, these future events will have been caused in part by your own purposeful behavior. Intentionally or unintentionally, you will have contributed to your own death. You will also have contributed to what people say about you at your funeral, to the provisions which are made for your family, to the kinds of memories which your friends and acquaintances will exchange about you, and so on and so on. The future, thus, is deterministic in the sense that adequate causes will produce specific results; it is not deterministic in the sense that only mechanical factors will operate. Your own purposes, desires, and efforts will be potent elements in producing whatever sort of future actually develops.

How then can the "future" be altered through precognition? Excluding (for the moment) the operations of ESP, and considering ordinary planning, the wise person attempts to forecast the future development of various factors. The driver of an automobile, for example, pays attention to cars which are ahead of him, passing him, or approaching from sideroads. In planning his own immediate future actions, he consciously or unconsciously takes into account his forecast of what these other drivers will probably do. Similarly, a business executive makes use of the best estimates he can get as to future prices, supplies of raw materials and labor, demands for his product, effects of advertising, and so forth. A college, when admitting new students, takes account of the forecasts as to the academic performances of such students, and adjusts its requirements and advice accordingly. In all cases of normal planning, the more accurately and wisely the planner can forecast factors which are beyond his control, the more successfully his plans are likely to work out.

Extrasensory awareness of the various kinds of factors affecting the future are involved in precognition. Assuming that precognition does actually occur, our hypothesis is that contact of the inner-world type is made, not merely with the future as it will actually be, but distinctively with the factors beyond the precognizer's control as distinct from those

which can be modified by his own planning or direct action. This precognitive knowledge becomes one of the causal factors in producing the actual future in all cases where the purpose and action of the precognizer enter into the outcome.

A precognitive dream about a train wreck or an airplane crash may involve exclusively factors over which the expectations and plans of the precognizer have little or no influence. But take the example of a man who dreamed vividly that he was driving along an unfamiliar road, that he came to a certain intersection, that, as he crossed this intersection, his car was struck by a very swiftly moving white automobile, and that he (presumably) was killed. In this case, the man in question, when actually driving his car a few days later, suddenly recognized the stretch of road which he had seen in his dream, and the intersection at which (in his dream) he had been killed. He jammed on his brakes, and then saw the white car rush past, narrowly missing the front of his own car. In such a case the precognizer obtained extrasensory awareness of some of the factors beyond his own control, in the future as it would actually happen, but retained enough purposive latitude so that he could adjust his intentional activities so as to avoid the consequences which would have followed if his purposeful activities had not been guided by precognitive awareness of the intersection and of the dangerously approaching white car.

Just as the individual who plans (presumably) without the aid of ESP will succeed better if his normal wisdom and foresight give him a reliable forecast of events which are beyond his control, so *the individual whose ordinary forecasting intelligence is supplemented by extrasensory awareness may be expected to succeed more often and more completely* than a person who has no extrasensory help in forecasting such factors.

The above interpretation of extrasensory perception is in line with the general interpretation which regards ESP as an extension of the ordinary senses and (in the case of psychokinesis) of ordinary skills and muscular controls. No logical inconsistency is involved. If one confines the axioms of material science to the sensorimotor world (to which, alone, they properly apply), and if he recognizes that psychical phenomena are closely related to the basic axioms of the inner world, precognition falls into place, just as other psychical phenomena do.

IV. THE FOLLOWING PROSPECTUS FOR A RESEARCH PROGRAM EMERGES

A. IMPROVING THE EXPERIENTIAL PHILOSOPHY BY COOPERATIVE DISCUSSION

The present version of the Experiential Philosophy has emerged out of such discussion. Details have been given on pages 9 and 10 of this monograph.

Major further developments are called for. Systematic application of cooperative discussion methods may be expected to eliminate logical fallacies, to improve the clarity and organization of the system, to bring out agreements and issues between the Experiential Philosophy and other systems, and—of outstanding importance—to explore rigorously and searchingly its applications to psychical research and parapsychology in general, and to the survival question in particular.

Participants in this phase of the research may be recruited as follows: It is proposed to send copies of this monograph to the editors on the various leading philosophical journals for review and critical comments. It is also proposed to send copies to professors of philosophy at the universities and colleges listed by Dommeyer and White (1963) as having shown interest in parapsychology. A covering letter accompanying these monographs is to suggest: (1) that faculty members in such institutions send in critical reactions to the Experiential Philosophy; (2) that (wherever appropriate) they assign, as projects in seminars and advanced courses in philosophy the writing of critical comments by graduate students and undergraduate majors in philosophy; and (3) that advanced philosophy students in these institutions be encouraged to participate as individuals in this project. It is proposed that articles, summarizing significant aspects of this correspondence, be prepared and submitted to the *International Journal of Parapsychology*, so that interested readers may follow the discussion, and may send in their own critical comments and contributions.

B. A CRUCIAL SCIENTIFIC VERIFICATION OF SURVIVAL

Dr. Crookall's basic discoveries. Dr. Robert Crookall, a retired British scientist, is the author of *The Supreme Adventure*, and of *The Study and Practice of Astral Projection*, both published in 1961, to which reference has been made earlier in this paper. Much in the

scientific spirit of F. W. H. Myers, Dr. Crookall has assembled hundreds of cases of two basic types: (1) out-of-the-body experiences from which individuals have reported the processes involved in leaving and returning to the physical body; and (2) messages through mediums, in which persons who have died are said to have reported what their experiences were in the process of final departure from their physical body. By a detailed and intensive analysis of the characteristics of these case reports, Dr. Crookall established a *prima facie* case which appears to authenticate the objective reality of the experiences thus reported. In addition to his two published books, Dr. Crookall has been working on a series of additional volumes embodying further data in the same general categories.¹¹

Scientific testing is now called for. Crookall's conclusions are founded upon comparisons of the relative frequencies of certain types of experience in certain contrasted categories of cases. I have applied a preliminary statistical test to one of his crucial generalizations, and found that it is validated. But, in order to place his findings on a scientifically invulnerable basis, it is important that the statistical analysis of his data be carried through far more rigorously and thoroughly than anyone has yet done. In my review in the *Journal of the American Society for Psychical Research* (April, 1962, pp. 93-94) I have outlined scientific steps which need to be taken in order to test, confirm, or bring out needs for modifications in Crookall's findings.

C. A COOPERATIVE EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF DREAMS

Previous researches suggest significant possibilities here. Dreams are one of the major channels through which psychical experiences have occurred. All of the major treatises on psychical phenomena contain extensive discussion of dreams.

That dreams can be used experimentally to test the reality of precognition was suggested by J. W. Dunne, in his book *An Experiment With Time* (1927), and in his subsequent publications. The Society for Psychical Research sponsored an extensive experiment at Oxford University, following up Dunne's technique.

Several decades ago I myself kept records (without publication) of nine hundred of my own dreams. Some of these contained definite evidence of precognition. Others produced evidence of "shared dreams," in which my wife and I were participants in the same dream at the same time. The published literature of psychical research contains a good many striking examples of this sort.

I have encouraged some of my students to use Dunne's technique, and several of them have reported confirmations of his theory about precognitive dreams.

¹¹After this monograph had been set up, Dr. Crookall published two further studies in this field (1964).

Participants might be secured as follows: Doubtless a good many volunteers might be enlisted by publishing invitations in various parapsychological and psychical-research periodicals. However, it would be highly desirable to have blocks of participants who would be doing the work as part of an assignment in a course in psychology or in some other closely related subject. If the faculty members who are interested in parapsychology, in the various universities and colleges which have been listed as interested in the subject, could be circularized with a view to their enlisting groups of students in the dream study, a considerably more systematic body of dream accounts might be secured. Probably the volunteer contributions would have certain advantages (such as spontaneous interest in the subject) so that the two groups of reports might supplement each other.

Cooperation should also be invited from any existing organizations which may already be making systematic studies of dreams—such as the Institute of Dream Research in Miami.

