

TOWARDS A PLACE FOR PSI-CHOLOGY IN A  
REVISIONED PSYCHOLOGY: HISTORY OF  
IDEAS AND MEMORY OF THINGS

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*Historical Exclusion of Psi*

Whatever is the current or future status of the relationship between science, psychology and parapsychology, this cannot be understood outside the context of the Western history of ideas. This history of ideas is itself a part of a long dualistic tradition between ideas and the material (idealism and materialism). This tradition I will call memory and, as the title indicates, it is a two-headed memory, first, the history of ideas, then the memory of things. It is within this dual memory context that I would like to point out some directions and historical opportunities for parapsychology. The historical opportunity is in the philosophical and functional transformation which is already underway in psychology and the direction I point to is a not normally recognized relationship between psi phenomena and memory: both of which, I suggest, reside in the space connecting here and eternity. Or, put differently, the cleavage generated during the "Age of Enlightenment" between Western science and religion.

While everybody in this room probably is trying to gain legitimacy for parapsychology within psychology, psychology itself is changing considerably and I am here to speak from that vantage point. It is not just psychology which is changing. It is that the scholarship dealing with the basic foundation of psychology has changed radically over the past 30 years. Much current philosophy and social criticism characterizes itself as "post-modern" or "post-Enlightenment." In other words, in some sense, we (modern thought) have already thought ourselves through and out of the presuppositions of the Enlightenment period of which science is a major product.

Now this does not mean science is going to vanish at all. It simply means that certain limiting assumptions and canons such as parsimony,

which we have heatedly discussed this very morning, are very much on their way out; or are given different values or emphases in the changing scheme of things. (Incidentally, I have just checked this out and found that four of five recent texts on the history of psychology no longer even mention "parsimony" or Occam.) Psychologists will have to work through this changing scene in their own way and this way, I must unhappily admit to you, does not seem for the moment to be passing through my own favorite areas of humanistic and transpersonal psychology. I console myself for this misfortune by seeing these areas as having been the gadflies for change. They have been the most recent reconnaissance squads. But they have not made it to central mainstream psychology.

Mainstream psychology has been going through a major crisis. It is in the process of adjusting itself along the schisms where flaw lines were already established. One major adjustment has been the philosophical shift over from behaviorist to cognitive premises and the other adjustment is to what may be called the guild crisis, that is to say, the crisis centered on practitioner versus the researcher. Again, we saw some expression of that fight here this morning. I am afraid that, unhappily from the researchers' point of view, the practitioners are, at least in the short run, going to win on this one. They outnumber the researchers and will have their way in the American Psychological Association. So, if you are an opportunist, join the therapists because that is where psychology is and will likely be centered politically over the next few years.

I see both of these adjustments as excellent news for parapsychologists, if these changes induce parapsychologists to look in other directions from the ones they are accustomed to looking. Because parapsychologists are caught up in the same paradigm as behaviorists and, unlike practitioners, they think that they can gain inclusion into this field through their research if only they can become more experimentally rigorous. Newer "out" areas than parapsychology, such as "creativity" and "humanistic psychology," both of whose supportive research is far less pristine, parsimonious and scientifically rigorous than parapsychology, are definitely a part of psychology now. These areas, which speak of phenomena which were well out of the behaviorist mainstream, never had to earn their membership through scientific rigor. It was the *Zeitgeist* or particular historical moment of value and meaning that best accounts for the inclusion of "creativity" and "humanistic psychology." The moment was right for that sort of thing.

*Historical Path: Exclusion and Inclusion of Parapsychology*

How did parapsychology, with all its attempts at scientific rigor, get and remain excluded from psychology? It got excluded through the path of history, not through the path of experimentation. And how is it going to get re-included? Of course, through the path of history. Why is this a propitious moment for re-inclusion, i.e., a propitious moment for parapsychologists to start thinking along different paths of reentry? This is a propitious moment for parapsychologists to be looking at history because psychology, as noted, is changing paradigms. Properly presented, parapsychology fits well into these changes.

Once psychology has made the transformation from a Darwinian (functionalistic) empirical behavioristic frame of reference to a cognitive one it has, in the process, returned mind to the center of psychology. And if you read any introductory textbook explaining cognitive psychology you will see that its orientation is not only quite different from a behaviorist's one theoretically but, characteristically, these cognitivist authors especially take the behaviorist's view of history to task. In this process, cognitivists are recreating or rediscovering history in accord with their own frame of reference. This is, as Marx suggested, a quite natural, a quite typical thing to do: "History is written by the victors."

*Memory as History: Back to Precognitive and Extrasensory*

Once mind has been brought back into psychology, those who bring it back, the cognitivists, are about to have their own minds blown. For once they start to go into their own history far enough, that is, if they go to the "heart of mind" in the history of psychology of mind, there they will find memory and soul. In a word, passing through mind, the path back from the historical desacralization process by which psychology abandoned soul, that path back historically is to soul. Memory is the vehicle for that trek "back."

Now, I'm trying to take memory in two different ways here that seem to be and, in a way are, really quite different and unique. One of them is through the history of ideas. That is the history I just spoke about where all of a sudden we have a new frame of reference ("a paradigm shift") into which we look differently at our history. The other is via the memory of things. If you look at this subdivision I make between history of ideas and memory of things you will see that one sits on the ideational or paradigmatic side of history, the other is via the experiential side or even the side of that which is being experienced,

e.g., objects, things, etc. That is, I am seeing this division in terms of great historical debate between idealism and materialism, or rationalism and empiricism: one is on the ideational/rational side, the other the material/empirical side.

