

MIND AND METHOD

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Introduction

We have missed something in our parapsychological research, something important. What we have missed is a subject matter. Other scientific disciplines, from astrophysics to quantum physics to physiology, have a subject matter, be it heavenly bodies, quantum bodies or living bodies. These objects can be described in ways that make sense and that are consistent with descriptions of other natural objects.

Each descriptive framework is reflected in a set of procedures—telescopes, cloud chambers, microscopes—that fits this framework and may help extend it. Parapsychology *uses* methods, sophisticated methods, but it does not *have* methods. And it does not have methods because it does not have a descriptive framework; it has no subject matter.

The methods that we use come from other disciplines, such as psychology, physiology, and physics. We do get results, however, at least on lucky days. All of us here would probably agree to this much. What do our results show? Our findings are determined by our methods and our methods are derived from the other sciences so what our findings show are deviations from the expected, from normal psychological, physiological, and physical effects. ESP, we agree, is not a known form of sense perception, and PK is not a known form of physical interaction with the environment. In other disciplines deviations from chance point to nature, to the normal. In parapsychology deviations from chance point away from nature, to the paranormal. We are in danger of becoming a deviant science, a science of the anomalous. Some of us are using these terms as synonymous with parapsychology and even speak about applied anomalous research instead of applied parapsychology. But the meaning of the noun science, *scientia*, knowledge, is canceled by the adjectives deviant and anomalous. So what we have is nothing, no science, and nothing to apply.

Dean Radin (1989) gave a more optimistic prognosis in his Presidential Address to the Parapsychological Association. Dean suggests

that the gaps in our knowledge of psi will be filled by the sciences whose methods we are using. Psychology, biology, or physics will eventually show how target and response are connected in ESP and PK. According to this scenario parapsychologists are apprentices in these other disciplines. As we fill in the gaps in the description of psi, we will become fullfledged psychologists, biologists, or physicists and parapsychology will disappear from the scene.

I do not think parapsychology will be swallowed by any other science or combination of sciences. I also do not think that parapsychology is on its way out. But the self-image of the field is not too good these days and our corporate health could be improved.

There was an earlier, simpler time when we could say what parapsychology dealt with. It dealt with mind and *The Reach of the Mind*. To J. B. Rhine (1947) parapsychology had a distinct mission to trace mind across space and time and perhaps across death. This was his purpose, to demonstrate to the world that there is a dimension of human nature that goes beyond the limitations traditional science has imposed on our thinking. I doubt that any of us would be in this field were it not for Rhine's vision. Certainly we would not be meeting here in North Carolina. Let us join with Rhine and explore the possibility that mind is our subject matter and that a methodology exists or can be created to explore mind.

Rhine liked to re-examine his findings and theories. Let us take this attitude in tracing the features of mind. Rhine equated the physical world of everyday experience with the world of the science of physics. He saw mind in a different domain, not subject to physical limitations. But the image of the physical world has changed. Let us explore the concept of mind, body, and related terms with as few preconceptions as possible.

There are three sets of relationships I would like to discuss today. I want to explore the relation between self and other, between self and body, and between body and place. I shall suggest that psychic phenomena are expressions of a corporeal self that includes others and that exists in the world of space and time.

Mind, Body, Place, and Time

Self and Other. "Mind is the element or complex of elements in an individual that feels, perceives, thinks, wills, and especially reasons." (Webster, 1977). Mind comes from the same root as memory and our mental faculties, the way we perceive, think and reason are also memory faculties. Mind and memory are constituents of the self. I experience

myself in the present in terms of my history, of my past and I project myself into the future in terms of that same history. Similarly I am perceived by others as they know my past, present, and future through their minds and memories. When my past is brought into my present, the remembered other is also brought into my present. The others are part of my mind, my self, and my mind is part of theirs.

Self and Body. The self is a corporeal self. I now exist in a body. When I look to my past, I trace an embodied existence and when I look to the future, I project this body ahead. If the self is many, its bodies are also many. These bodies are part of my body and my body is part of theirs.

Body and Place. If I review my past, present, and future, I always find my body in particular places and among particular objects. My body is grounded in place. If the bodies of others are part of my body, the places and things that surround their bodies also surround mine. My body is emplaced in many locations. This mind-body is an enduring corpus. Without endurance or persistence I would have no mind and no body. My memories of the past define my self and my mind in the present, and they project this present mind into the future. In an advanced state of Alzheimer's there is no past and no future; the mind is gone. The body, too, is a product of the past projected to the future. It is substantiality, weight, heft, comes from foods ingested in the past and metabolized in the present to carry the body forward into the future. If my embodied and emplaced self includes other emplaced body-selves, it endures in these bodies and places, it has several pasts, presents, and future.