How the cooperative project might be carried out. It would be suggested that on certain selected dates, or within a selected period of time, pairs (or larger groups) of persons closely related by love, friendship, or interest in psychical research would carry out techniques which have been found effective in enabling persons to remember and record their own dreams. The participants would be put on their honor to send in these reports without giving each other any normal clues as to the contents of their dreams. The participants would be asked to note the following points:

1. *Possibly precognitive dreams would be sought, by modifications of Dunne's techniques.*

2. *Personas appearing in these dreams would be described in as much detail as possible, and would be classified into such categories as the following:*

- (a) Persons well known in, and closely associated with, the dreamer's daily life;
- (b) Other living persons known in waking life and recognized as such in the dream;
- (c) Persons not recognized in waking memory, but who seem in the dream to be familiar;
- (d) Persons who seem in the dream to be strangers, including as full details as possible about their appearance, utterances, friendly or unfriendly attitudes, and so forth.

3. *Possible occurrences of shared dreams would be explored.* The reports of these dreams would be sent in without delay to a central research office. The independent reports of dreams by the paired dreamers would then be analyzed with a view to discovering to what extent (if at all) it seemed evident that these dreamers were in telepathic contact with each other. In particular, evidence would be

sought of cases in which individuals dreamed of meeting each other, in identical or very similar dream surroundings, and in which they remember engaging in conversations which both of them independently recall.

Possibly significant findings from such a study: Several conclusions of major importance might emerge. (1) The verification or non-verification of Dunne's hypotheses about precognitive dreams would be of considerable significance. (2) Even more important would be testing of the hypotheses that shared dreams are considerably more frequent than people realize. If it could be established that close friends, lovers, and others with strong emotional attachments (or even repulsions) for each other do engage in a dream life which is actually shared, in ways similar to the sharing of life in the material world, this would have important bearings on the relation between the spiritual world, the "astral world," and the sensorimotor world.

The analysis of types of personalities appearing in dreams can be of basic significance. Profound problems as to the nature of personality—both embodied and disembodied—need exploration, and such a project would have major potentialities of value in this connection.

D. PSYCHICAL PHENOMENA RELATED TO HYPNOTICALLY INDUCED DREAMS

Various experiments have demonstrated that it is possible to start a good hypnotic subject dreaming about topics which the hypnotist suggests. A psychotherapist of my acquaintance in Los Angeles uses the technique of having his patients tell him what they dreamed during the preceding night, then getting them into a hypnoidal state, and saying to them: "Now you are back in that dream. I want you to see the details of the surroundings in the dream. Who is there? What is he or she saying? . . ." By suggesting to the patient intensive attention to the details of the dream, the patient begins to go forward with the dream experience.

Shared dreams might quite conceivably be induced by hypnotic techniques. The cooperation of individuals who are already both (1) actively interested in hypnosis, and (2) more or less skilled in its use, would be highly desirable. One organization through which competent and reliable cooperation might be hoped to be obtained is the Association To Advance Ethical Hypnosis, whose headquarters are at 10 Washington Avenue, Irvington, New Jersey, and whose executive secretary is Mr. Harry Arons. Mr. Arons is himself a highly competent hypnotist, editor of *Hypnosis Quarterly*, and author of various outstanding books in the field. He has already shown a capacity for courageous experimentation in his cooperation with police departments and in his conduct of a seminar for expectant mothers who are taught to use hypnosis as a means of reducing or eliminating pains of childbirth.

An initial type of psi experiment might consist in having a husband and wife, or both members of an engaged couple, or of some other emotionally linked pair, hypnotized in two locations as widely separated as feasible, and without opportunity for preliminary collaboration. It would be arranged in advance that each hypnotist would suggest that his subject dream about the other subject, and remember as fully as possible the details of the surroundings, the actions of the dreamer and of other persons in the dream, and particularly the contents of any conversation which took place in the dream.

If shared dreams are as frequent as some of the literature would seem to suggest, it is an hypothesis worthy of investigation that this sort of procedure (with variations of such sorts as the experimenters may find promising) would produce conclusively verifiable examples of shared dreams, and would provide a means of exploring the boundaries and the psychical relationships of this sort of phenomena.

An interesting variant of this experiment might consist in hypnotic suggestions that the individual dream about a deeply loved but deceased husband, wife, child, parent, or friend. Detailed records of conversations occurring in such dreams might provide significant material for psychical analysis.

Researches in dreams have obvious relationships to psychoanalysis. The psychoanalyst regards all dreams in terms of their symbolism as related to the unconscious emotional life and tensions of the dreamer. This aspect of the suggested experiments should not be neglected or ignored. On the contrary, the constructive criticism of case records, and suggestions for improvements of research techniques, should be sought from psychiatrists who are interested in psychical matters. However, the approach here suggested proceeds from the broad hypothesis that dreams may provide an entryway into experiences in a world intermediate between the spiritual realm beyond time and space and the sensorimotor realm confined to time and space as known here on earth. The existence of such a realm is a major finding of spiritualist, theosophist, and various other types of occultism. Philosophically, the existence of such a realm would seem to be at least a highly rational hypothesis.

E. AN INTENSIVE STUDY ON OUT-OF-THE-BODY CASES

Importance of the Rhine collection for this purpose. The last report which I have received indicates that Dr. and Mrs. Rhine now possess, in connection with the Parapsychology Laboratory, more than 10,000 cases which have been sent in by observers in various parts of the United States and elsewhere in the world. Mrs. Rhine has been using them as a basis for articles published in the *Journal of Parapsychology*, and in her book *Hidden Channels of the Mind*. But these cases deserve further intensive analysis.

These cases might throw light in the following ways: Various types of study have been made of cases of this sort. The most extensive and intensive analyses are probably those which have been made by Dr. Crookall, although reports by Sylvan Muldoon and others are also of major significance.

The importance of the proposed study of the Rhine collection is that it would provide a very substantial body of fresh material, which could be used to test out further the generalizations which have developed in the previous studies, to consolidate the findings, and to point out still more clearly their bearings upon survival questions.

F. AN EXPLORATION OF THE BEARINGS OF EXPERIENTIAL PHILOSOPHY ON PRECOGNITION

Such exploration might well include the following aspects:

1. A critical examination of the Experiential interpretation of precognition (as sketched above) would be in order—both before the start of systematic research, and at any step where it became appropriate during such research.

2. Persons participating in the recording of dreams should be encouraged to carry out Dunne's technique for locating precognitive elements in their own dream records. All purportedly evidential phenomena along this line should be sorted out, assembled, and analyzed searchingly.

3. To suitable subjects, hypnotic suggestions might be given that they dream about specified future dates or specified future events. This might be particularly interesting if several good hypnotic subjects who were related to each other emotionally were separately given instructions to dream about the same date at the same location.

4. A fresh review of available spontaneous cases of purportedly precognitive knowledge (including cases in the Rhine collection) should be carried out, with a view to critical examination of the relationship between such data and the Experiential theory of precognition.

Brief

I. EXPERIENTIALISM CONSTITUTES A RADICALLY NEW APPROACH

Various philosophers have been concerned with parapsychology.

The following problems require philosophical illumination: 1. The nature of "astral matter" needs clarification. 2. In what senses, if at all, are various types of apparitions conscious? 3. What light can a new philosophical approach throw on the problem of survival? 4. What about clairvoyance? 5. How can psi be incorporated into natural science? 6. How can philosophical thinking about psychic matters become convergent rather than divergent?

Why not be REALLY skeptical? Skepticism of psychic phenomena appears to be becoming something of a collective obsession. This extreme incredulity about psychic phenomena appears recently to have been spreading among parapsychologists and even among psychical researchers.

Experientialism is based on cooperative discussion and on constructive skepticism. Philosophy has become largely an arid area of futile combat. Experientialism has been developing through three decades of cooperative discussion and factual research.