As we go back through the history of ideas, to the origins of cognition, we see that the question of mind itself is a debate between idealism and materialism and we also realize that the great issue of mind or of cognition is also one of (on the idealist side) precognition and (on the materialist or empirical side) extrasensory perception. Perception itself was extrasensory, i.e., something more than that given in and by the senses themselves. Even the great empiricists of the 17th and 18th Century acknowledged this. The Gestaltists borrowed the notion from the great spokesperson of British empiricism, Hume, when they claimed "The whole (perception) is greater than the sum of the parts (sensations)". In other words, extrasensory perception was a perception grounded in (formed or informed by) meaning. Meaning, of course, was on the idealist side of the debate.

But by the 17th Century, the philosophical debate was well overbalanced on the side of empiricism and materialism. Meaning was merely a product of combined sensations—or strongly on the side of materialism. And, I should add here, this historical bias in favor of materialism strongly determined both the basis for an Enlightenment-inspired science (which could study the human like other natural objects) and the fault lines now being revealed by failures within that science and by post-Enlightenment scholarship. In other words, modern science is already a product of a biased view of history. So to contextualize the bias we must go back much earlier in this historical debate. When I say that the history of cognition is also the history of precognition and that precognition and extrasensory perception were intrinsically linked in that history, I refer back to the great Plato-Aristotle debate.

The path to truth for Plato, we recall, was through memory, under various names given to memory, including "reminiscence." Since, for the Platonists, experience, or the senses, fostered illusion, reason and the dialectic method was a way of "off-centering" oneself from experience in order to recognize contradictions which opened (reminded) of other paths and possibilities. Ultimately this progressive-regressive path (progressive in the sense that one posited realities given by the senses in order to, regressively, get beyond these empirical "realities" to a source of already givens) led to the forms, ideas or principles by which the world operated beyond observed specific events and objects (lawfulness of the universe) and through which this operation of the

world could be grasped by mind. This path towards reminiscence of the truth is constituted of more than step by step reasoning. It was also inspired—for Socrates by his “Daemon.” All truth, and particularly this mysterious and non-rational source of inspiration, was in the fullest sense precognitive.

Let me return to the Aristotelean side of this debate in just a second after pausing to remember that it is this inspirational or precognitive side that will be the domain onesidedly valued by the Christians and which Saint Augustine will claim to be the Divine Truth revealed not through a path of reason but, rather, through an act of faith. This inspired truth will be called revelation.

The Greeks, in my own view to their great credit, and unlike the Early Christians, never went all out on that non-rational side where all is “precognition.” Rather, as the good humanists they were, they moved with Aristotle into a dialogue with the other side of human capacity, that which is the most self-evident, the world of experience and the senses and that part of mind (the concrete reasoning and memory) which refers to and makes sense of these. How can one deny the input of the senses and experience?

But to pose the question this way, as Aristotle did in opposition to those who followed his teacher Plato, was not to take the position of the 17th Century empiricists who argued that experience and the senses were the primary, if not only, (e.g., Locke’s *Tabula Rasa*), source of mind. Rather, Aristotle already accepted from Plato what we have called precognition. But he pointed out to the Platonists two factors concerning experience. First, experience does lead to certain immediate levels or concrete kinds of truth and immediate kinds of memory. This is the sort of memory we rely on in school or everyday experience. But, second, even where the form or precognition is concerned, it is through experience that this memory is opened. Or, put differently, the world of things thought about, reminds. And to make this point ironically and succinctly, he points to Socrates’ own use of empirical examples to induce the student to get beyond his assumptions and to the precognitive principles and inspiration. So experience, or the passing through the world of experienced things, gave us an extrasensory opening to the domain of the precognitive. Just as one had to pass through cognition to get to its source in the precognitive, one had to pass through the senses to get to the extrasensory which in turn was an opening to the precognitive.

Here was a humanism which ties the supernatural to the natural. It is a humanism that makes the extrasensory and precognitive related dimensions of each other and of the senses and cognition. This thicket

of relationships between opposites is required to complete the paradoxical path to truth and understanding: a progressive movement of dialectic to reveal, regressively, the principles or pre-established forms for operation of both the human mind and the natural cosmos: idealism and materialism or supernaturalism and naturalism. It will await the 18th and 19th Century "Enlightenment" thinkers to separate themselves as "the age of reason" from those of "authority and faith." For the Renaissance was still a matter of nature and spirit and, like the Hellenic period, one centered on humanism. That split during the "Age of Enlightenment" between "reason" and "faith" is expressed today as the two-headed Western enemy of parapsychology: science and religion.

### *Memory of Things*

I have intentionally wanted to stress the idea and experience side of truth which is inherent in the Classic and, therefore, Western history of ideas, which is a pre-scientific source from which psychology draws and to which it continuously contributes. This pre-scientific (and post-scientific) history contains, when opened up from a cognitive perspective, both a precognition and extrasensory perception. But in stressing this historical point (which nonetheless refers to the empirical or experiential side) we have still stayed on the side of history as idea, or the history of ideas. Let us shift emphasis now over to the side of experience; but experience now in terms of what is experienced, i.e., the experienced thing.

Note first, that while this may appear to be the extreme of emphasis on the material of the idealist-materialist debate, the side we take now is that of a neo-Platonist taking on the Aristoteleans or empiricists. For if the path to truth lies through experience, what in experience reveals that truth? We have tended to see a subjective and objective side to experience and have placed memory on the subjective side. But here I want to begin to look for memory in things (albeit, things as experienced).