The Long Body. The mind or self I am describing here is not some mysterious or paranormal entity. It is our ordinary, everyday self, our lived mind-body. This mind and body, however, is not the mind-body studied by present day psychology and physiology. The focus of these sciences is a small body abstracted from a wider field of experience. The larger lived mind-body includes other people and the places and times of these people. I suggest that this mind is the subject matter of parapsychology and that our methodology should be oriented to an exploration of its features, of its reach.

To clarify the distinction between the small body studied by present day psychology and physiology and the larger body of which it is part, I use the metaphor of the long body for the latter. This concept, which originates in the native American tradition, has been introduced to parapsychology by my colleague at West Georgia College, Christopher Aanstoos (1986). I shall now relate the three characteristics of mind outlined above to some of the findings in parapsychology. I shall then

sketch some of the features of a research methodology that may aid in the investigation of mind.

Self and Other

I have recently made a surprising discovery. The main features of mind outlined here can be found in the writings of Sigmund Freud. The idea that the self incorporates others is central to psychoanalysis. According to Freud the self, especially the ego and super-ego, is formed by identification with significant others, such as parents and siblings. Psychoanalysis regards the mind or self as something like a corporate or team spirit whose purpose is to insure the comfort and continuation of the self. The evidence for this view comes from clinical studies. When the mind is disturbed this has been traced to the conflicting needs and values of the internalized others that compose it.

Edward Casey (1987) notes that to psychoanalysis "mind is *ineluctably inter-subjective in origin and import*" (p. 243) because it is based on identification and because

identification is always *with an other*, whether this other be parent, sibling, lover, friend, an ideal or even one's own mirror image. When Freud (1957, p. 77) spoke of a "new psychological action" by which every ego is formed, he meant the action of identification (mainly identification with one's parents); and the super-ego is entirely a product of identification. Even the id "inherits" identifications in the form of images and repressed memories, mixing these in with instinctual representatives. At every level, the human psyche is constituted by identifications. (p. 243-244)

Freud (1959) proposed a theory of how the notion of a separate self is formed:

The objects presenting themselves, in so far as they are sources of pleasure, are absorbed by the ego into itself, "introjected" (according to an expression coined by Ferenczi); while, on the other hand, the ego thrusts forth upon the external world whatever within itself gives rise to pain (the mechanism of projection) . . . Thus at the very beginning, the external world, objects, and that which was hated were one and the same thing. When later on an object manifests itself as a source of pleasure, it becomes loved, but also incorporated into the ego . . . (pp. 78-79)

Norman Brown (1966) relates the processes of identification and incorporation to Freud's interest in telepathy. "Identification" is par-

ticipation; self and not-self identified; an extrasensory link between self and not-self. Identification is action at a distance; or *telepathy*; the center of Freud's interest in the "occult." Freud (1964) said that "psychoanalysis by inserting the unconscious between what is physical and what was previously called 'psychical' has paved the way for the assumption of such processes as telepathy" (pp. 55).

Jan Ehrenwald (1971) explored the possibility of a telepathic relationship between the child and its parents, especially its mother. When the child is in the womb it is nurtured by the body of its mother. This continues after birth, but is now extended to the other needs that arise in the new and more complex environment. In this preverbal phase "signals are exchanged and mutual cuing occurs in a way which runs far ahead of the infant's capacity to make himself understood. At the same time the mother seems to 'understand' in a way which is difficult to account for in terms of the 'ordinary' means of communication." Telepathy, Ehrenwald suggests, would account for "the exchange of an infinite variety of primitive or protomessages between mother and child. At the same time it suggests that telepathy is in effect the embryological matrix of communication which is later destined to be superseded by speech." Telepathy ". . . follows the pattern of intrapsychic communication within one single, psychologically as yet undifferentiated personality structure."

According to this view, ESP may reflect connections within the same mind or self. ESP, if you will, is overhearing others in the mind talking when they are separated by space or time.

Psychoanalysis has shown that we can learn about the self when the self is disturbed. Like stars, atoms, and brains, the self may reveal its constituent parts and the forces that hold them together when it is disturbed.

J. Nickie Jackson (1986) has written a small volume in which she tells of a precognitive experience of her son's death and apparitional experiences following it. The psi experiences come at the end of the book. The text is mostly about her son's life, his death, and her grief. Glenn was injured in a football game and died from a staph infection two weeks later. The book begins in the hospital:

Glenn's father, stepmother, and I were waiting anxiously in the surgeon's office for the final results of a life-saving operation, hoping and praying for a successful outcome.