Four procedural rules provide the basis for a rigorously skeptical approach. Skepticism is adopted as the base of departure in order to arrive at rigorously verifiable conclusions. The four rules are: 1. Use uncontradictable propositions as basic. 2. Define and measure crucial terms and variables operationally. 3. Test hypotheses by systematic collections of operationally defined and measured data, and by repeatable experiments. 4. Resolve disagreements by cooperative discussion.

The following uncontradictable propositions are basic: 1. We shall need at first, to use common-sense definitions. 2. At least some tentative general principles can be formulated, applicable to further inquiry into experience. 3. To my own consciousness, the proposition: "I am conscious," is uncontradictable. 4. I am conscious of recognizable experience-configurations. 5. There is a time-sequence in my experiences. 6. I sometimes feel moved to act. 7. I can operate. 8. I can observe at least some of my own operations. 9. I can observe at least some experience-configurations which are not at the moment being created by my own operations. 10. I can select. 11. I can pay attention.

Experiential Philosophy excludes from consideration everything except experience. It starts with solipsism. The independent existence of matter is not an uncontradictable proposition. Experientialism is concerned with concepts, hypotheses, principles, memories, expectations, potentialities, and so on, but only as experiences.

II. THE SENSORIMOTOR AND THE INNER WORLDS MAY BE DISCRIMINATED OPERATIONALLY AS TWO DIFFERENT CATEGORIES OF EXPERIENCE

This step hinges on a repeatable experiment. It is described here in ideal terms. The sensorimotor world consists in all the aspects of experience which could be excluded, for the time being, by relaxing completely in a dark, quiet, comfortable room. The inner world consists in all other experience-configurations.

Inner-world experience-configurations may be classified into (1) inner images; (2) abstractions; and (3) wordless, imageless thought. 1. Inner-image configurations consist in remembered, imagined, planned, or dreamed images. 2. Abstractions are of various degrees. 3. Imageless thought may be demonstrated experimentally.

The four-dimensional structures of the inner world may be regarded as existing in five-dimensional space. A sequence of five widely reported experiences provides a basis. 1. Ordinary dreams are four-dimensional, but lack clarity. 2. A clear dream may be defined as one in which the dreamer becomes aware of the fact that he is dreaming, but continues within the dream. 3. A shared dream may be defined as one in which two or more dreamers dream of each other in a common space-time situation, and independently remember more or less of their surroundings, their conversation and their other interactions within the dream. 4. Out-of-the-body excursions into the sensorimotor world may be taken as a fourth stage in the series. 5. Many out-of-the-body excursionists report having visited regions which are not located in the sensorimotor world. These inner four-dimensional structures may be regarded as existing within a fifth dimension. The nature of the fifth dimension may be clarified by geometric logic. The psychic fifth dimension is the logical next step.

The axioms which materialistic scientists take for granted as applied to the sensorimotor world are contradicted by psychical and parapsychological phenomena. Professor Broad lists nine such axioms. Telepathy and clairvoyance negate propositions 3, 6, and 7; precognition negates propositions 1, 2, 3, and 8; and psychokinesis negates proposition 4. When phenomena are inconsistent with philosophy, philosophy requires reconstruction.

The basic axioms of the inner world are radically different from those of the sensorimotor world. For illustration: 1. An observer in the inner world can move either backward or forward in time, and can

move from one point to another in either time or space, without necessarily traversing intermediate points. 2. An "I"-thinker (when properly trained) can mold inner-world matter more or less at will. 3. The laws of gravitation, momentum, and the like, do not necessarily control the observer-operator in the inner world. 4. Objects and events in the inner world are arranged on the basis of emotional, ideational and habitual linkages. The laws of the inner world tend to be consistent with psychical phenomena. Professor Broad's challenge as to clairvoyance may help to focus the above discussion. Clairvoyance can be understood to some extent by means of analogies with other forms of inner-world vision.

III. THE ABOVE ANALYSIS PROVIDES A BASIS FOR RESOLVING MAJOR PARAPSYCHOLOGICAL DIFFICULTIES

A. Both in the sensorimotor and the inner world, "matter" is known only in terms of configurations of correlated actual and potential experiences. Any material object may be defined (so far as Experiential Philosophy is concerned with it) as consisting in the correlated experience-configurations—actual, remembered, and potential—which are obtainable by observing and operating upon whatever phases of this complex are presented. At this point, Professor Ducasse asks to have these principles applied (for example) to a piece of paper; this is done.

Actual experiences are those which are in the focus of attention at the present moment, while potential experiences are those which may be brought into consciousness by further operations and observations. A sensorimotor experience-configuration is partially but never perfectly predictable.

A sensorimotor configuration consists in any bundle of correlated sensory observations and/or motor operations. A sensorimotor configuration, then, consists of what the "I"-thinker experiences directly with respect to what are referred to in common-sense terms as physical objects, physical actions, and sensory observations.

As to the experiential conception of matter, Ducasse and Hart differ mainly in emphasis. Common-sense terminology, of the sort recommended in this connection by Ducasse, is inadequate to deal with crucial psychical-research problems, such as inner-world matter, and the elimination of dualism.

B. The existence of other "I"-thinkers than oneself is also to be approached with rock-bottom skepticism. What evidence have I that conscious personalities other than myself exist? Robots are not conscious. Other types of sensorimotor human-like figures may not be conscious.

About the ordinary people in my sensorimotor world I note the following facts: 1. They have bodies. 2. We communicate. 3. We cooperate and otherwise interact. 4. They seem to act as if they had

purposes, values, and interests, somewhat as I have purposes, values, and interests.

C. The survival question hinges on the existence of "I"-thinkers within human-like apparitional and inner-world bodies. A multiplicity of inner-world figures must be considered. Apparitions involve an overlapping of the inner and the sensorimotor worlds.

The evidence to be examined parallels the evidence by which the consciousness of sensorimotor personalities is judged. In what sense are the bodies of inner-world personalities "real"? At this point (as elsewhere) theory needs to be related closely to reliably observed phenomena. Collectively perceived apparitions have major bearings on the question of the sense in which apparitions are to be regarded as objectively real. The existence of "objectively real" bodies of such apparitions would seem to be an appropriate assumption.

But are these apparitional bodies vehicles of conscious personalities? Self-conscious apparitions of the living provide a basic clue. Some apparitions of the living can be regarded as vehicles through which "I"-thinkers observe and operate.

But what about apparitions of the dead? They are closely similar to apparitions of the living. Purposefulness is a particularly significant similarity. The evidence which is now available, and which has been systematically analyzed, provides a firm threshold for the working hypothesis that human personality does survive bodily death.

D. In what sense does personal identity survive bodily death? An *expanded personality* consists of any entity who thinks of himself as "I," plus everything which the "I"-thinker regards as "mine." The *persona* consists in the objectively perceptible aspects of the expanded personality. Every "I"-thinker has five significant characteristics, including a unique chain of memories. Personas have five characteristics, including the fact that an apparition is a persona which (temporarily) has become psychically visible to one or more percipients.

Experientially, personal identity consists in the unique chain of memories. In what sense does the self exist during periods of total unconsciousness, and of partial or distorted consciousness? The retention, beyond death, of the memory chain and of essential purpose and value relationships would constitute valid and adequate survival. Experientially, the "persona" is merely a vehicle.

E. A rational approach to the precognition problem is provided by Experientialism. This analysis hinges on the psychic fifth dimension. A motion-picture director operates in the fifth dimension—a time dimension of his own. Our only contact with the potential future is through the inner world. The ordinary individual operates in the fifth dimension when he is remembering the past or planning the future. The future of an individual, as it will actually develop, will be determined by (1) his desires, (2) factors beyond his control, and (3) his anticipa-

tions and plans. His future will be deterministic in the sense of being the outcome of adequate causes.