Let us start with a thing called a book. At one level, of course, words are things. One word is a different thing from another as is one letter different from another letter. An alphabetic letter chiseled, scratched, brushed, penned or typed is all remembered, i.e., recognized as a letter of the alphabet. The chiseled mark, like the others, opens prior meaning.

At the level of a book, say *Gulliver's Travels*, the combinations of marks, words, sentences, etc., evoke a meaning. But to the ten-year-

old that meaning may center on little and big persons. Nothing changes in the book which is laid on the shelf for a decade and reread in college English. Now the big-little meaning is there, but changed into different or even greater meanings relative to whatever other meanings reveal themselves to the twenty-year-old mind. It was all in the book, different meanings from those in another book, yet not revealed as fully unless read by a more mature mind. Maturity does not mean that the 20-year-old has learned, between ages 10 and 20, what Swift had to say but, rather, that these greater truths can now be revealed, understood, remembered.

Let us move more radically into the thing. The post-dualistic psychology now popular in Eastern Europe and centered greatly on the works of Vygotski, places an even greater stress on what appears to be materialism than does Marx. And, yet, this is no continuation of the idealist-materialist debate Marx had with, say, Hegel. For this new school of Soviet psychologists (and I think here particularly of the writings of Leontiev) memory is opened through activity with the thing. Let us take an example of the plow. The plow is a thing, an instrument. It has evolved over the centuries in tune with a certain activity of preparing the soil. Its design encounters at one end the soil, at the other the hands of the plower and accomodates each optimally relative to the other. The activity is plowing. The farmer, in the activity of plowing, tunes into the plow which is historically (shaped, evolved, whatever) tuned into the soil and through this active tuning-in, according to this psychology, the cultural universe of farming of all times and all places is opened to this farmer. In other words, this activity, opened in and through instruments, opens a universal coherence.

Another post-dualistic thinking, at times still quite mistakenly confused with a subjectivism like introspectionism, is phenomenology. Like Vygotskian thinking, Husserl's phenomenology places the emphasis on the thing. And, like it again, it is placed on the thing experienced. Thus, in phenomenological experience, consciousness systematically lets go of itself, so to speak, in order to open to the object as it can be experienced or, put differently, to "hear or see what it says or shows of itself." The dualistic attitude, that attitude which makes a distinction between natural and supernatural, objective and subjective, i.e., the "Age of Reason" attitude is precisely that which is suspended in this "going to the things themselves," as Husserl put it. The things then reveal their meanings or, put into my terms, open up memories or remind us of their essence.

Merleau-Ponty went well beyond Husserl into the world of things. Husserl was still, relative to Merleau-Ponty, on the idealist side of the

debate. For he implied that the things reveal themselves to consciousness as if consciousness were some mysterious, disembodied sphere of idea potential. For Merleau-Ponty, even consciousness of things is embodied. Our consciousness of things is through our body. Thus the "thing" is revealed differently to the reaching or withdrawing hand. Likewise, and reciprocally, things in their way of presentment, or of being experienced, reveal the body, i.e., open self-consciousness.

The research on creativity reveals a similar post-dualistic stress on the thing, or material, as the opener or revealer of truth. The first part of the creative process is called immersement, which means abandonment to the material. There is a loss of stereotyped thinking or, when past meaning has been broken and new meaning not yet found, a moment of frustration and experienced chaos. A new insight follows, as the material reveals itself in a new and perhaps more profoundly insightful way.

The creative product can have the reverse effect on the audience, pointing through material, stone or even words describing material events or things, to new truths, or the reminiscence of truths now opened by the creative experience of these works of art. Consider this translation of a poem written by an 11-year-old Italian boy:

Look like many men  
Excited, frightened,  
The first snowflakes.  
They seem to be running away.  
Everywhere.  
Mesmerized without a goal.

Looking at them,  
I remember the Jews.  
It looks as if  
They don't want to come down,  
As if,  
When they touch the ground,  
They will meet their end.

Voilà, in the first snowflake the essence of a people.

### *Memory and psi: The Border Between Artificially Polarized Enemies*

Given the limits of time, I hope I have said enough to prepare the ground for the concluding portion of this paper which focuses more specifically on parapsychology. Both crises in psychology (the recen-



tering on cognition and on practice) today are good news for parapsychology which has, according to my views, been excluded from the field more by history than by lack of rigor. The new cognitive emphasis opens a history which cannot deny that essential to it are both precognition and extrasensory perception: there is a world of reality beyond defined idea or defined sense experience. Neither a psychology reduced to the study of behavior nor one reduced to a *Tabula Rasa* empiricism could naturally accommodate psi phenomena. Likewise, but for a different reason, the new emphasis on practice over research also opens up psychology to experiences it had arbitrarily cut off in a laboratory. Both therapist and client have a shared activity, shared experience which often goes beyond theory and event. The nature and quality of the therapeutic activity itself may play a role in breaking the walls down between that blocked off and that revealed and between the experience of therapist and client. That often indescribable experience may be the key to healing.

But if it is history which has excluded parapsychology and is its path back into psychology, then the path is not back into history per se, i.e., back to the past, to the Greeks; nor is it by rejection of science. Rather, as the broader possibilities for psychology (which include, even require, a reality status for psi phenomena) are revealed, it will be by the broadening of science itself that parapsychology is naturally reincluded in psychological reality. That path is post-enlightenment, post "Age of Reason," if we mean by "reason" that which excludes precognition, extrasensory experience under a synonym for obsolescent, i.e., pre-science.