When the surgeon stepped quietly through the door his face reflected the dread in my heart. As he opened his mouth to speak I felt the blow of a sledgehammer strike my chest with a crushing,

shattering blow that sent gut-splintering screams echoing around the room. I just screamed and screamed until there were no sounds left to utter. Great gulping sobs wrenched my whole body as wave after wave of anguish tore at my heart; my soul had never experienced such torment. Then shocked disbelief and numbness took over. I was like a zombie, like someone else had taken over my body and I was watching from a distance. I later learned that shock is a form of protective armor that nature seems to give us for a few days . . .

After sleepless nights and long hours of waiting and watching, hoping and praying, and being afraid to hope, Glenn's bed was empty. Death came in the late afternoon of a bright October day. He was gone—this son I had held as a baby, who was so vitally alive, who had grown into a compassionate, caring young man. He was dead. My dreams for the future had been smashed. (pp. 1-2)

Glenn's death was the death of a part of his mother. A large segment of her life in the present and the future was erased and the meaning of the past diminished. A year before she said that she had woken up in terror from a dream that her son had died, but the circumstances were different from the actual event. His father told of a dream two months before that is more suggestive or precognition:

"I dreamt that I saw Glenn lying injured on the football field," he said, "with little things like frogs pouring out of his mouth in a steady stream," and he looked up at me and said, "Don't worry, Dad, they don't hurt," I touched him and knew that he was dead. And I wept." "I awoke from the dream with a vague feeling of unease, like waiting for a phone call that never comes. Only this time the call did come—just two months later." (p. 82)

Glenn's mother, father, grandmother, and sister had apparitional experiences following the death though mostly without ESP elements, that is, without verifiable elements. A possible exception involved Glenn's nephew:

One time when my seven-year-old grandson was visiting me, he went into Glenn's room and stayed for a long time. Feeling concerned, I went to check on him and found him sitting on the side of his bed with tears streaming down his little cheeks and clutching a picture of his uncle close to his chest. "Steven, are you all right?" I asked, and wrapped my arms around him. "Yes, Grandma Jack, I'm O. K. I just had a long talk with Uncle Glenn, and he told me all the things he used to do when he as a little boy."

I was amazed at the experiences my grandson related because they

were from Glenn's childhood and had not been told to Steven by anyone else. (p. 79)

The psi and theta experiences surrounding Glenn's death show two features that parapsychologists have also noted. The experiences often concern significant others and they often relate to the death or injury of these others. (L. E. Rhine, 1957a, 1957b, 1961; Schouten, 1979, 1981; Stevenson, 1970). Schouten's studies are of special interest because they suggest that the prevalence of these features are not just the result of a tendency to report more such cases than cases involving individuals that are only remotely connected and to report incidents that are less critical to these individuals.

Clear cases of ESP may be rare in the lives of most, but if we restrict ourselves to times of death or injury they may be much more frequent. The reason, I suggest, is that crisis cases of ESP involving close family and friends thereby involve the self of the ESP percipient. A threat to the other is a threat to the self and the death of the other is a death of part of the self.

Self and Body

My experience of myself involves my body. This is true not only of my present experiences; but also of my past and planned experiences. My existence is an embodied existence and it is embodied in many bodies. When people report apparent ESP experiences involving significant others they often describe bodily sensations.

A woman wrote me, "about one month before my dad died I was sitting at Denny's restaurant about twenty miles from where my dad was in the hospital (for cancer). It was around 11:00 p.m. and I felt a tremendous pain in my heart that took my breath away. I told my husband that my dad was having a heart attack—but it was too late to call. The next day I asked my mom if he was okay and she told me that he had a massive heart attack around 11:00 p.m. the night before."

Another woman told me when her son Kenny was a senior in high school, she was unable to sleep one night. "I couldn't sleep that night because my right knee was hurting so bad . . . The next day my husband called and told me that Kenny's knee was injured and he was in the hospital. Same knee, right knee. My knee never hurt before and it hasn't hurt since. I immediately knew why my knee hurt when I heard about his accident. It hurt most of all night."

A form of sympathetic pain that may be common and that may include a psi element is the "couvade syndrome," the bodily sensations some men experience during the pregnancy and labor of their partners.

In a study of this phenomenon, David Allan Rehorick (1987) describes apparent ESP sensing of his wife's condition.