But his own purposeful behavior will contribute part of the causes. The more wisely a planner can forecast factors which are beyond his control, the more successful his plans will be. Extrasensory awareness of the various kinds of factors affecting the future are involved in precognition. The individual whose ordinary forecasting intelligence is supplemented by extrasensory awareness may be expected to succeed more often and more completely.

IV. THE FOLLOWING PROSPECTUS FOR A RESEARCH PROGRAM EMERGES

A. Improving the Experiential Philosophy by cooperative discussion. The present version emerged out of such discussion. Major further developments are called for. Participants in this phase of the research may be recruited from philosophy departments in universities and colleges which have shown interest in parapsychology.

B. A crucial scientific verification of survival. This would involve scientific testing of Dr. Crookall's discoveries.

C. A cooperative experimental study of dreams. Previous researches suggest significant possibilities here. Participants might be secured through announcements in periodicals and through cooperation of existing organizations. Possibly precognitive dreams would be sought, by modifications of Dunne's techniques. Personas appearing in these dreams would be described and classified. Possible occurrences of shared dreams would be explored.

D. Psychological phenomena related to hypnotically induced dreams would be explored. Shared dreams might be induced by hypnosis. Researches in dreams have obvious relationships to psychoanalysis.

E. An intensive study of out-of-the-body cases. The Rhine collection has major importance for this purpose.

F. An exploration of the bearings of Experiential Philosophy on precognition.

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Summary

Seven basic parapsychological problems require philosophical illumination: 1. the nature of "astral matter"; 2. the question whether and to what extent apparitions are conscious; 3. precognition and its place in a rational and comprehensive philosophy; 4. survival; 5. clairvoyance; 6. the incorporation of psi into natural science; and 7. how philosophical thinking about psychic matters can become convergent instead of divergent.

Constructive skepticism is adopted as the base of departure of Experientialism in order to arrive at rigorously verifiable conclusions. Four procedural rules are specified. 1. Use uncontradictable propositions as foundations. 2. Define and measure crucial terms and variables operationally. 3. Test hypotheses by systematic collections of operationally defined and measured data, and by repeatable experiments. 4. Resolve disagreements by cooperative discussion.

The following uncontradictable propositions are basic: 1. To my own consciousness, the proposition, "I am conscious," is uncontradictable. 2. I am conscious of recognizable experience-configurations. 3. There is a time-sequence in my experiences. 4. I can operate. 5. I can observe. The Experiential Philosophy excludes from consideration everything except experience.

The sensorimotor and the inner worlds may be discriminated operationally as two basic categories of experience. The sensorimotor world consists in all the aspects of experience which could be excluded, for the time being, by relaxing completely in a dark, quiet, comfortable room. The inner world consists in all other experience configurations.

The axioms which materialistic scientists take for granted as applied to the sensorimotor world are contradicted by psychical and parapsychological phenomena. Professor Broad lists nine such axioms.

The basic axioms of the inner world are radically different from those of the sensorimotor world. For illustration: 1. An observer in the inner world can move either backward or forward in time, and can move from one point to another in either time or space, without necessarily traversing intermediate points. 2. An "I"-thinker (when properly trained) can mold inner-world matter, more or less at will. 3. The laws of gravitation, momentum, and the like, do not necessarily control the observer-operator in the inner world. 4. Objects and events in the inner world are arranged on the basis of emotional, ideational and habitual linkages. The laws of the inner world tend to be consistent with psychical phenomena.

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The four-dimensional structures of the inner world may be regarded as existing in five-dimensional space. 1. Ordinary dreams are four-dimensional, but lack clarity. 2. A clear dream may be defined as one in which the dreamer becomes aware of the fact that he is dreaming, but continues within the dream. 3. A shared dream may be defined as one in which two or more dreamers dream of each other in a common space-time situation, and independently remember more or less of their surroundings, their conversation and their other interactions within the dream. 4. Out-of-the-body excursions into the sensorimotor world may be taken as a fourth stage in the series. 5. Many out-of-the-body excursionists report having visited regions which are not located in the sensorimotor world. These inner four-dimensional structures may be regarded as existing within a fifth dimension. Such inner-world experience-configurations may have varying degrees of objective reality.

The existence of other "I"-thinkers than oneself is also to be approached with rock-bottom skepticism. What evidence have I that conscious personalities other than myself exist? Robots are not conscious. Other types of sensorimotor human-like figures may not be conscious.

About the ordinary people in my sensorimotor world I note the following facts: 1. They have bodies. 2. We communicate. 3. We cooperate and otherwise interact. 4. They seem to act as if they had purposes, values, and interests, somewhat as I have purposes, values, and interests.

The survival question hinges on the existence of "I"-thinkers with human-like apparitional and inner-world bodies. The evidence to be examined parallels the evidence by which the consciousness of sensorimotor personalities is judged. Collectively perceived apparitions have major bearings on the question. The existence of "objectively real" bodies of such apparitions would seem to be an appropriate assumption.

But are these apparitional bodies vehicles of conscious personalities? Self-conscious apparitions of the living provide a basic clue. Apparitions of the dead are closely similar to apparitions of the living.

Purposefulness is a particularly significant similarity. The available evidence provides a firm threshold for the working hypothesis that human personality does survive bodily death.

In what sense does personal identity survive? An *expanded personality* consists of any entity who thinks of himself as "I," plus everything which the "I"-thinker regards as "mine." Every "I"-thinker has a unique chain of memories, which constitutes its identity. The retention beyond death of the memory chain, and of essential purpose and value relationships, would constitute valid and adequate survival.

A *persona* consists in the objectively perceivable aspects of an expanded personality. An apparition is a persona which has become psychically visible to one or more percipients. Experientially, the "persona" is merely a vehicle.

A rational approach to the precognition problem is provided by Experientialism. The ordinary individual operates in the fifth dimension when he is remembering the past or planning the future. The future of an individual, as it will actually develop, is deterministic in the sense of being the outcome of adequate causes. But his own purposeful behavior will contribute part of the causes. The more wisely a planner can forecast factors which are beyond his control, the more successful his plans can be. The individual whose ordinary forecasting intelligence is supplemented by extrasensory awareness may be expected to succeed more often and more completely.

From the above experiential analysis, a research program emerges.

Resumé

Sept problèmes parapsychologiques fondamentaux exigent un éclaircissement philosophique: 1. La nature de la "matière astrale"; 2. la question de savoir si et dans quelle mesure les apparitions sont conscientes; 3. la précognition et sa place dans une philosophie rationnelle et compréhensive; 4. la survie; 5. la clairvoyance; 6. l'incorporation de psi dans la science naturelle; et 7. comment la pensée portant sur les questions psychiques peut devenir convergente et non divergente.

Un scepticisme constructif est adopté comme base de départ d'un expérimentalisme en vue de parvenir à des conclusions rigoureusement vérifiables. Quatre règles de procédure sont spécifiées. 1. Prendre comme fondation des propositions impossibles à contredire. 2. Définir et mesurer les termes et variables cruciaux par des opérations pratiques. 3. Soumettre les hypothèses à la comparaison de collections systématiques de données définies et mesurées pratiquement et d'expériences répétables. 4. Résoudre les désaccords par une discussion coopérative.

Les propositions suivantes qui ne peuvent être contredites sont fondamentales: 1. Pour ma propre conscience, la proposition "Je suis conscient" est impossible à contredire. 2. Je suis conscient de configurations d'expérience reconnaissables. 3. Il y a une séquence temporelle dans mes expériences. 4. Je puis agir. 5. Je puis observer. La philosophie expérientielle exclut de toute considération tout ce qui n'est pas expérience.

Les mondes sensorimoteur et intérieur peuvent être pratiquement distingués comme deux catégories d'expérience fondamentales. Le monde sensorimoteur consiste en tous les aspects d'expérience qui pourraient être exclus, pour le moment présent, en se relaxant complètement dans une pièce sombre, tranquille, confortable. Le monde intérieur consiste en toute configuration d'expérience autre.