Pre-science is science's traces or memory. A science which in the name of consensual validation and progress reduces itself to "state of the art" criteria such as parsimony, or the most efficient explanation among alternatives, becomes a science with amnesia unless by parsimony is meant the elegance of great art, i.e., the classic which does not reduce to a single explanation but, rather, opens up, like *Gulliver's Travels*, or *Oedipus*, to many levels of memory, meanings and potential meanings. The creative transition from one level of meanings amounts to great leaps of "distance" such as we see now in psychology in the great paradigm shifts.

So do I see psi in something I will call memory travel. Via memory, through things, we can travel from one domain to another to others all of which previously seemed quite impermeable and unrelated, even alien, to one another. Such is the nature, is it not, of the psi phenomena? Something apparently invisible, irrational or unnatural, seems to link two apparently unrelated natural and visual events. The invisible is

what we call extrasensory. The irrational is the precognitive and the unnatural supernatural.

These psi events occur between and through things and relationships, and more commonly are reported and experienced by certain people rather than others. Beginning with this latter I suspect that those who frequently report such experiences share something with the creative individual. One of the reasons given by J. P. Guilford, in his classic 1950 Presidential talk to the American Psychological Association on creativity, for the lack of criteria in assessing creativity is the many forms, from child's doodle to Sistine Chapel, creativity emerges from. A decade later, Maslow expanded creativity beyond the necessity of a tangible product. The notion of what creativity is has been expanding widely over the recent few years and now, in my view, accommodates forms of creativity which are very close to what are also called forms of psi. There is, for example, the creative party-giver who "intuitively" brings together the "right" people who, say, in the future will elucidate each other's contributions.

Frank Barron, among others studying creativity, found a special memory—an openness to experience (and possible new combinations of these)—strongly characteristic of such creative individuals. Such a memory, I suspect, is connected with the other two factors mentioned above: relationships and things. What kinds of relationships open up the fullest potential, or most significant potential memory of things?

William Roll finds intimacy (perhaps of varying sorts) an important condition of nearly all psi experience, but certainly that called psychometry. Here in psychometry and in PK the special relationship between mind and thing is most obvious. And here, in these two types of parapsychological event, the kind of precognition and extrasensory perception we found in Greek history, or the Soviet psychology "opening of cultural memory through the thing" seem inadequate and of another sort than those connected with psychometry and PK. For extrasensory perception and precognition of the classic sort lead to a greater shared truth or coherence of meaning. And the cultural memory opened up in the farmer's activity through the plow is related precisely to the evolved form of that instrument.

How, by contrast, to the intellectual shared truth do we find the special and unique truths and acts of psi and how do we explain the opening of understanding of one person by another through an endless array of shaped and designed objects, such as a watch or pen, etc., where the knowledge is in no apparent way related to the shape or function of the object? What is the reader opening to in the object about the object's owner? In PK what kind of "creative" relationship

does the mover have with the object moved? Is it a "psychic Archimedes" who so understands (is tuned into) this object and, in this special understanding, relates to it such that the most subtle "nudge" can move it? What has the thing moved revealed of itself to remind the specially relating mover of this possibility? Roll now feels that context for understanding these psi events is memory.

Finally, as we speak of memory of things, we must take things to their very ends, as H. H. Price does, and suggest with Leibniz that things have memory. Price, as does the "Father" of experimental psychology, Fechner, borrows from Leibniz a view in which the body and mind are sides of each other. Leibniz was talking about Monads. Monads were psychological entities. They contained everything (infinite spaces) in the universe and as the other side of things, mind could "enter," (or better put open) into any of those spaces. We are not far here from at least two contemporary notions in the physical sciences, Bohm's "Implicate Order" and "Holography." In both, depending on the nature and quality of the engagement and relationship, the (pre)mind can travel "through things" from one to another universe of meaning. This stress I have put on memory, as well as those changes which I have claimed will open the future of psychology to parapsychology, help also to explain the apparent strangeness of its two traditional Western enemies: religion and science.

The very term "blind" faith of Christianity tells us that this religion does not derive its truth from extrasensory experience but, rather, from a shutting off of or attempt to bypass both reason and the senses. For this reason faith has no memory or history. This is why, in order to deal with the mundane world, Western science had to develop around an extreme emphasis on this world concreteness: common sense and empirical methods. But, for its part, the positivistic end of that science plays "dumb" to all experience which cannot be derived from sense observation and limits itself to concretely linked reasoning on these observations. All of us in the West have been living between the blind and the dumb. Parapsychology and memory, like creativity, inhabit this historical void.

The diabolical characteristics of parapsychology accorded it by religion are related to psi's necessary intercourse with the "impure" world of thoughts and things. Its effects occur in history. On the other side, the amnesia I ascribe to a positivistic science (to whose latest stage of progress all history is reduced) is precisely the blocking off of that which pre-conditions knowledge and goes beyond the senses, i.e., the blocking off of precognition and extrasensory perception.

## DISCUSSION

NEPPE: I was wondering whether or not you could not draw another dichotomy. One often talks about apprehension of objects and events in relation to extrasensory perception and psychokinesis. Objects and events strike me as a similar kind of dichotomy or parallel dichotomy to the history of ideas and memory of things.

ARONS: Would you go further with that because I'm not clear on your point.

NEPPE: It's a difficult one. As I see the memory of things, the things are the objects. In the history of ideas one has the ideas being the events, so in the same way as one can define extrasensory perception in terms of, say, apprehension of objects and events, one could almost throw in words like the history of objects or the history of ideas, or the memory of things.