A description of swelling in her feet, experienced about one month from term, is illustrative. During a business trip, I experienced swelling in both feet, followed by stiffness in my hands and fingers. Within a week, the problem had intensified and I could not strap on sandals. I thought that my swelling was caused by hot and humid weather. I also wondered if the toxic chemicals which I had recently been using might have had some effect. When I returned home, I learned that Salley had experienced fluid build-up in her feet and ankles. I was surprised by the fact that the problem extended to her hands and fingers. (pp. 8-9)

Rehorick suggests that the reason men may fail to recognize the connections between the experiences of their wives and their own symptoms is that they may attribute their symptoms, for instance of swelling, headaches, or gastrointestinal upsets to more familiar causes such as tension (p.8) or that they may simply ignore unfamiliar localized pains (p.10). Rehorick attributes this to our tendency to turn away from our own body as a source of knowledge and perception.

Body and Place

"To be embodied," Casey (1987) notes, "is *ipso facto* to assume a particular perspective and position . . . a *place* in which we are situated" (p. 182). A place is a container of objects and is identified in terms of these objects; to have a body is to be emplaced among objects; to have a body is to be emplaced among objects. If my body incorporates the bodies of those to whom I am close, it is also emplaced among their objects. Norman Brown (1966) regards the unconscious as a container of objects to which the person is attached (object-cathexes). This attachment between person and object, whether another person or an inanimate thing provides a psychic link "the original telepathy" between them.

The hidden psychic reality contained in the unconscious does not consist of fantasies, but of action at a distance, psychic streams, projects, in a direction: germs of *movement*; seeds of living thought. These seeds are Freud's "unconscious ideas," which are concrete ideas; that is to say ideas of things, and not simply of the words, or images inside the mind corresponding to the things outside. Concrete ideas are cathexes of things: "The Unconscious contains the thing-cathexes

of objects, the first and true object-cathexes"; the original telepathy. (p. 134)

How exactly does this relate to ESP? Casey (1987) states, "As embodied existence *takes place in place* . . . so our memory of what we experience in place is likewise place-specific" (p. 182). This leads to the observation that "*place is selective for memories*: that is to say a certain place will invite certain memories while discouraging others" (p. 182). The same situation holds for objects and memory.

Aanstoos (1986) suggests that our capacity for attunement with another person is also lived between our body and things. This attunement with things is reflected in the ESP practice of "psychometry" where the person connects with others through contact with objects they have touched.

This concept links "psyche," that is, the mental aspect of an object with "meter," or measurement, its physical aspect. William James (1909) proposed that memories may exist not only in association with human brains, but with other physical objects as well. According to James' theory a person's memories may persist after death in the objects with which the person was connected when living. An ESP subject may then obtain information about the person by contact with his or her object.

A number of rather impressive psychometry studies have been conducted over the years and the possibility of psychometric linkage has also come up in more conventional ESP tests (Roll, 1966, 1967, 1986; Pratt & Roll, 1968). In free response psychometry studies there may be a tendency to respond to traumatic events, such as accidents or sudden death, and also to frequent or recent events, tendencies we also find in other forms of ESP as well as in familiar types of memory.

Implications for Methodology

ESP may be a form of memory in two respects. Firstly, ESP may be a form of remembering insofar as a person's ESP response may be composed of his or her memory images. Secondly, the act of connecting with a distant person or situation, may be an act of reconnecting with, of remembering a part of our long body. This suggests two types of research procedures: one involves an exploration of memory schemata to facilitate the emergence of ESP; the other involves procedures to facilitate connecting with or re-membering the long body.

Exploring ESP Memories. The common insensitivity to ESP, what we might call long body amnesia, seems to involve a radical form of forgetting. It is so radical that many people are unaware of their psi con-

nections while others insist that ESP does not and cannot exist, that the human mind does not possess the cognitive schemata entailed by the postulate of ESP, in other words that it is impossible to bridge the spatial and temporal distances described in purported instances of ESP.

There is a form of forgetting that is familiar to most of us and that is so radical that it is all but impossible to penetrate; this is childhood amnesia. Most people are unable to recall events from the first years of their lives. Freud (1959) proposed that childhood amnesia is due to the repression of infantile sexuality brought about by feelings of shame instilled in the child as it learns the moral codes of adult society. Ernest G. Schachtel (1982) offers a hypothesis for childhood amnesia: "The categories (or schemata) of adult memory are not suitable receptacles for early childhood experiences and therefore not fit to preserve these experiences and enable their recall. The functional capacity of the conscious adult memory is usually limited to those types of experience which the adult consciously makes and is capable of making" (p. 192). Schachtel supposes that it is because adult memory schemata have no place for the child's wholehearted search for and indulgence in pleasure (p. 200) that childhood experiences cannot be reached by adult memory.