Les axiomes que les savants matérialistes prennent comme convenus dans leur application au monde sensorimoteur sont contredits par les phénomènes psychiques et parapsychologiques. Le Professeur Broad compte neuf axiomes de ce genre.

Les axiomes fondamentaux du monde intérieur sont radicalement différents de ceux du monde sensorimoteur. Par exemple: 1. Un observateur dans le monde intérieur peut se mouvoir soit vers l'arrière soit vers l'avant dans le temps, et peut se mouvoir d'un point à un autre soit dans le temps soit dans l'espace, sans nécessairement traverser des points intermédiaires. 2. Un "Moi-penseur" (lorsqu'il a été con-

venablement exercé) peut façonner la matière du monde intérieur, plus ou moins à son gré. 3. Les lois de la gravitation, de l'accélération et autres faits semblables, ne commandent pas nécessairement l'observateur-opérateur dans le monde intérieur. 4. Les objets et événements dans le monde intérieur sont aménagés sur une base de liaisons émotionnelles, idéationnelles et habituelles. Les lois du monde intérieur tendent à s'accorder avec les phénomènes psychiques.

Aussi bien dans le monde sensorimoteur que dans le monde intérieur, la "matière" ne nous est connue qu'en termes de configurations d'expériences effectives et potentielles. Tout objet matériel peut se définir (pour autant que la philosophie expérientielle ait à s'y intéresser) comme consistant en les configurations d'expérience—actuelles, rappelées à la mémoire, et potentielles—en corrélation, qui peuvent s'obtenir en observant et en agissant sur toutes les phases de ce complexe quelles qu'elles soient qui se présentent.

Une configuration sensorimotrice consiste en un assemblage quelconque d'observations sensorielles et (ou) d'opérations motrices en corrélation. Une configuration sensorimotrice consiste, par conséquent, en ce dont le "Moi-penseur" fait l'expérience directe, à l'égard de ce à quoi on se réfère, en termes de sens commun, comme objets physiques, actions physiques et observations sensorielles.

Les structures à quatre dimensions du monde intérieur peuvent être considérées comme existant dans un espace à cinq dimensions. 1. Les rêves ordinaires sont à quatre dimensions mais manquent de clarté. 2. Un rêve clair peut se définir comme un rêve dans lequel le rêveur prend conscience du fait qu'il est en train de rêver, mais continue en dedans du rêve. 3. Un rêve partagé peut se définir comme un rêve dans lequel deux ou plusieurs rêveurs rêvent l'un de l'autre dans une situation d'espace-temps commune et se souviennent indépendamment plus ou moins de leur entourage, de leur conversation et de leurs autres interactions en dedans du rêve. 4. Des excursions hors du corps dans le monde sensorimoteur peuvent être prises comme une quatrième étape dans la série. 5. Beaucoup des excursionnistes hors du corps relatent qu'ils ont visité des régions qui ne sont pas situées dans le monde sensorimoteur. Ces structures internes à quatre dimensions peuvent être regardées comme existant en dedans d'une cinquième dimension. De telles configurations d'expérience du monde intérieur peuvent avoir des degrés variables de réalité objective.

L'existence de "Moi"-penseurs autres que soi-même doit aussi être abordée avec un scepticisme fondé sur le roc. Quelle preuve ai-je qu'il existe des personnalités conscientes autres que moi-même? Des robots ne sont pas conscients. D'autres types de personnages sensorimoteurs d'aspect humain peuvent n'être pas conscients.

Quant aux gens ordinaires de mon monde sensorimoteur je remarque les faits suivants: 1. Ils ont des corps. 2. Nous communiquons. 3.

Nous coopérons et réagissons d'autres manières les uns sur les autres.
4. Ils semblent agir comme s'ils avaient des buts, des valeurs et des intérêts, à peu près comme j'ai des buts, des valeurs et des intérêts.

La question de la survie dépend de l'existence de "Moi"-penseurs ayant des corps de forme humaine pouvant apparaître ou se trouver dans le monde intérieur. La preuve qui doit être examinée est semblable à la preuve sur laquelle la conscience des personnalités sensorimotrices est jugée. Les apparitions perçues collectivement ont la portée la plus considérable sur la question. L'existence de corps "objectivement réels" pour de telles apparitions semblerait une supposition convenable.

Mais ces corps d'apparitions sont-ils les véhicules de personnalités conscientes? Les apparitions conscientes d'elles-mêmes des vivants nous fournissent un indice fondamental. Les apparitions des morts sont étroitement similaires aux apparitions des vivants. La poursuite d'un but est une similitude particulièrement significative. La preuve dont nous disposons offre un seuil solide à l'hypothèse de travail que la personnalité humaine survit effectivement à la mort corporelle.

En quel sens l'identité personnelle survit-elle? Une personnalité développée consiste en toute entité qui pense d'elle-même comme de "Moi" plus tout ce que ce "Moi"-penseur regarde comme "mien". Tout "Moi"-penseur possède une chaîne unique de souvenirs qui constitue son identité. La conservation, au-delà de la mort, de la chaîne des souvenirs, et des relations essentielles des buts et des valeurs, constituerait une survie valable et adéquate.

Une *persona* consiste dans les aspects objectivement perceptibles d'une personnalité développée. Une apparition est une persona qui est devenue psychiquement visible à un ou plusieurs percipients. Expé-rienciellement, la "persona" n'est qu'un véhicule.

Une approche rationnelle du problème de la précognition est donnée par l'expé-riencialisme. L'individu ordinaire opère dans la cinquième dimension quand il se souvient du passé ou qu'il fait des plans pour l'avenir. L'avenir d'un individu, tel qu'il se développera effectivement, est soumis au déterminisme en ce sens qu'il est le résultat de causes adéquates. Mais sa propre conduite délibérée apportera une partie des causes. Plus sagement un faiseur de plans pourra prévoir les facteurs qui échappent à son contrôle, plus heureux ces plans pourront être. On peut s'attendre à ce qu'un individu dont la prévision intelligente ordinaire est complétée par la connaissance extrasensorielle réussisse plus souvent et plus entièrement.

De l'analyse expé-riencelle ci-dessus sort un programme de recherche.

Zusammenfassung

Sieben parapsychologische Grundprobleme bedürfen einer philosophischen-Aufhellung: 1. das Wesen der "Astralmaterie"; 2. die Frage ob und in welchem Ausmass Erscheinungen Bewusstsein besitzen; 3. Vorausschau und ihre Stellung innerhalb einer rationalen und umfassenden Philosophie; 4. das Fortleben; 5. Hellsehen; 6. die Einordnung von Psi in die Naturwissenschaften und 7. wie die parapsychologischen Gegebenheiten statt im Gegensatz in Übereinstimmung mit dem philosophischen Denken gebracht werden können.

Um zu streng überprüfbaren Schlussfolgerungen zu gelangen, wird ein konstruktiver Skeptizismus als Ausgangspunkt des Experimentierens gewählt. Vier Regeln für das Vorgehen werden angeführt: 1. Man muss von unbestreitbaren Voraussetzungen als Grundlage ausgehen. 2. Grundlegende Begriffe und Abwandlungen müssen in ihrer Anwendung definiert und abgemessen werden. 3. Hypothesen müssen durch systematische Sammlung von in deren Anwendung definierten und angemessene Daten und wiederholte Experimente überprüft werden. 4. Unstimmigkeiten müssen durch gemeinsame Diskussionen aufgeklärt werden.

Folgende unwiderlegliche Voraussetzungen sind grundlegend: 1. Für mein eigenes Bewusstsein ist die Aussage: "Ich bin mir bewusst" unwiderleglich. 2. Ich weiss um erkennbare Erfahrungs-Gegebenheiten. 3. Meine Erfahrungen enthalten eine zeitliche Aufeinanderfolge. 4. Ich kann mich betätigen. 5. Ich kann beobachten. Die Erfahrungs-Philosophie lehnt es ab, irgend etwas anderes als Erfahrung in Betracht zu ziehen.