ARONS: I think you are absolutely right if you come to something like the following: ideas open in and through and "transcend" things in activity. But, also, the potential for such an emergent and developing idea can be properly said to be "in" (or as Aristotle might put it [in potential] of the thing.) Return to an example in my paper: When I am ten years old and I read *Gulliver's Travels* I see big men and little men. That idea of big and little people is in the book. The book does not change; the words are the same as I store the book for years on a library shelf. The book is later assigned in college English when I am twenty-one years old. I take out the book and on new reading I see (i.e. have so much more insight into) so much more in there. Now what I see in the book does not deny the (objects, things) big and little men, but there is now a "transcendent" experience. I have mind blowing meanings of the sort Charley was talking about. I am a quite transformed person because I experience so much more meaning in the (object) book. Now this path of meaning is not accidental or merely subjective because it is obvious that Swift put those things and this potential significance in there to a certain degree. Still, Ricoeur and others are saying that we also then go off in a creative direction given our new (different from Swift's historical) context. Yet the writer, Swift, was expecting that as the depths of potential meaning opened to the reader, each was going to find a little bit more than big and little men in there. This example of an object happens to be a cognitive one, i.e. a book, or literature. But let us shift to more material examples. Let us go to Florence or Venice. Many of you I am sure have been there. A common experience of encountering this meaning-full stone can be

described as being *aghast* or *awed*. *Aghast* and *awed*, though at one level referring to opposing emotions, ultimately describe roughly the same thing. Combined there is a sense of terror and a sense of being amazed. Amazed meaning out of the maze, being broken from a frame of reference and what are we broken to? What is there in this stone that is different from all other stones? What is it about Florence if it is not that we are somehow precognitively and extrasensorily carried out to the limits of what human beings could do, in other words what we can do as human beings. We humans have done it here in Florence. And when we talk about Florence we are talking about history as well. The history is incarnated in the stone and then the stone somehow or other reopens the history, so that you are stunned by the starkness or the nakedness of your humanness and pulled asunder by it. I could give example after example of these experiences that are within what we all have experienced. Nothing exceptional. Put differently, the potentials for transformation in Florence or Venice are in both the stone and engagement which open potential meaning, or new ways of seeing or "connections." So why do we have to go all the way out of the natural (the things, objects) in order to find some kind of a supernatural? The natural could take care of both, like psychophysics could take care of both thing and idea and it then could be brought back into the world as history which is reopened. If you mean this by your stress on "object-event" we are probably not far apart.

NEPPE: Somehow I think you are implying that one can draw these parallels from a parapsychological perspective and in that kind of perspective one could almost see how the object/event dichotomy shifts into one and that shift towards one is in relation to history and memory. That ultimate unity may imply a central place for parapsychology or parapsychological theory in future psychology.

ARONS: Yes, I certainly agree with that conclusion, though I use my own paths of example to get there. When we recognize that unity (not abstractly, but in process), the place of parapsychology will be central in psychology. It is not now because psychology is "off-center," i.e., distorted by the materialistic, rationalistic, positivistic tilt of recent historical orthodoxy. When we work in that domain of the unity we will see that "memory travel" is our potential. It puts us in touch with a part of our larger consciousness. Thus, memory could be the "space" within which we fill in the gaps between what message is sent and what message is received two thousand miles away or between an object and somebody's reading of it somewhere distant, both temporally and spatially. The one area that has all of the conditions for such "space travel" is memory. And that area has been obliterated by us in terms of "en-

lightenment" predispositions, e.g., where the *tabula rasa* or written over mind-body split notions cut us off from the memory that Socrates was talking about. The term memory today is a strictly empirical type of memory. That word "memory" itself has so many reminders within itself that are released through acts/things. For example, when I have to be reminded of something I often need a fetish, a thing, an object. Or using psychometry as a more appropriate example, I have to get into or work myself into a state. Even a baseball player to get into hitting a home run needs a little ritual. Things are part of rituals and as such things seem to play an enormous part in this opening up to memory.

MUNSON: I found your talk very stimulating. It keeps us on our toes and shows us all kinds of new possibilities. You were talking about the idea of arriving at a new position, a new view of psychology, moving away from the stimulus-response behavioristic position to a more cognitive position. That reminded me of Jung and his idea of personality types, that there are different kinds of personality types and that it is actually very natural for us to have to lean towards one personality type or toward another. The extraverted and the introverted would be the source of major classification. Maybe we are not moving towards a new unitary view of psychology at all, but we are going back and forth. We are cycling perhaps in the same way that we seem to be cycling politically today away from the hip '60s to the conservative '80s and perhaps we will go back again. Politically we might at some other time move back again.

ARONS: Let me nail down this business first. I want to be more specific. I do not want you to just take my word on this. If you go to Schultz or to Boring or any of the historians of psychology they made an observation about history which is interesting. They have observed that, for some very special reasons, history for psychologists is more important than it is for other scientists. Most academic psychologists feel that each psychology major should have a background in the history of psychology. But you do not get that view in physics. I mean, nobody cares about the history of physics. Why history is significant to today's psychologists is that we are still asking the same questions as we asked at the time of the Greeks. Psychology has not outgrown its questions, but we are asking these through different methods. According to this view psychology's methods have progressed, but our subject matter has stayed the same. I would like you to think about physics. Physics methods and the subject matter evolve reciprocally. The physics method evolves when you get a new problem and a better way of looking at it. And likewise the reverse is true. When physics finds, for example, that

the absoluteness of math will not work it goes to statistics. What psychology did historically was to buy into a successful model in physics which we thought since it would work for them would work for us, without any regard for the special and differing natures of the two subject matters. The point has been made over and over again. But what has happened is that when we talk about the huge changes that have occurred in psychology in the last 20 or 30 years e.g., from S-R rats to transpersonal psychology, it is a big distance we have gone in such a brief time.