The child's world of sexual gratification and intimacy which, according to Freud and Schachtel, is closed territory to the adult, may be unreachable for other reasons. On the cognitive level this world shows distinct cognitive differences from the world of the adult (Anderson, 1985; Neisser, 1967; Piaget, 1952a, 1952b; Piaget & Inhelder, 1971). The unitary nature of the child's world may be especially inaccessible to the concepts of language and therefore to the world of the older child and the adult. Louisa Rhine (1961) mentions how she and J. B. Rhine

. . . at first brushed off as just coincidence the fact that one of our daughters, then about three years old, seemed repeatedly to voice my own unspoken thought . . . eventually we did take notice and I began to keep a diary, recording the incidents. In time, as the entries accumulated, it was possible to notice some recurring characteristics in these little episodes. The first . . . was the ease and effortlessness of the apparent transfer. One typical example occurred when the child was playing contentedly on the floor after breakfast and I was starting to clear the table. One piece of buttered toast remained and I was tempted. Then I thought, "No, I'm gaining. I must not eat it."

Just then the little voice, in true unflattering child-fashion, piped up: "Mama, you're fatter now than you've ever been, aren't you?"

And then, back to her own pursuits again—no follow-up, just as there had been no introduction to her thought. For several reasons I was "really stirred," but she was entirely oblivious. The remark was evidently based on an impression received so easily and naturally that she was entirely unaware of its extraneous source, and also of the fact that it had no rational introduction or relation to anything that went before or after.

The episode also illustrates another characteristic of telepathy often noticeable in the experiences of both adults and children. It is the obliqueness of the remarks. For in them the other person's idea seems to have been reconstructed and adapted to the child's viewpoint, instead of being repeated exactly. (pp. 137–138)

Rhine (1961) finds that such experiences may first be noticed when the child is very young, become frequent about the ages of three to four, then decrease and cease entirely when the child enters school. Experimental studies of ESP in this age group have also been relatively successful (e.g., Drucker, Drewes, & Rubin, 1977). The age when telepathy interactions seem most frequent thus correspond to Piaget's (1952a, 1952b) preoperational stage. This period, which is characterized by the child's tendency to deal with things as they appear concretely in the perceptual field, extends from two to seven, when the child has learned many of the rules of the adult world.

If adult cognitive schemata and abilities are inversely related to ESP, we might expect older children who are mentally retarded to show more evidence of ESP than children of the same age groups who have developed normally. Eloise Shields (1976), who worked as a psychologist in a school for severely retarded children and also in a school for unimpaired children, received many more reports of spontaneous cases of ESP and precognition from the staff of the former school than from the staff of the latter. In a series of tests with 75 children, ages 7 to 21, who had been diagnosed as having Down's syndrome or other forms of impairment and with mean IQs of 40–46, she obtained highly significant scores under telepathy conditions and suggestive results in clairvoyance tests. The experimental conditions in the telepathy trials did not conclusively rule out sensory cues from the speech therapist who acted as telepathic agent, but Shields is of the opinion that they did not contribute all the results of this series. Shields notes that these children, "are often primitive in personality and actions, and extremely dependent upon adults for their very survival . . . The superiority of

the telepathy scores also reflects the high degree of rapport between the children and the speech therapist from whom the children may 'borrow' knowledge symbiotically in lieu of having knowledge themselves."

The unitary world of the child may be beyond adult thinking and language, or at least Western thinking, because language imposes sharp delineations into self and other, and sharp temporal and spatial categories. As the child learns to speak, it learns to experience the world in terms of these categories and to ignore events, feelings, and impressions that are not encompassed by them. At the same time there would be no means whereby the older child and the adult could consciously recapture and recall its earlier experiences.

There are exceptions to childhood amnesia. One such exception may be what Sheryl Wilson and Theodore Barber (1983) refer to as the "fantasy prone personality." These persons, who may constitute four percent of the population, show characteristics that are relevant to our discussion. They report an unusual capacity to recall early childhood memories, they are highly imaginative and spend a significant part of their days day-dreaming and fantasizing, and they believe themselves to be psychic and to have frequent ESP type experiences. A study of the childhood of some fantasy prone individuals suggests that they had a stressful childhood and that their world of imagination served as an escape (Roll, 1982).

The purported recall of childhood memories and of psychic experiences are rarely verified and it needs to be determined to which extent the memory and ESP claims are genuine. With respect to the latter it is perhaps suggestive that some psi sensitives ("mediums") whose ESP capacities have been empirically demonstrated (Roll, 1982) are probably fantasy prone. Perhaps the fantasy prone individuals avoided childhood amnesia because they retained their psychic schemata into adulthood, thus also retaining a mnemonic continuation with their earlier experiences.