Die sensorisch-motorischen und die inneren Welten können als zwei grundlegende, unterscheidbare Erfahrungskategorien behandelt werden. Die sensorisch-motorische Welt enthält alle jene Aspekte der Erfahrung, die sich zeitweise ausschalten liessen, wenn man völlig entspannt in einem dunklen, ruhigen, bequemen Raum verweilt. Die innere Welt besteht aus allen anderen Erfahrungsgegebenheiten.

Den Axiomen, welche die materialistischen Gelehrten in ihrer Anwendung auf die sensorisch-motorische Welt für unumstösslich halten, widersprechen die psychischen und parapsychologischen Phänomene. Professor Broad zählt neun solche Axiome auf.

Die grundlegenden Axiome der inneren Welt sind völlig verschieden von jenen der sensorisch-motorischen Welt. Zum Beispiel: 1. Ein Beobachter der inneren Welt kann sich in der Zeit entweder vorwärts oder rückwärts bewegen, kann sich sowohl in der Zeit als auch im Raum von einem Punkt zum anderen bewegen, ohne notwendigerweise

Zwischenpunkte zu durchqueren. 2. Jemand, der das "Ich denke" vollzieht, kann (bei entsprechender Schulung) mehr oder weniger willkürlich die inner-weltlichen Gegebenheiten gestalten. 3. Die Gesetze der Schwerkraft, der Bewegung u.dgl. beherrschen nicht notwendigerweise den Beobachter oder Handelnden in der inneren Welt. 4. Gegenstände und Ereignisse der inneren Welt werden aufgrund gefühlsmässiger, ideierender und habitueller Verknüpfungen angeordnet. Die Gesetze der inneren Welt tendieren zu einer Übereinstimmung mit den psychischen Phänomenen.

Sowohl in den sensorisch-motorischen als in den inneren Welten kennt man "Materie" nur im Sinne von Konfigurationen aus aufeinander bezogenen aktuellen und potentiellen Erfahrungen. Ein materieller Gegenstand kann (insofern die Erfahrungs-Philosophie es mit ihm zu tun hat) definiert werden, als etwas, das aus den aufeinander bezogenen —aktuellen, erinnerten, potentiellen—Erfahrungskonfigurationen besteht, die dadurch erlangt werden können, dass man jedwede sich bietende Phase dieses Komplexes beobachtet oder handhabt.

Eine sensorisch-motorische Konfiguration besteht aus jedwedem Bündel auf einander bezogener, sensorischer Beobachtungen und/oder motorischer Betätigungen. Demnach besteht eine sensorisch-motorische Konfiguration aus dem, was der "Ich denkende" unmittelbar erfährt inbezug auf das, was in den Begriffen des Alltags als physische Objekt, physische Handlungen, sinnliche Erfahrungen bezeichnet wird.

Die vier-dimensionalen Strukturen der inneren Welt können als im fünf-dimensionalen Raum existierend aufgefasst werden. 1. Gewöhnliche Träume sind vier-dimensional, entbehren jedoch der Klarheit. 2. Man kann einen klaren Traum als einen solchen definieren, in dem der Träumer dessen inne ist, dass er träumt, aber im Traum verbleibt. 3. Einen gemeinsamen Traum kann man definieren als einen Traum, in dem zwei oder mehr Träumende in einer gemeinsamen raumzeitlichen Situation von einander träumen und unabhängig von einander sich mehr oder weniger ihrer Umgebung, ihrer Unterhaltung und ihrer sonstigen Wechselbeziehungen während des Traumes erinnern. 4. Ausserleibliche Ausflüge in die sensorisch-motorische Welt können als eine vierte Stufe in der Reihe aufgefasst werden. 5. Viele ausserleibliche Ausflügler berichten, sie hätten Gegenden aufgesucht, die nicht in der sensorisch-motorischen Welt liegen. Diese inneren, vier-dimensionalen Strukturen kann man als in einer fünften Dimension existierend auffassen. Solche innerweltliche Erfahrungskonfigurationen können verschiedene Grade objektiver Wirklichkeit besitzen.

Auch an die Existenz anderer "Ich"-denker als man selbst muss man mit grundsätzlicher Skepsis herangehen. Welchen Beweis habe ich dafür, dass es ausser mir noch bewusste Persönlichkeiten gibt? Roboter besitzen kein Bewusstsein. Andere Arten von sensorisch-motorischen, menschenartigen Gestalten besitzen vielleicht kein Bewusstsein.

Hinsichtlich der gewöhnlichen Leute in meiner sensorisch-

motorischen Welt nehme ich folgende Tatsachen zur Kenntnis: 1. Sie haben Leiber. 2. Wir tauschen Mitteilungen aus. 3. Wir handeln gemeinsam und stehen in sonstigen Wechselbeziehungen. 4. Sie scheinen zu handeln als verfolgten sie Ziele, besässen Wertungen, Interessen, etwa so, wie ich Ziele, Werte, Interessen besitze.

Die Frage des Fortlebens dreht sich um die Existenz der "Ich"-denker, denen eine menschenartige Erscheinung und innerweltliche Leiber eignen. Die zu untersuchenden Beweise sind gleich jenen, aufgrund deren die Bewusstheit sensorisch-motorischer Persönlichkeiten beurteilt wird. Kollektivwahrnehmungen von Erscheinungen sind von grösster Wichtigkeit für diese Frage. Die Existenz "objektiv realer" Leiber derartiger Erscheinungen dürfte eine angemessene Annahme sein.

Aber enthalten diese Erscheinungsleiber bewusste Persönlichkeiten? Die ihrer selbst bewussten Erscheinungen Lebender liefern einen grundlegenden Anhaltspunkt. Die Erscheinungen Verstorbener besitzen grosse Ähnlichkeit mit den Erscheinungen Lebender. Eine besonders bedeutsame Gleichartigkeit liegt in der Zielstrebigkeit. Was sich da an Beweisen erhalten lässt, stellt einen festen Ausgangspunkt für die Arbeitshypothese dar, dass die menschliche Persönlichkeit den körperlichen Tod überlebt.

In welcher Hinsicht überlebt die identische Persönlichkeit? Eine entwickelte Persönlichkeit besteht aus einem jeden Wesen, das von sich als "Ich" denkt, zuzüglich alles dessen, was dieser "Ich"-denker als "sein" betrachtet. Jedem "Ich"-denker eignet eine eigenartige Kette von Erinnerungen, die seine Identität ausmacht. Die Erhaltung dieser Erinnerungskette und wesentlicher Ziel- und Wertbeziehungen über den Tod hinaus würde ein stichhaltiges und angemessenes Fortleben ausmachen.

Eine *Persona* besteht aus den objektiv erkennbaren Aspekten einer entwickelten Persönlichkeit. Eine Erscheinung ist eine *Persona*, die einem oder mehreren Percipienten psychisch sichtbar wurde. Hinsichtlich der Erfahrung ist die "*Persona*" lediglich ein Träger (Vehikel).

Die Erfahrungswissenschaft liefert einen rationalen Zugang zu dem Problem der Vorschau. Der gewöhnliche Mensch bewegt sich in fünf Dimensionen, wenn er sich der Vergangenheit erinnert oder für die Zukunft vorausplant. Die Zukunft eines Individuums ist in ihrer tatsächlichen Entfaltung insofern determiniert, als sie das Ergebnis adäquater Ursachen ist. Aber sein eigenes zweckdienliches Verhalten wird einen Teil der Ursachen beisteuern. Je klüger der Planende die Faktoren voraussehen kann, die von ihm unabhängig sind, desto erfolgreicher können seine Pläne sein. Ein Individuum, dessen gewöhnliche vorausschauende Intelligenz durch aussersinnliches Innesein ergänzt wird, dürfte öfter und in grösserem Umfang Erfolg haben.