Then we have to realize that if it were physics we were discussing, it would be this huge distance traversed attributed to a major breakthrough in method. But that is not the reason at all, for our "leap" in psychology. The reason we had the breakthrough from S-R to transpersonal is because the method was so impoverished that our bet on the method was a failure. So that those who wanted to go exploring these subjects e.g. consciousness, had to go outside of the method. They had to become humanists. Of course we all bow occasionally to the god of methodology, but the fact is that most of the great things that we are discovering did not come through method, they came through revelations, meditation or through people reading Eastern psychology. Speaking of this, do we notice how the kids in the 60's/70's, even though their primary source of education was proximate in the form of parents, teachers and friends etc., here traveled over space and time to tune into Lao Tzu or Gibran; people who lived centuries ago and ten thousand miles away. They were somehow in that *Zeitgeist* linked to these people and their thinking, while unlinked from the tangibly near. I want to go back to the point about method. Our changes in psychology at this particular period are not due to success of method. On the contrary, they are due to *failure* of method. That is why the cognitivists are now switching focus and are uninterested in concerns which bound behaviorists. They are not worrying about .01 level of significance. They are not worrying about any of that sort of criteria any more. They are more in line with parapsychologists in trying to get to invisible (cognitive) structures. I mean if you want to use Kelly you can talk about "constructs," i.e. things nobody can see, nobody can pin down. So it is up to parapsychologists to realize they should not be caught up in a method or supportive paradigm for that method, but, rather, like cognitivists, to attune method to the nature and demands of their focal subject. The method is evolving toward what we are recognizing as an expanding subject matter now. We need the method now to go with the subject matter. So we need a parapsychology that centers on the subject matter again. And since you parapsychol-

ogists have been there trying to tell us that there is more in the subject matter than has been met in our methods, then it is up to you to take the leadership and to show us how, whether through memory as I am suggesting or in other ways, it can be the case that psi phenomena have been reported in all cultures at all times. It is essential to recognize how psi got lost in history, in the historical extremist struggle between Christianity and science. The average person accepts psi, but gets support from neither extreme. Most of us in the West have been living, between *blind* faith and science, playing *dumb* to experience such as those labeled psi, that any kid could have and does have and reports. My paper suggests that psi is in the relationship between ideas and things at the very invisible heart between religion and science. How do we bring this relationship between idea and thing together so that we can all start at heart with our common experiences? How to build our lives, not reduce our contexts to bottom line science or religion (i.e. scientific or religious monisms), but enrich our context so that we can experience these things in normal situations and then develop a science around enriched contextualized things. I did not mean to get into sermonizing, but that debate about parsimony yesterday got me mad.

ISAACS: I have read your paper and found it very interesting and I am in fact sympathetic to the program that you are advocating. It seems to me that to some extent maybe you have not fully appreciated the depth of revision that is forced on us and the kind of change in epistemological status between physics and psychology that parapsychology implies, in the sense that you are saying that psychology has tried to ape physics. I am suggesting that parapsychology may eventually transform physics, so that we may see psychology shifting physics into a totally new construal of the world. One of the things that I found in your paper which surprised me was that you had apparently completely accepted a model of psi which parapsychologists have now been leery of for several decades. That is the transmission model, where something moves from one place to another place, whereas the models of psi which parapsychologists are increasingly interested in are holistic, synchronistic models, apparently acausal or that have been given an acausal label, with which I do not agree, where things happen in ways that are very non-local and which is compatible perhaps with the non-locality of quantum physics. I would like to offer an alternative analysis of the issue of the apparent failure of method within psychology. I think that there is certainly some truth to what you say, but I think that there is also much that could be said in addition. The status of psychology illustrates perhaps better than anywhere else the issue that Kuhn raised



of what happens in pre-paradigmatic sciences. Psychology is a science which has not found a consensual view of what its subject matter should be nor what its methods should be. What we are seeing is a pre-paradigmatic science.

ARONS: Well, I do agree with you that the only thing I was saying was that psi phenomena do not move from place, though I have worded it such that this is the impression I have. In fact, I agree that psi is more in the nature of a shift of paradigms if you want; shift from one world of memory to another world of memory (without going anywhere). It is not a matter of moving from place to place. Still, there is no ideational shift without an activity which opens memory. So, in fact, in that sense of memory opening activity there is movement.

ISAACS: One of the things that really puzzled me about your paper was your attitude towards history which I thought was dialectical or a Hegelian view in some ways, in the sense that it was almost as if history had a kind of life and timetable of its own which it then imposed on things and in a rather reified way things were in or out of history and had relationships to history. I found this kind of terminology very confusing.

ARONS: What terminology is it that gives you your impression? I do not know what you are referring to.

ISAACS: Well, you talk of things being in or out of history. You refer to "History's special significance to psychology." Then you say "the progressive quality of history as memory," and a few sentences later on you talk about things being into history. We need to talk about this.

ARONS: I think we will have to talk, but I do not really recognize what you are saying. I do not deny Hegelianism, but I would come at it more from a Husserlian point of view. Husserl cites an example of how Descartes' thinking can actually lead our view of history from future to past and back. Followers of Descartes saw things in Descartes that even Descartes could not have seen. Consequently Descartes gets revised and then a whole new future is opened up by a revised Cartesianism in a kind of dialectical path of past to future to past to future, etc. I would agree with that path. I think that is what is happening with us right now in terms of cognition. In a way we go back through our new interest in cognition to problems which people have had before. We are going to discover certain things about our history and we are going to get into such things as memory in a new and different way than, say, the nonsense syllable type of thing. Then we are going to have to ask different kinds of questions. Once we open up those questions in new ways we already have psi more or less as an implicit which requires explicating.