The effort to retain or restore the world of psychic connections may entail allowing more rein to imagination. It may be the ESP subject's capacity to imagine that makes possible the arrangement of available memory images so that they match the distant situation. The play of imagination in ESP, however, creates a problem because of the difficulty of distinguishing imagination evoked by ESP from imagination evoked by other, more personal factors. The successful psi sensitive may be the rare individual who has an active imagination, who is able to experience the connections between things that usually seem distant, and

who knows enough about the workings of his or her mind to identify the sources of its images.

Exploring long body connections: Performance in laboratory memory tests is usually poorer than in natural situations (Istomina, 1982; Keenan, MacWhinney, & Mayhew, 1982). Similarly results in laboratory tests for ESP rarely reach the quality of reported cases of ESP in real life situations.

Experimental methodology in parapsychology has largely been based on the dualistic image of a mind that can be detached from its body. In a test of ESP or PK the subject's body is placed in a room in a laboratory, while the subject's mind is instructed to go to the target wherever it might be in space or time. This mind, supposedly unbounded by physical limitations and governed only by its free will, would then be expected to go where directed. When results did not follow expectations, we speculated that the impediments were mental; the subject did not have sufficient belief, confidence, or motivation. And indeed some studies showed that these conditions do affect results. Nevertheless when all known psychological factors were taken into account, we have still been unable to replicate results at will or even to give a convincing account for our failure to do so.

If parapsychology deals with the long body, then that body, not the small body, should be the focus for research methodology. Conventional test procedures may impede rather than support the participation of the long body by the very parameters of the experimental design. The test of ten has little personal meaning to the subject; it typically takes place in an alien environment where the subject is surrounded by strangers with whom he or she shares no history. From the long body point of view, the body we attempt to engage in an ESP or PK test is often an amputated body.

If psi phenomena reflect relationships within a system that in part can be described in terms of the subject's personal history then that history must be engaged if consistent or meaningful results are to be expected. The researcher needs to determine the meaning of psi in the life of the subject and the extent to which the test responds to that lived meaning. If the subject comes to the test hoping to understand and perhaps develop his or her psi relationships, the researcher needs to address these aims.

Then, if results are obtained during initial testing it needs to be determined what effect these results have on the subject. Opening oneself to ESP impressions in relation to people with whom there can be no other intimacy may engender anxiety and may lead to a closing or distortion of the psychic connection. ESP entails a disclosure or sharing

of one's personal history, of who one is and what one hopes to be. It is an act of intimacy that we cannot expect to be lightly given or accepted.

The subject in a psi test is not only the person who walks into the laboratory to be tested. The experimenter effect, where the subject's performance is affected by the experimenters, including assistants who may not even interact physically with the subject, suggest that experimenters and subjects have become members of the same long body. The meaning of the test to the experimenter then also becomes a focus for attention and gives rise to the same questions asked of the subjects.

According to the long body model, this also includes the physical setting of the test. By connecting with the laboratory and equipment the subject connects with the past and present users of the laboratory, an interaction which may affect the results of the test. The long body model implies a laboratory psi effect no less than it implies the experimenter effect and it implies a methodology that responds to the possibility that the psychometric aspects of the laboratory may affect results.

A psi study is not necessarily replicated by reproducing the manifest test conditions. The meaning that the earlier study had to the participants must be recaptured if similar results are to be expected in the later study. Like other living organisms the long body is a changing body and it may be necessary to change the test conditions to retain their meaning.

These conditions can fairly easily be met and have actually been met in several parapsychological studies. In the PK work of Kenneth Batchelder (1966, 1983) a group met repeatedly to produce movements of objects and other large-scale PK effects. Batchelder reported PK occurrences of several types under what appeared to be good conditions or observation. Brookes-Smith (1973) and Brookes-Smith and D. W. Hunt (1970), obtained similar effects under improved conditions of observation. Batchelder's approach also bore fruit in the study by A. R. G. Owen (Owen & Sparrow, 1976) where an attempt was made to evoke "Philip," a ghost whose identity and history the group members themselves had invented.

In all studies a lighthearted state of arousal was maintained in the group coupled with a focused intensity aimed at PK effects. For the Philip group, there was a sense of "complete rapport" which ". . . was more than just a 'good friend' feeling; the group members have come to regard themselves as a family, and they behave together very like a closely knit family" (p. 77).

In an ESP group experiment conducted by Doris Koop (1986) and me, ESP exchanges within the group seemed to emerge following pro-

cedures that stimulated group cohesiveness and dissociated states. This special rapport also resulted, in apparent instances of ESP between them.