Aus der obigen, von der Erfahrung ausgehenden Analyse ergibt sich ein Forschungsprogramm.

Sommario

Sette problemi parapsicologici di base richiedono un'illuminazione filosofica: 1. la natura della "materia astrale"; 2. la questione se ed entro quali limiti le apparizioni siano coscienti; 3. la precognizione, e il suo posto in una filosofia razionale e comprensiva; 4. la sopravvivenza; 5. la chiaroveggenza; 6. l'incorporazione dei fenomeni *psi* nelle scienze naturali; 7. come il pensiero filosofico relativo ai fatti parapsichici possa diventare convergente invece che divergente.

Si adotta uno scetticismo costruttivo quale base di partenza dell'"esperienzialismo", onde arrivare a conclusioni rigorosamente verificabili. Si specificano quattro regole di procedura. 1. Usare proposizioni incontrovertibili come fondamenti. 2. Definire e misurare in guisa operativa termini cruciali e variabili. 3. Saggiare le ipotesi mediante raccolte sistematiche di dati operazionalmente definiti e misurati, e mediante esperimenti ripetibili. 4. Risolvere le controversie mediante discussione e collaborazione.

Le seguenti proposizioni incontrovertibili sono fondamentali: 1. Per la mia coscienza, la proposizione "Io sono cosciente" è incontrovertibile. 2. Io sono cosciente di configurazioni esperienziali riconoscibili. 3. Nelle mie esperienze vi è una sequenza temporale. 4. Io posso operare. 5. Io posso osservare.—Questa filosofia esperienziale esclude la considerazione di qualsiasi cosa che non sia esperienza.

Il mondo sensoriale-motorio e quello interiore possono essere operazionalmente discriminati quali due fondamentali categorie d'esperienza. Il mondo sensoriale-motorio consiste di tutti gli aspetti dell'esperienza che potrebbero essere esclusi, per un certo tempo, rilassandosi completamente in una stanza buia, calma e comoda. Il mondo interiore consiste in ogni altra configurazione d'esperienza.

Gli assiomi che gli scienziati materialisti accettano come senz'altro applicabili al mondo sensoriale-motorio sono contraddetti dai fenomeni psichici e parapsicologici. Il Prof. Broad ne elenca nove.

Gli assiomi fondamentali del mondo interiore sono radicalmente diversi da quelli del mondo sensoriale-motorio. Per illustrare ciò: 1. Un osservatore nel mondo interiore si può muovere avanti o indietro nel tempo, e può muoversi da un punto all'altro nel tempo e nello spazio, senza attraversare necessariamente punti intermedi. 2. Un "Io pensante" (se propriamente addestrato) può foggiare più o meno a volontà la materia del mondo interiore. 3. Le leggi della gravitazione, il momento, e simili, non controllano di necessità colui che osserva ed opera nel mondo interiore. 4. Gli oggetti e gli eventi del mondo

interiore sono disposti in base a legami emozionali, ideativi e di abitudine. Le leggi del mondo interiore tendono ad accordarsi con i fenomeni parapsichici.

Tanto nel mondo sensoriale-motorio quanto in quello interiore, la "materia" è nota soltanto in termini di configurazioni d'esperienze sia in atto sia potenziali. Qualsiasi oggetto materiale può essere definito (nei limiti in cui la filosofia esperienziale può prenderlo in considerazione) come qualcosa che consiste in configurazioni d'esperienze—in atto, ricordate o potenziali—che si possono ottenere osservando od operando su qualsiasi fase di tale complesso che venga presentata.

Una configurazione sensoriale-motoria consiste in un qualsiasi insieme di osservazioni sensoriali-motorie correlate e/o di operazioni motorie. Essa consiste pertanto in ciò che l'“Io pensante” sperimenta in modo diretto nei riguardi di quelli che vengono chiamati, in termini di senso comune, oggetti fisici, azioni psichiche e osservazioni sensoriali.

Le strutture quadridimensionali del mondo interiore possono essere considerate come esistenti in uno spazio a cinque dimensioni. 1. I sogni ordinari sono quadridimensionali ma mancano di chiarezza. 2. Un sogno chiaro può essere definito come un sogno nel quale il sognatore acquista consapevolezza di stare sognando, ma continua a sognare. 3. Un sogno condiviso può essere definito come un sogno in cui due o più sognatori sognano l'uno dell'altro in una situazione spazio-temporale comune, e indipendentemente ricordano più o meno ciò che li circondava, la loro conversazione e le altre azioni in comune inerenti al sogno. 4. Uscite “fuori del proprio corpo” nel mondo sensoriale-motorio possono essere considerate come un quarto stadio della serie. 5. Molte persone che hanno avuto l'esperienza di “uscire dal proprio corpo” riferiscono di aver visitato regioni che non sono situate nel mondo sensoriale-motorio. Queste strutture interiori quadridimensionali possono essere considerate come esistenti in una quinta dimensione. Tali configurazioni esperienziali del mondo interiore possono avere gradi variabili di realtà oggettiva.

L'esistenza di altri “Io pensanti”, diversi dal proprio sè, dev'essere anch'essa affrontata con solido scetticismo. Che prova ho io dell'esistenza di altre personalità coscienti all'infuori di me? I robot non sono coscienti. Altri tipi di esseri aventi facoltà sensoriali-motorie, e simili agli uomini, potrebbero non essere coscienti.

Circa le persone ordinarie che compaiono nel mio mondo sensoriale-motorio, io noto i seguenti fatti: 1. Esse hanno dei corpi. 2. Comuniciamo. 3. Collaboriamo e compiamo azioni interattive. 4. Sembrano agire come se avessero scopi, valori e interessi, più o meno come io ho scopi, valori e interessi.

La questione della sopravvivenza s'impenna sull'esistenza di “Io pensanti” aventi corpi che appaiono simili a quelli umani e mondi interiori anch'essi umano-simili. Le prove che debbono essere esaminate

sono parallele a quelle in base alle quali viene giudicata la coscienza delle personalità sensoriali-motorie. Le apparizioni percepite collettivamente hanno maggior peso nella questione. Sembrerebbe giustificato pensare all'esistenza di corpi "oggettivamente reali" appartenenti a tali apparizioni.

Ma questi "corpi di apparizioni", sono essi veicoli di personalità coscienti? Una indicazione di base al riguardo ci è fornita da apparizioni auto-coscienti di persone viventi. Le apparizioni dei morti sono molto simili a quelle dei vivi. Una similarità particolarmente significativa è data dalla finalità. I dati dimostrativi di cui disponiamo forniscono una solida base all'ipotesi di lavoro che la personalità umana sopravviva alla morte corporea.

In qual senso sopravvive l'identità personale? Una personalità ampliata è data da una qualsiasi entità che pensi di se stessa "Io"—più tutto ciò che quell' "Io pensante" chiama "mio". Ogni "Io pensante" ha una sua unica catena di memorie, che costituisce la sua identità. Trattenere tale catena mnemonica oltre la morte, insieme con finalità essenziali e con rapporti di valore, costituirebbe un sopravvivere valido e adeguato.

Una *persona* è data dagli aspetti obbiettivamente percepibili di una personalità ampliata. Una apparizione è una persona divenuta psichicamente visibile a uno o più percipienti. Al livello esperienziale, la "persona" è semplicemente un veicolo.

Un avvicinamento razionale al problema della precognizione è fornito dall'esperienzialismo. L'individuo ordinario opera nella quinta dimensione quando ricorda il passato o pianifica il futuro. Il futuro di un individuo, così come si svilupperà di fatto, è deterministico nel senso d'essere il risultato di cause adeguate. Ma il suo comportamento volto ad un fine fornirà una parte delle cause. Quanto più saggiamente un pianificatore può predire fattori che stanno fuori del suo controllo, tanto maggior successo possono avere i suoi piani. L'individuo la cui consueta facoltà di prevedere è arricchita da consapevolezza extra sensoriale può presumibilmente aver successo più sovente, e in modo più completo.