ISAACS: Is that what you meant when you wrote the two sentences, "I have suggested an unusual route that parapsychology might take to reinclude itself indigenously in the field of psychology. This is the path of history"?

ARONS: Yes. I am suggesting that we not take the Rhine view that if we only perfect our methodology we will be included in psychology because they will recognize us among the gods of perfect psychology. Instead of taking that path—I am using the word "path" in a very narrow sense—why not look at the path of history where we already were and were excluded from it. We were always in the history of the mind. Somebody mentioned this morning that nothing that we are talking about was alien to Socrates. What I am suggesting here is reinclusion as the cognitivists start to go in. Let us encourage them to go into their history. Let us start writing papers that go back and open up that history and show that history from this other point of view. You will attract to such a mission plenty of followers rewriting history from a cognitive perspective, many within mainstream cognitive psychologists. Then that path leads to a fuller history of precognition. Many young people will be extremely interested in some pathway by which they can see a legitimate place for psi.

ISAACS: That is really what made the bells ring for me in terms of a Kuhnian analysis, because Kuhn says that physics does not need its students to look at the history of physics because it is perceived by its exponents as largely ahistorical. What is physics is what is in the text books, allegedly, whereas in a pre-paradigmatic science the history is relevant, because that allows you to consider schools.

ARONS: You do not ask the question in physics "Is an atom really the way that the pre-Socratics evolved an atom?" But you cannot say that we have outgrown Pascal when he said "Ésprit de geometrie, esprit de finesse," because our new neuroscience is finding that he was pretty wise there. As was St Augustine, when he made a distinction between scientia and sapientia. You know we cannot deny the current validity of distinctions and say we have outgrown these. Because all of a sudden we may be coming to these under a new jargon. In fact, we have been talking a lot about those things here. So psychology is coming to its past in a way. So as long as it is wrapped up in its past and cannot get out of that past then let us use the past as a pathway, because it is obvious we use the path to go off in a very narrow direction. Let us go back to that road not taken and let us rediscover how these things were together. We do not have to go back very far. Go back to Fechner where he was historically misinterpreted in order to foster a going view of science.

NEPPE: I would like to continue this discussion, but in a somewhat different strain. Would you conceive of history, as you have implied Vico does, almost in a spiral way as opposed to a circular way, where there is always a progression? There are now facts available that were not available before, where there is a spiral component.

ARONS: I notice you put a spiral down there. I think we probably think the same way on this, that the spiral is simply saying that you can never go back. You can never literally go back to where you were because you are a different person now that you come around the second time. You see new things and it is not that you are a new person, but the whole context is new. You see new things that were not there before. Vico was absolutely right. Incidentally, Vico was one of these old guys that the young people are really getting off on, because he is speaking again of science that is more akin to poetry or at least has the power of poetry in it. What he says is that every context is unique and because it is unique it allows us to experience similar situations in unique or creative ways. Originality is both in the origins and also out toward the unique or new. But it has to be done through uniqueness. This whole relative, absolute thing we were fighting off this morning does not pose a problem for me. Unique situations are creative not just discovery. They are actually new, presenting new phenomena.

NEPPE: The spiral that I drew was supposed to reflect the idea. I am wondering about what philosophical framework you feel is most apposite to try to explain what you have presented today. You have mentioned numerous philosophies.

ARONS: Well, of course, Bill Roll likes Price and he likes David Bohm. He has been working through them. My problems with Price and Bohm are that they are too theoretical. If we had a lot of time, I could get into some of Price's work. He has several different alternatives that you can look at, one of them memory. But all of it is through a monadology, a Leibnizian type of monadology in which everything in the world has memory in a way, but not the way that I would see it. At one time Price's work is consistent with a theme I am putting forward here yet also just the opposite of it. The difference, maybe, is my existential background. Price seems to escape to some transcendent state. In my view we never get off into God. Even when we "get into" enlightenment, we simply discover that we are not going anywhere until everybody else is enlightened. This is the Bodhisatva concept. The memory view I espouse is fully and ever grounded. We are condemned, as Ricoeur and others have said, to being both finite and infinite. And knowing one through the other but by such knowledge never escaping either. The type of science I would anticipate would be derived from

that existential situation. That is the only honest situation. Theory like that of Price goes off too much on the idealistic side. It tries too much to stand outside the criticism that Kierkegaard made of Hegel, that he understood the entire universe except he has to live in a dog house on the outside of it. In other words, he was not seeing it from his situation. That we can not escape the situation is my existential side. My other side is that from that situation, phenomenologically experienced, we leave the language of absolute cause and effect because we are not standing out there and looking how the watch is made. We are part of the watch and we can be part of the situation. We can understand these things and, as we do, we come into different relationships with our universe, with everything else so that enlightenment (grace) is in one sense just knowing how to live gracefully. Maybe that is what grace means. First it is a state of being lightened and lighted up. Then, as experience, this means living gracefully. And when you live gracefully—just as the Russian psychologists are saying now with the plow—that when you really can get in tune with the earth in a certain way you are literally in tune with your culture, with everything else at the moment you open things up. So I see no escape like standing outside in some kind of feigned objectivity, but I see it is not hopeless at all. Quite the contrary. This is the essential opposition I would make between my existentially centered and others, like Price's, theoretical views.

ISAACS: Just for the sake of being thoroughly objectionable, this reminds me to some extent of my experience of walking around the corridors of this hotel. As in the existential view there is no escape, because I constantly take wrong turnings and walk into mirrors. The serious point that I am making is that if I had a map I would in theory be able to correlate my experience with what is on the map. What is wrong with regarding theory as having a useful map-like function even though one is not escaping the world?