You may object that in experimental studies of ESP there is only a casual relationship between subject and experimenters. I suggest that this may be one reason why results are rarely sustained. Secondly, the purpose of the test rarely has the significance of the events to which people respond in natural situations. An ESP test should take account of the meaning the results may have for the subject. If ESP entails an opening or sharing of the self, the experimenter must be able to fill the role of the significant other. In this context it would be interesting to explore the relationship between Rhine and Pratt and their star subjects in the early studies at Duke. The psychoanalytic concept of transference might be relevant here. Nowadays we know that the experimenters are also subjects. But we are not, I feel, paying enough attention to the meaning the results may have for the researchers.

Parapsychology is still struggling with the issue of objectivity. If the researcher has a strong, personal investment in his or her studies, we tend to suspect them. On the other hand, if the researcher is remote and "objective," the subject may feel like an object that is cut off and used for the purpose of the test. Psi research calls for a combination of personal engagement and impersonal appraisal.

The experimental parapsychologist is usually skilled in what, with Bohm, we might call the explicate conduct and assessment of research. We are less knowledgeable about the implicate dimensions of this work. It is not only the results of a test that may—or may not contain evidence of psi. Psi, that is, the psyche, the minds of subjects and experimenters may be enfolded in all aspects of the test situation, including its material aspects and may contribute or detract from the results.

Conclusion

Parapsychology, I suggest, has a distinct subject matter and its subject matter, as Rhine saw, is the mind. This mind reaches into and incorporates the other and it reaches into the material world and also enfolds that world. This image leads to empirical hypotheses and to the means to test them.

Parapsychology questions the distinctions of the world into separate realms of mind and matter, self and other, here and there, now and then. These divisions have had debilitating effects on human life. By extracting mind and meaning from the material world, matter is seen as a lifeless substance. The corporeal world has been endowed with

the meaning of death—entropy with the exclusion of negentropy—and a death dealing technology has been created to hasten the destruction. The process is supported by the image of others as aliens, as threats to the self to be overcome rather than as parts to be integrated.

If we question these distinctions we also question the notion of an objective reality and of the scientist as an investigator whose explorations can be separated from his or her intentionality. The findings of parapsychology suggest that science is a dialectic that may change the world at the same time as it explores it. This, too, is said by other disciplines. Parapsychology goes further, however, because of its subject matter. If mind extends into the other and is enfolded in matter, then a clear distinction can no longer be made between private intentions and public events. The way I am, even by myself, the way I think and feel, might then have consequences for others. Also my unconscious feelings and problems might affect others in the direct and immediate way of psi, perhaps especially my unconscious mind might have such effects.

This scenario is not easy to contemplate. Perhaps this is why parapsychology meets such vehement opposition and perhaps this is why we ourselves have found it so hard to come to grips with our subject matter.

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DISCUSSION

MORRIS: I found your whole paper really very interesting. I think you have gone considerably beyond what you presented at the PA conference in terms of deriving some of the implications of, for instance, the long body notion. I do have a minor disagreement with regard to the notion of anomaly. I think that a science, especially as defined within the terms of knowledge, quite frequently finds itself exploring anomaly. Anomaly represents circumstance where knowledge really is weak and needs to be expanded most. I think often science proceeds as it defines a problem and a problem can be defined in terms of a set of thematically related anomalies. When Rhine was dealing with the notion of mind he seemed to be studying it in terms of what appear to be anomalous interactions between self and environment. He evolved a set of methodologies to study them, but these seemed to deal just with certain characteristics of the notion of mind. The original societies for psychical research I think tended more to come at it from the idea of mind and wanting to explore evidence for its range of properties. Those societies have been at it for quite some time with certainly no more progress than formal structured parapsychology. I am wondering what you would see as the most important lines of departure coming from your concept of the long body with regards most especially to the traditions that have been used within the societies for psychical research, where they really were taking on the notion of mind very directly.

ROLL: First of all, the departure comes in seeing body and mind as indistinguishable or, if you will, as descriptions of different aspects of the same thing. So when you have mind, you have body. Second, a body is always emplaced so that where you have a body you have a place. Third, the self is a group or corporation in a very literal way composed of others. The psychic connection then is the self. There is no need for any further links, the missing link is the self. The self is the other, the self is corporeal, it is a group of bodies and these bodies are emplaced in space and time.

MORRIS: And what does that lead you to do that is different?

ROLL: It leads to a series of hypotheses focusing on this notion. It leads to a unified description of our phenomena including so called haunting cases, psychometry cases, and reincarnation cases, which are place-oriented as far as I can make out. And with that comes the hypothesis that if psi is going to work, if ESP is going to work, the experimenter has to be connected with the self of the person. There has to be the same kind of relationship with that individual as there is between individuals the person is close to. So it leads to a number of experimental designs several of which have actually been carried out by various parapsychologists. Jim Carpenter's group experiment reflects this type of thinking. The Batchelder studies and the Brooke-Smith and Hunt studies in Great Britain, the Philip studies in Canada reflect this kind of procedure. So do some experiments that I did with Doris Koop involving group studies of ESP. So there are two ways you can go; you can go out in the field and you can study psi there and what you see is the long body, as far as I can make out, or you can create the long body in the laboratory.