Dall'analisi esperienziale che precede sorge un programma di ricerche.

Resumen

Siete problemas parapsicológicos básicos requieren de esclarecimiento filosófico-ellos son: 1. La naturaleza de la "materia astral"; 2. El problema sobre hasta qué punto y en qué extensión son o no conscientes las apariciones; 3. La precognición y su ubicación dentro de una filosofía racional y abarcativa; 4. La sobrevivencia; 5. La clarividencia; 6. La incorporación de psi a las Ciencias Naturales y 7. De qué modo el pensamiento filosófico concerniente a las materias paranormales puede tornarse convergente en vez de divergente.

Adoptaremos el escepticismo constructivo como punto de partida básico del experiencialismo con el objeto de llegar a conclusiones rigurosamente verificables. Se especificará cuatro reglas de procedimiento: 1. Uso de proposiciones no contradictorias como fundamentos. 2. Definición y medida operacionales de los términos y variables. 3. Puesta en prueba de las hipótesis mediante colecciones sistematicas de datos medidos y definidos operacionalmente y mediante experimentos repetibles. 4. Resolver los desacuerdos mediante la discusión de conjunto.

Son básicas las siguientes proposiciones no contradictorias: 1. Para mi propia conciencia la proposición "Yo soy consciente" es incontra-decible. 2. Soy consciente de estructuras experienciales reconocibles. 3. En mis experiencias hay una secuencia temporal. 4. Puedo operar. 5. Puedo observar. La filosofía experiencial excluye todo de posible consideración, salvo la experiencia.

Se puede discriminar operacionalmente al mundo sensoriomotor y al interno como a dos categorías básicas de la experiencia. El mundo sensoriomotor consiste en todos aquellos aspectos de la experiencia que pueden ser momentáneamente excluidos de la experiencia relajándose completamente en una pieza oscura, quieta y confortable. El mundo interior consistirá entonces en todo otro tipo de estructura experiencial.

Los axiomas que los científicos materialistas dan por garantidos para ser aplicados al mundo sensoriomotor, son contradichos por los fenómenos psíquicos y parapsicológicos. El Prof. Broad enumera nueve de tales axiomas.

Los axiomas básicos del mundo interior son radicalmente diferentes a aquellos del mundo sensoriomotor. A título de ilustración: 1. Un observador en el mundo interior puede moverse ya sea hacia adelante o hacia atrás en el tiempo, y puede moverse de un punto a otro ya sea en el tiempo o en el espacio, sin necesariamente tener que atravesar puntos intermediarios. 2. Un "pensador-Yo" (adecuadamente entrenado) podrá moldear la materia del mundo interior más o menos a

voluntad. 3. Las leyes de gravitación, del instante, y semejantes, no controlan necesariamente al observador-control en el mundo interior. 4. Los objetos y hechos del mundo interior se ordenan de acuerdo a ligazones emocionales, ideacionales y habituales. Las leyes del mundo interior tienden a ser consistentes con los fenómenos psíquicos.

Tanto en el mundo sensoriomotor como en el interior, la "materia" solo es conocida en términos de estructuras de experiencias actuales y potenciales, correlacionadas. Cualquier objeto material puede ser definido (en la medida en que la filosofía experiencial se preocupe de él) como consistiendo en las estructuras experienciales actuales, recordadas y potenciales correlacionadas, que pueden ser obtenidas observando y operando sobre cualquiera de las fases en que se presente este complejo.

Una estructura sensoriomotora consistirá en cualquier conjunto de observaciones sensoriales y/o operaciones motoras correlacionadas. Una estructura sensoriomotora entonces consiste en lo que experimente el "Yo-pensador" directamente con respecto a lo que se menta comúnmente con los términos de objeto físico, actos físicos y observaciones sensoriales.

Las estructuras cuadri-dimensionales del mundo interior pueden ser consideradas como existiendo en un espacio de cinco dimensiones. 1. Los sueños habituales son cuadri-dimensionales, pero carecen de claridad. 2. Un sueño nítido podría ser definido como aquel en el que el ensoñante se haga conciente de que está soñando y sin embargo continúe dentro del sueño. 3. Un sueño compartido podría definirse como aquel en que dos o más ensoñantes sueñan uno del otro en una situación espaciotemporal común, e independientemente recuerdan más o menos de sus alrededores, su conversación, y sus otras interacciones dentro del sueño. 4. Las excursiones fuera del cuerpo en el mundo sensoriomotor podrían tomarse como un cuarto estadio dentro de las series. 5. Muchas personas que han tenido excursiones por fuera del cuerpo informan haber visitado localidades que no son ubicables en el mundo sensoriomotor. Se puede considerar a estas estructuras interiores cuadri-dimensionales como existiendo en una quinta dimensión. Tales estructuras experienciales del mundo interior pueden poseer grados variables de realidad objetiva.

Con escepticismo radical deberíamos acercarnos a la aceptación de la existencia de otros "Yo-pensadores" diferentes de uno mismo. ¿Qué evidencia tengo de que existan personalidades conscientes diferentes de mi mismo? Los robots no son conscientes. Los otros tipos de figuras sensoriomotoras humano-afines podrían no ser conscientes. Sobre las personas ordinarias de mi mundo sensoriomotor podría anotar los siguientes hechos: 1. Tienen cuerpo. 2. Comunicamos. 3. Cooperamos e interactuamos. 4. Parecen actuar como si tuviesen propósitos, valores e intereses más o menos como yo poseo también intereses, propósitos y valores.

La cuestión de la sobrevivencia engrana con la existencia de "Yo-pensadores", con cuerpos con mundo interior y humano-afines aparicionales. La evidencia que debemos examinar es semejante a la con que se juzga la conciencia de las personalidades sensoriomotoras. Las apariciones percibidas colectivamente tienen un mayor peso sobre este problema. La existencia de cuerpos "objetivamente reales" en tales apariciones parece ser una asunción apropiada. ¿Pero, son acaso estos cuerpos aparicionales, vehículos de personalidades conscientes? Las apariciones autoconscientes de los vivos nos proveen de la clave básica. Las apariciones de los muertos son estrechamente semejantes a las de los vivos. La semejanza más particularmente significativa parece ser la intencionalidad. La evidencia disponible nos provee de un sólido umbral para la hipótesis de trabajo de que la personalidad humana sobrevive a su muerte corporal.

*¿En qué sentido sobrevive la identidad personal? Una personalidad *expandida* consiste en cualquiera entidad que piense de sí misma como "Yo" más todo aquello que este "Yo-pensador" piense como "suyo". Todo "Yo-pensador" posee una cadena única de memorias que forman su identidad. La retención—más allá de la muerte—de la cadena mnésica, y de la intencionalidad esencial, y de las relaciones axiológicas, constituirían una sobrevivencia válida y adecuada.*

*Una *persona* consiste en los aspectos objetivamente perceptibles de una personalidad *expandida*. Una aparición será una persona que se ha hecho psíquicamente visible a uno o más percipientes. Experiencialmente la "persona" es un mero vehículo.*

*El *experiencialismo* provee un *acercamiento racional al problema de la precognición*. El individuo ordinario opera en la quinta dimensión cuando el recuerda su pasado o planea su futuro. El futuro de un individuo tal como se desarrollará actualmente, es determinista en el sentido de ser el resultado de causas adecuadas. Pero su propia conducta intencional contribuirá a parte de las causas. Mientras más sabiamente un planificador puede prever los factores que están fuera de su control, más exitosos serán sus planes. De aquel individuo cuya inteligencia previsor habitual sea suplementada por una conciencia extrasensorial podrá esperarse que tenga éxito más veces, y en forma más completa.*

Del análisis experiencial que se ha bosquejado más arriba, se desprende un programa de investigación.

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