ARONS: I had an experience in Europe that I have had so many times before. I have always heard Alan Watts say "The map is not the territory." Lots of people said that, but I discovered that the map that you have on your kitchen table in Carrollton, Georgia, is not the same as the map is in Germany that you are going through at the time. Not only that, the territory is never the same territory either. So that what you see and what you plan and what you want to do from your kitchen table in Carrollton, Georgia or Orinda, California, is entirely strange. When you arrive you recognize how naive and strange it is once you get into the German setting where the same map all of a sudden looks so entirely different and is experienced so differently.

ISAACS: Can I do a bit of terminological aikido on you.

TART: Terminal logical?

ISAACS: Yes. Why does existentialism itself in your theory, get to escape from being called a theory? If it does not then what is wrong with theory?

ARONS: Well, the existentialist theory, if you want to take one like Sartre's theory, would start out by saying that in a sense we are condemned to be free. All he would mean by that is that all of the other things that we are not doing are the things that we are trying to avoid, because of fear that we would fall off the edge. We live between a world that is structured on the one hand and a world that is open to possibility, in some sense a world of freedom on the other. This is the *ensoi/poursoi*, in itself/for itself matter. I believe every Eastern psychology starts with an existentialism and this is an argument I used to have with Abraham Maslow. I used to call his theory an optimistic existentialism. It always had a happy ending. And a lot of Eastern psychology as it is viewed by Americans also has a happy ending. It ends up as nice and orderly. Everything is orderly if you just follow the theoretical recipe step by step. You see people doing this all the time. I have no objection to any of that except that it is instrumental. We Americans tend to always get caught up in instrumentalism. We never start with an existential attitude. The existential attitude is one in which there is really no place to go. But there is a paradox that Albert Camus points out when he talks about Sisyphus. He offers us the most damnable experience, you know, and condemns this guy for eternity (which is a long time) to push a rock up to the top of the mountain. But strangely, the book ends up by saying "one must imagine Sisyphus happy." But who can imagine a person so condemned to futility being happy and this is the paradox. I think all Eastern psychologies start with what we have discovered in existentialism and at heart always remain there. I think that that's one part of us we never leave. It is this groundedness that in one sense there is never any place to go, therefore let us go. Why not? Because if we do not have a place to go, then we are free to go and do anything we want. Now I am not denying all of the nice neat maps that the Buddhists and the Hindus and the Shintos and everybody else put out. Even at your local gas stations in California where one can get a map of the chackra system, I am not denying those things at all. It is a matter of who is reading that map. At a certain point one does not need the map. At a certain point it is like going on a trip to Europe. Throw the map away, because you are with the people whom that map is talking about and now listen and they will tell you where to go from here. That is if you are existentially grounded.

ISAACS: So let us demolish physics, biology. . . .

ARONS: Let us not take ourselves seriously.

ISAACS: Well, I would always agree with that.

ARONS: Let us not get caught up in these recipes. Above all let us not get caught up in the idea that if we talk about this we will lose our motivation, because we need to talk about it. We need to talk about God. We need to talk about God in ourselves and the non-God in ourselves and the God in Stanley Krippner and the God in you and the God in everybody else. If you think that that does not bring on humility, then I do not know what would. For if we are all God, then my claim to divinity has little priority over anybody else's. Let us talk about these things so that we do not get hung up on them and oversacralize them. Let us deal with this whole thing as a reality. Let us come back to our senses. The biggest prejudices I see right now are on the part of the scientists. I am very, very hard on scientists. I think that they got caught up in a nice neat little world and labeled this the only place on earth where one can find truth. By calling science a progressive task it can claim dominance forever, because we never have the right to call in the truth right away. We can always tell our students that truth is on the way, just stay there long enough. As scientific psychologists we simply claim to be a young science and they leave us alone. That is what the behaviorists said and look what happened—we have cognitive psychology!

ISAACS: I think you are providing a really existential demonstration of the truth of your prophecy.

NEPPE: Being somebody who perceives himself both in terms of a mainstream science and also in terms of parapsychology, I have been continuing my little drawing of spirals over here and I have now got two spirals. The one spiral may be the history of science going along in terms of conventional science and the other may be the history of parapsychology, which might be a much shorter or equidistant kind of spiral, because it has been going on for a long time. Emanating from both of them are all sorts of things pertaining to ideas and memory. What I am trying to understand is how to fit these two things together. In other words, you are saying let parapsychology hop onto history quickly, now is the time. How does it hop?

ARONS: Well. . . .

NEPPE: To use the terminology of yesterday, how does it "zap" history?

ISAACS: I am glad to see "zap" enter our technical terminology.

ARONS: I do not know. I am going to be thinking about it because of what happened last year when I was teaching in Denmark. Bill Roll

was there and we spent a whole weekend. I was getting into this Eastern European Russian stuff. I cornered Bill and I said, "Come on, Bill, I want to see where this idea of memory and phenomenological memory and your memory of things fit together." Some of you were at other conferences where I presented a paper on just that part of it, memory of things. Then when I got the assignment to do this one I do not know what happened, but all of a sudden it started to provoke a lot of other ideas so I can not go any further than where I am. I feel in a sense for me this is a way of just beginning to look at it. That is why I do not take a truth pledge on it at all. Maybe this is all one big thin balloon that just collapses, but I do think that it is an area that I would like to investigate. It is like anything, once you see new possibilities maybe you could look at it from this angle or that angle and see if it would work. From some of the stuff you have been doing it seems it would work beautifully.