BRAUD: I like your concept of the long body very much, as you probably know. It occurred to me that you might make use of this concept in dealing with the issue that Richard Broughton addressed: introducing need into experiments. The kinds of needs that Richard addressed were all needs in the service of individual survival. Now if what you say is correct, and I think it is, we also have other needs. Needs involving membership in the long body or connectedness with other people, connectedness with all of nature. I think we might use our psi experiments as opportunities for remembering and we could actually bring in some symbols or some additional tools to remind our participants of our membership in the long body. That very participation in the experiment would serve to fulfill that need, to add another element of motivation to the study. Chuck has done something along these lines by using superimposed images of the agent and percipient in his ganzfeld experiments. With some ingenuity we might be able to think of more similar ones.

ROLL: Bob has some speculations about meaning and psi, Debbie Weiner's Presidential Address to the PA was focused on this same realm and Richard's paper was very much also to the point. Everything that I know in the field with some confidence, such as the work on dissociation, the ganzfeld work and Rex's work all fit into the view of the larger connection that I call the long body and that I think is no more than the emplaced mind-body.

RAO: Bill, I would like to compliment you on your being so forthright

and speaking about mind without any inhibitions. I have been tempted several times to do just the same, but then when I looked into the implications I began to lose courage. Precisely for the reason you gave in support of the use of the concept of mind I am afraid we may be left with no subject matter if we talk in terms of mind as the subject matter of parapsychology. It seems to me that mind is more an explanatory concept to account for certain phenomena with which we are dealing and it can not by and of itself be a subject matter. So I would like to make a distinction between parapsychology which proceeds without any theoretical presupposition about the ultimacy of the phenomenon we are dealing with and philosophical psychology that is concerned with what lies behind the phenomena themselves. While I agree with rational discussion of the meaning and the place of psi phenomena in the order of things, I believe we should not prejudge the phenomena.

ROLL: I understand your point of view. It is really very much the point of view of the field until now. At the same time I feel that, for myself, I need to say what psi is and it has to do with the self. Now I equate the self, the mind and the psyche. To me these are the same.

RAO: How do you define mind?

ROLL: The mind is the meaning of things to us, our intentionality, consciousness, the intentionality of a human being, the memory of a human being, the consciousness of a human being. So this I see as mind. The word self or psyche as far as I am concerned will do equally well. But then when I look at the self I always see it as corporeal, as embodied. So I see mind and body as the same, but as descriptive of different aspects of that one thing. When I try to convey the significance and the importance of this work I have to do it in terms of something that resonates with my mind and with the minds of those I am speaking to. We can now say something about this parapsychological subject matter. If we are going to say it all in one phrase it is the mind or the mind-body or the self. If we are going to describe it in detail then we describe it in terms of the findings of parapsychology.

STANFORD: Even if we may not like the way that Bill Roll has phrases for the specific concept of the long body, I hope we will not neglect the kinds of things that his construct is pointing toward and is trying to cover and help us to understand. It gives a broader view of the meaning to the individual of our psi experiments and I think that is really important. There are a number of observations that parapsychologists of the experimental and of the non-experimental kinds have made that are interesting anecdotal observations that seem to fit in with the kind of concerns that you have. William Braud and I were

discussing at lunch one such observation which we have both made in our laboratories and which I imagine others have as well. It is rather a striking experience that quite often a subject comes into our laboratory for a ganzfeld session, let us say, and among the predominant imagery that he brings up during the session is a particular theme that the immediately previous subject has discussed. Now it is difficult to evaluate this scientifically and know what it means, but it certainly has a suggestive value to us who have seen it again and again. In like vein, psychoanalytically oriented parapsychologists have pointed out that, in the course of therapy when there seems to be some lack of communication between the client and the therapist, it is at that point that the client or the patient seems to intrude into their beingness, if you will, in the psi way by starting to dream about salient things that are happening in their lives. I think this is very closely related to what you are talking about. It is a shared extension of being which we invite people to participate in psi experiments. I am not wild about the concept of long body because it links it onto something material, but I look at it in a more existential kind of framework. But I think we are really talking about the same kind of phenomena. I do not know quite how to come to grips with them, but they seem to be potent factors and to represent needs in people who we deal with which we ought to acknowledge in some way.